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Slowly, and driven by a growing recognition of the impact of organised crime on developing countries, as well as the allure developing countries represent to criminal groups, development agencies have begun to engage with the problem of criminality. As a new actor in this area though, the linkage between development actors and other stakeholders – particularly those at the security end of the spectrum – is mired by a series of tensions. The explicit connection between crime and development in the Sustainable Development Goals increases the incentive, and urgency, for development actors to work through these tensions. However, the response often replicates the focus of security actors, such as building the capacity of law enforcement agencies to arrest criminals and seize illicit goods. This approach neglects the specific value that development offers in the response to organised crime. This chapter will map out the tensions that exist between security and development actors, and their impact on the response to organised crime. It will then consider what development can contribute to the response, drawing on examples from Libya and Mexico.

This chapter outlines the co-operative possibilities that may occur between terrorists and organised criminals. It focuses specifically on the decision making processes of organised criminals, outlining the factors that affect any decision they may make that involves a move to assist those engaged in terrorism, the ‘initial nexus’. It accomplishes this with specific reference to the perceived entrepreneurial aspects of organised crime, using the work of Baumol specifically, but also expanding the scope of the criminal’s considerations of ‘profit’ beyond simply financial gain.

A literature review and potential model of the decision making processes of organised criminals working within an initial nexus relationship is presented, supported by a range of opinions.

We suggest a number of factors that affect organised criminals decision making process when co-operating with terrorists for profit. These factors include: the nuances of criminal cultures, the use of calculated deception, cultural affinity and geographical distance from spheres of operation.

In the main the chapter presents the decision making processes of organised criminal income generation through those involved in academia and law enforcement. However, there is an acknowledgement of the need to gather the views of those involved in organised crime, and an outline of potential methods of research to achieve this.

It highlights this under-researched area to both academic and law enforcement professionals. Suggestions regarding potential areas of policy focus to interrupt initial nexus relationships are made.

Provides an insight into this under-researched area, and may affect the perception of criminal decision making processes for academics, law enforcement professionals and the public at large.

The model presented is a means by which the potential for more accurate assessment of criminal action and associated risk calculation can be predicted.

Contemporary policing and the control of (organised) crime involve priority setting, strategic planning and the use of strategic planning tools. The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to the fast‐growing body of literature on intelligence‐led policing, and explore new concepts and methods to aid the strategic decision making of actors involved in policing organised crime.

This paper argues that priority setting and strategic planning in the field of organised crime is inherently characterised by uncertainty. The authors examine to what extent policymakers can plan and anticipate coming organised crime threats. It is argued that, while predicting such issues is impossible, policymakers can prepare for them. It is suggested that the field of scenario studies can provide tools that can support strategic planning and the assessment of security challenges in the field of organised crime control. A scenario study is presented on the vulnerability of economic sectors to illustrate and develop this claim.

Scenario studies do not predict the future of organised crime, nor do they replace information‐gathering methodologies and crime intelligence applications that support concrete criminal investigations. Scenario studies are sensitising tools that force strategic planners to examine the assumptions and knowledge base on which they base their decisions. To that end, scenario studies combine the analysis of law enforcement data and scientific analysis of organised crime with analysis of issues most vital to societies, regions, cities, etc. The analytical focus shifts from targeting concrete offenders to detecting opportunities and weaknesses in structural processes that may not always be visible to police organizations, but pose significant security risks if left unattended. The scenario study that is presented on the vulnerability of economic sectors in the EU illustrates that scenario studies can amend traditional crime intelligence in this manner.

The paper is limited to a conceptual study and a concrete scenario study. Future research might shed more light on implementation/evaluation issues of scenario‐based planning.

The paper offers a conceptual and methodological framework for scenario‐based strategic planning.

The paper intends to advance the debate on organized crime assessments in light of the development towards intelligence‐led policing strategies. To that end, new concepts and a different methodological framework are suggested.

Politicians justified the introduction of the illiberal and liberal parts of the UK's anti‐money laundering and asset recovery regime by reference to the extra‐ordinary threat posed by organised crime. This paper attempts to evaluate the extent to which the financial measures contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002 and the Serious and Organised Crime and Policing Act 2005 are actually used against this threat.

The objective is achieved by reference to four distinct datasets found on the use of these measures. The first consists of the regular, usually monthly, bulletins on the Proceeds of Crime produced by the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA). The second – which reveals the length of sentences given to those convicted of money laundering offences under the POCA – was gathered from the Financial Action Task Force, the Home Office and Justice Office in Scotland. The third consists of the value of the cases which had been, and which were being, dealt with by the ARA at the time the National Audit Office produced it's report on the institution. The fourth is the number of financial reporting orders which have been imposed upon criminals, follows the discovery of an earlier version whilst examining parliamentary records.

The triangulated results suggest that the POCA powers – originally used by use against organised crime – were used against this alleged threat only on a small minority and number of occasions.

This infrequent use raises major questions of either the ability of the policing agencies including the Serious and Organised Crime Agency to take on organised crime and/or the credibility of those who exaggerated a threat of organised crime to justify the (often illiberal) powers.

This paper questions whether the POCA will achieve one of its original aims. It will interest politicians and practitioners concerned with the combating of organised crime and/or anti‐money laundering and asset recovery as well as criminologists and those interested in civil liberties.

The purpose of this paper is to research how local councils in England responded to a national initiative intended to address the risk of the involvement of organised crime in local government procurement fraud. In so doing, it considers definitional issues before undertaking original research to explore how councils responded and, through in-depth interviews with three councils, what initial explanations may explain the responses. It concludes that the national initiative was insufficiently thought-through, and that councils’ responses were significantly influenced by the relevance of the threat of organised crime, financial constraints and competing priorities.

The case study involves a literature review, an analysis of official documentation, a questionnaire to local councils in the north of England and semi-structured interviews with anti-fraud practitioners in three councils in the northeast of England. The approach is to provide an analysis of the implementation of a national initiative to promote a local government response to procurement fraud by organised crime.

On the basis of original research, the paper proposes that the national initiative was insufficiently thought-through, and that councils’ responses were influenced by the relevance of the threat of organised crime, financial constraints and competing priorities.

The research looks at a national initiative and how local councils responded within the context of financial and other constraints. The research is limited in terms of the range of responses it sought, and that it only studied the experience of three local councils in detail. On the other hand, its findings support further research into the implementation of national initiatives in terms of practice on the ground.

The findings identify issues surrounding the design and implementation of national anti-fraud policies from the perspective of local government and will be of value to practitioners and academics interested in fraud, policing, organised crime, local government and policy making.

The paper is the first study in the UK on the local implementation of national strategies on procurement fraud and organised crime and raises positive and less-positive aspects of how far national strategies and intentions are addressed on the ground, with a focus on what factors may influence local implementation.

This study aims to examine organized crime, corruption and their challenges to the economic growth of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Organized crime and corruption can have a grossly negative impact on the economic growth process of every system, but the extent of damage they have needs to be measured to determine the policy implications to the region.

The study uses the fixed effects model and the feasible generalized least square known also as the random-effects model with the pooled ordinary least square as a control on the defined objectives using secondary time series data that covers the period 2000 to 2019 for 11 countries in the ECOWAS region. The panel nature of the data set provides a rich degree of freedom with 220 (20 years for 11 countries – 20*11 = 220) observations.

Results show among others that organized crime does not have a significant impact on economic growth, whereas corruption significantly reduces economic growth.

Unavailability of data affected the scope of the study in the areas of a number of countries selected and years chosen for the study. The implication is that it would have given the study better degrees of freedom.

The practical implication of this study has exposed corruption hinders economic growth in West Africa.

The social implication of the study is that it has exposed that though the organized crime was a bad phenomenon it does not retard economic growth significantly in West Africa.

This study is original and of immense importance as its the first study to focus on organized crime and corruption’s influence on economic growth among West African states.

The purpose of this paper is to consider organized crime as various forms of business activity which may or may not have attracted the label of criminality. In particular, how perceptions of legitimacy and the effects of other normative factors will influence strongly whether activities, individuals and groupings may be viewed as constituent parts of organized crime.

This paper first discusses some of the ambiguities surrounding the definition and practice of organized crime. It then emphasizes the inherent business focus of much organized crime activity and the crucial importance of legitimacy contexts in decision making seeking to counter organized crime.

The overall effects of organized crime are generally negative for society and organized crime activity can be brutal and harmful. The paper closes by acknowledging the rationality of at least some organized crime activity.

The paper considers the law enforcement potential in developing counter‐strategies that consider organized crime as part of the continuum of business.

The purpose of this paper is to show the interconnectivity between the economic sphere, governance and organised crime and to shed light on the role of white-collar crime and show that constant redefining of the term “organised crime” has certain downfalls.

Methods of analysis and examination of relevant domestic and foreign primary and secondary resources and legal acts are used. The paper is theoretical in nature, as review of literature was the main method used for our argumentation.

The term and phenomena of organised crime have now long enjoyed the attention of many researchers, institutions, policymakers and others. And yet, in this quest for unification, proper definition and classification, it seems that we have somewhat strayed from that original idea of what organised crime represented in the period when this term was first coined. Unfortunately, by doing so, we failed to include the most dangerous forms of behaviour, i.e. (some, not all!) white-collar crime, which falls within the scope of organised crime.

Despite the fact that ideas presented in this paper belong to the old masters of criminology, they have lately been slightly forgotten. The paper is therefore useful to those who are interested in seeing how original ideas about the nature of organised crime are applicable today.

The paper provides an insight into the somewhat overlooked scholarship of those who deal with organised crime and white-collar crime.

There are increasing levels of concern in many countries about the threat posed by organised crime to established political structures and processes. This analysis considers some of the issues associated with the political influence of organised crime.

The forces of globalisation have had a profound effect on the world's economies and it should come as no surprise that they have given new opportunities for organised crime and new challenges for legal systems and law enforcement. While the phenomenon of organised crime is not new, it has been growing in recent years and is now generating and laundering huge illegal profits, subsequently investing them in legal business. Strategies against organised crime will be shaped by the mental models used to understand it, and anyone whose mental model of organised crime is derived from the Chicago gangsters of the 1920s or the Mafia godfather of cinematic fiction is using the mental model of a bygone era. Organised crime today must be understood using a business model and hence viewed as businesses, producing illicit goods and services, which vary in size and scale on a continuum from small, local businesses to multinational corporations. The business model assists in analysing the structures of organised crime and, by applying it, one can postulate for example that, at the latter end of the continuum, organised crime groups will, like all multinational corporations, have their own managing directors, finance directors and other corporate officers. The unprecedented challenge now facing law enforcement authorities is to develop effective strategies to combat these multinational corporations of organised crime.