Search results

The purpose of this paper is to provide an understanding of the specific techniques through which illicit funds generated by criminals are moved, transferred and laundered in the financial arrangement retained by cash-intensive businesses in the UK and internationally.

This paper presents exploratory findings from research conducted between 2011 and 2013 in the UK. The research undertaken sought to identify the process, steps and vulnerabilities behind money laundering via cash-intensive businesses and highlight the explicit facilitators to enable this method of money laundering to take place.

Despite significant research into money laundering typologies, the use of cash couriers and cash-intensive businesses has remained largely untouched regardless of the increased implementation of anti-money laundering (AML) policies and procedures seeking to halt the depositing of illicit cash into the global financial system. This paper demonstrates how cash-intensive businesses are extremely vulnerable to money laundering, despite the large-scale AML efforts focused on combating money laundering across a broad range of sectors.

This paper is of value to government policymakers, regulators and financial institutions considering future preventative measures. It is also of value to financial investigators and law enforcement agencies intent on investigating money laundering. While the paper relies on data from the UK, the overall findings are such that wherever cash-intensive businesses exist, so too does the opportunity for money laundering through the financial arrangement retained by such businesses.

This paper presents new research on the direct link existing between cash-intensive businesses and money laundering in the UK, despite significant research having previously taken place to identify and develop money laundering typologies.

Uses examples from US case law to illustrate how money laundering has been attempted in the past. Details a large number of specific methods: cash couriers, cash conversion, safe deposit facilities, credit cards, foreign bank accounts, alternative or parallel remittance systems, trusts, precious metal and gems, art and antiques, expensive lifestyles, fictitious loans, real property, cars, boats and planes, stocks and bonds, bearer bonds, casinos, negotiable instruments, cash for cheque exchanges, business, investment funds, non‐profit organisations, shell corporations, and working capital for a criminal enterprise. Also indicates the factors influencing choice of money laundering methods: the amount of money to be laundered, the availability of professional services from people willing to be involved, the scope for intimidation or corruption of professionals, and so on.

This study aims to develop a newer, revised model of money laundering of general application, and to apply that updated laundering model to the use of cash in Canada. A wide-ranging analytical tool for identifying money laundering is described, which demands a comparative evaluation of available financial choices against choices made, concentrating on factors which matter most to economic enterprises: speed, cost and security. The model is applied to bulk cash money laundering and the use of cash in the Canadian context, a mature economy where cash is predominantly used for micro-payments. The inference of criminality to be drawn from bulk use of cash is explored, as is any need for continued circulation of large denomination banknotes.

Extensive criminal investigative experience is juxtaposed with practices of legitimate commerce. As to patterns of transactional conduct, a review is undertaken of publications from financial institutions including the Bank of Canada.

The model may be applied generally. In light of modern banking realities, strong inferences of criminality arise from the bulk use of cash.

Documented standards of legitimate commerce and proven laundering behaviours provide more reliable evidence than voluntary disclosures from surveys.

The model promotes an objective analysis of financial conduct either in conjunction with, or independent of extrinsic evidence, and can augment historic lists of laundering indicators and identify new laundering typologies.

The speed, cost and security model moves towards a renewed paradigm for understanding laundering, beyond traditional cash-based models. This instructive model applies to the full spectrum of laundering, from frauds to cash-based street crimes. By examining the inherent characteristics of financial choices, investigations may proceed without tipping off targets. The model maximizes the investigative value of know-your-customer information.

The purpose of this article is to review the legislation on limitation on cash payment from a comparative perspective with France. This legal provision has been the subject of inconsistency and lack of clarity for the past two decades.

This paper uses a doctrinal legal research technique based on an analysis of the law and how it is interpreted in relation to Mauritius's prohibition on cash payments. Section 5 of the FIAMLA 2002 is interpreted in large part by this assessment using legal precedents from the Supreme Court and other Mauritius judicial authorities. France has been chosen as the comparative jurisdiction as it has well-defined legal framework on cash payment limitations in Europe.

The Mauritian judiciary has played a far more significant and active role than the French judiciary. A cursory search reveals a dearth of case law concerning the interpretation of the pertinent sections of the French Monetary and Financial Code concerning the prohibition on cash payments. The French legal system places more emphasis on the kinds of transactions that are exempt, whereas the Mauritius system places more attention on the entities that are exempt, such as banks and other financial organisations.

This paper fills in the gap that exists on legal interpretation of legislation on limitation on payment by cash in Mauritius. It originally contributes to legal literature on money laundering by undertaking a comparison between Mauritius and France for the benefits of students and researchers around the world.

This paper aims to conduct a comparison on the effectiveness of the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) of Australia and Malaysia in investigating money laundering cases by looking into the legal system and operational issues faced in conducting the investigation.

The purpose of this paper is to review and analyze the data collected from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation Report, focusing on the information outlined in the third chapter. The legal system and operational issues cover the area of technical compliance and effectiveness compliance, which were introduced in the latest FATF Evaluation Methodology issued in 2013.

The results show that both countries have the power needed to investigate money laundering and terrorism financing under their respective Anti-Money Laundering Act. However, Australia is seen to have a better investigative support system to assist LEAs during the investigation process. This explains the reason for difficulties in increasing the number of prosecutions for money laundering and terrorism financing cases. Hence, improvement actions are needed in curbing this issue.

The result suggests that Malaysia should strengthen the cooperation, coordination and capacity among LEAs to ensure effective targeting, investigation and prosecution of money laundering. The government should also revise the money laundering investigation time frame and broaden the power of LEAs in retrieving information during the investigation process. Malaysia should also enhance the investigative support system, which will be helpful for LEAs in gathering sufficient evidence to support their money laundering charges. Unlimited power in gathering evidence is prominent to charge money launders as it helps to gather information required for prosecution.

Prior literature focuses on the prevention mechanism, where this paper aims to focus on detection and investigation mechanism focusing on money laundering investigation conducted by LEAs. Lack of study on money laundering investigation calls for this research to be done to understand the strengths and weaknesses to improve its effectiveness in the future.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the international community efforts through the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in confronting tax evasion and money laundering (ML).

The paper is based on the confrontation of OECD's and FAFT's results with data produced by the World Bank and Transparency International.

The G20 has speeded up the fight against tax evasion. There is no dilemma between confronting tax evasion or organized crime/terrorist ML but a potential crowding out effect and a risk of facade compliance. Corruption and poor governance have regional aspects but generate money for global laundering. The OECD is impressive in countering tax evasion. Its listing is not universal and gives satisfaction to jurisdictions having bad corruption/governance indicators. The FATF's record is striking but governance remains an issue as well as fair cooperation, and the ML and terrorist financing (TF) threat is evolving. New risks include tax evasion know‐how, facade compliance, rising bad banks and financial centres in poorly governed jurisdictions. There is a destabilizing effect in the competition and linkage between weakly and highly compliant institutions and jurisdictions. The misuse of the financial sector has a bright future as long as poor governance continues to affect jurisdictions.

The paper is a call to practitioners, professionals and policy makers for keeping the momentum on ML and taking into account governance indicators.

The paper puts a parallel between the actions of the international community on tax evasion and ML and confronts official results with relevant assessments on corruption and governance.

Pakistan is predominantly a cash-based economy, with consumers showing several traits ranging from low confidence on the electronic commerce security, poor access to banking, absence of widespread awareness of e-payments and other religious and psychological barriers to adopting alternatives to cash. This study aims to examine e-payment modes in Pakistan with respect to their impact on supplier and consumer behaviour before and during the pandemic times.

The research follows a qualitative approach. Focus groups and interviews are conducted to carry out an in-depth analysis of consumer and supplier behaviour.

The findings show that customers are not satisfied with the current e-commerce system in Pakistan, whereas though producers prefer prepayments, they are forced to rely on cash on delivery. However, due to the recent COVID-19 outbreak, consumers are going cashless to avoid physical cash and observe safety protocols. To convert this temporary and enforced patronage of online transactions into a long-term and sustainable one, massive marketing and a combined effort from the government, private bodies and financial institutions is required.

The study was conducted using online interviews which has the drawback of connection issues, delays and lags in the connectivity, and hence may lead to miss important gestures for data analysis.

This research can be of benefit to online consumers and the supplier side of the online retail industry, by providing them with insight into the various factors that affect consumer behaviour towards e-commerce payment options. An understanding of the behavioural motivators of consumers will allow e-retailers in developing more marketing strategies that are effective, to improve the satisfaction level of their customers and contribute to the development of Pakistan’s e-commerce sector into a globally competitive one.

It is now generally recognised that, when investigating acquisitive crime, investigators must focus not just on obtaining evidence of the commission of the underlying crime itself, but also on what happened to the criminal proceeds. While there has been significant culture change in the UK so that investigators now focus to a greater degree on the proceeds of crime, this is usually from the perspective of tracing what remains of the proceeds so that the confiscation legislation may be applied. Even then such a focus is patchy and inconsistent and much work remains to be done to ensure that the confiscation legislation is applied in a rigorous manner.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the strategic intelligence oversights with regards to the funding of terrorism.

The paper considers the modus operandi of terrorist financing, and how and how speedily or otherwise they were identified, and the international and national anti‐terrorist financing measure implemented post 9/11.

The paper concludes that there were (and still are) strategic oversights, delays and distractions by government law enforcement and financial regulatory agencies in combating terrorist financing.

The paper suggests there should be more proactive exchange of intelligence by law enforcement and financial regulatory agencies in combating financing of terrorism.

The added value is lessons learned in international efforts against financing of terrorism.