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Research on the organizational ramifications of chief executive officer (CEO) greed remains scarce. This study intends to fill this gap by examining the impact of CEO greed on an important yet risky corporate strategy, corporate tax avoidance (CTA). Drawing on upper echelons theory, the authors argue that greedier CEOs tend to engage in more CTA. The relationship is weaker when CEOs experienced economic recessions in their early career and stronger when CEOs are endowed with equity ownership of their respective firms.

The authors test the hypotheses with data from US public firms from 1997 to 2008 and employ the ordinary least square regression analysis to analyze the hypothesized relationships. The authors also test the robustness of the results by performing the two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching analyses.

The findings lend broad support to all the hypotheses. The authors find that greedier CEOs tend to engage in more CTA by paying lower corporate taxes. The impact of greed on CTA is attenuated when CEOs are recession CEOs and is exacerbated when CEOs own large numbers of firm shares.

This paper contributes to the upper echelons research by investigating a novel executive personal characteristic, greed, and its negative impact on an important organizational outcome. This paper also contributes to the growing tax research that recognizes the important role executives play in shaping corporate tax strategies.

This study aims to examine the impacts of board chairman characteristics on the decision to finance with debts.

Based on historical data from 173 active nonfinancial firms listed on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Stock Exchange Markets during 2012–2019, this research uses ordinary least squares (OLS) and dynamic system-generalized methods of moments to test its hypotheses. The final dataset comprises 1,384 firm-year observations from 10 major nonfinancial industry classifications.

Results indicate a negative impact of board chairman ownership on the decision to finance with retained earnings (RE). Negative effects of the chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) from the same family on the decision to finance with RE, whereas positive effects of the chairman and CEO from the same family on the decision to finance with debts are observed. In addition, a negative effect of the chairman from a royal family on the decision to invest with debts is found.

Many board chairmen characteristics, such as age, gender, experience, education level, periodic change and ethnicity, are unaddressed. Financial decisions (FDs) are also limited to two decisions (internal financing with RE and external financing with debts).

Findings of this study provide an improved understanding of the role of chairman characteristics in FDs in GCC. Investors and lenders dealing with companies in GCC markets benefit from the authors' results because of the effects of chairman characteristics on FDs when making investment decisions in company stocks.

The study clarifies how each of the three board chairman characteristics (i.e. chairman ownership, chairman and CEO from the same family and the chairman from the royal family) affects FDs, especially the decisions to finance with debts and RE.

This study investigates the empirical association between environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance and top executive compensation in the US financial services industry. Considering that financial firms can inflict systemic shocks across the economy, it has been argued that they must conduct ethical and sustainable business in accordance with ESG principles. This study examines whether ESG efforts are beneficial to managers.

The authors use CEO compensation and ESG performance ratings data for all US financial firms (SIC 6000–6799) from 2015 to 2019. Employing fixed effects regressions, the authors test whether lagged ESG performance is related to CEO compensation, after controlling for other firm characteristics such as size, financial performance, leverage and CEO stock ownership.

The authors find that lagged ESG ratings are strongly associated with all forms of compensation. An increase of one standard deviation in the composite ESG rating is associated with a 14%–16% increase in the total pay. Among the three ESG pillars, only S (social) and G (governance) exhibit persistent and significant associations with both short- and long-term executive pay. The authors also document the significant moderating effects of ESG on the relationships among firm performance, size, leverage, ownership and executive pay, identifying how ESG is associated with compensation.

The authors conclude that managers receive ESG incentives implicitly and explicitly. The novel finding of direct and indirect associations between ESG and top executive compensation contributes to the growing ESG literature on the financial sector and ongoing debate about the explicit inclusion of ESG targets in compensation design.

This article examines the link between the structure of the board of directors and target price accuracy using a sample of 51 listed firms on the Tunisian Stock Exchange over the period of 2011–2017.

In this study, the authors used the generalised method of moments (GMM) model to control the endogeneity problem.

As a result, that model can serve as a signal in the forecasting process. The authors' results suggest that target price accuracy is negatively related to board independence, and dual Chief Executive officer (CEO). In addition, CEO compensation tends to exert a negative impact on target price error.

The authors' findings are valuable for common investors because the findings can be useful in enhancing their capital allocation decisions by assigning higher weights to forecasts issued by firms with strong corporate governance systems. The authors' study also has practical implications for managers and policymakers. Specifically, the evidence provided herein suggests that firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms enhance the accuracy of market expectations, alleviate information asymmetry, and limit market surprises, especially in a context characterised by weak investor protection. The authors' results highlight the advantages of strong corporate governance in improving a firm's information environment and, therefore, are useful for the cost–benefit analysis of improving internal governance mechanisms. Additionally, the authors' results may prove useful to investors who can rely on the information provided by analysts for well-governed companies.

The authors' study contributes to the literature in both corporate governance and analysts' forecasts fields. The study provides additional evidence of the benefit of board quality attributes on target price accuracy in an emerging market characterised by high information asymmetry and weak investor protection. The authors' findings exhibit the effectiveness of board attributes in producing better financial information quality in Tunisia. This is useful for investors who may improve their capital allocation decisions by assigning greater weights to target price forecasts of companies with good governance quality, suggesting that good corporate governance is a credible signal of better financial information quality. These results have important implications for capital market regulators and corporate management in encouraging the implementation of good governance practices.

The authors attempted to assess whether corporate governance of listed firms are priced in the Tunisian context characterised by weak governance control and to highlight which mechanism is highly considered by independent financial analysts to build their forecasts.

The global economy has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has placed greater responsibility on companies to fulfill their obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) amid the crisis. This chapter investigates the role of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) attributes in improving a firm's CSR in the emerging economy of Jordan and how the COVID-19 pandemic modifies this relationship. Using a Jordanian sample of 655 firm-year observations during the 2014–2021 period, the research results show that older CEOs, well-educated CEOs, CEOs' remuneration, and CEOs' ownership positively correlate with CSR reporting. However, long-tenured CEOs are associated with lower CSR initiatives. The subsample analysis findings also validate the significance of CEO attributes in improving CSR practice during the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the prepandemic period. These findings are beneficial for the regulatory setters to understand better whether CEO attributes are linked to engagement in CSR-related information. This research is among the limited number of studies that have explored how CEO attributes impact CSR reporting for the stakeholder's welfare. Moreover, it uniquely concentrated on contrasting the findings before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Motivated by rapidly increasing CEO age in the USA, the purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality and consider the moderating role of clawback provisions.

This study uses a data set of 18,492 US firm-year observations from 2003 to 2019. Financial reporting quality is proxied with accruals-based and real activities earnings management measures, and with financial statement irregularities, measured by applying Benford’s law to financial statement line items. A number of sensitivity tests are conducted including the use of an instrumental variable.

The results provide evidence that financial statement irregularities are more prevalent when CEOs are older, and they suggest a complex relation between CEO age and real activities earnings management. The results also suggest that the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality is moderated by the presence of clawback provisions which became mandatory for US-listed firms in October 2022.

This study is the first, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to consider the effect of CEO age on financial statement irregularities and earnings management. This study has important implications for stakeholders evaluating the determinants of financial reporting quality, for boards of directors considering CEO age limitations and for policymakers considering mandating clawback provisions, which recently occurred in the USA.

Outstanding unexercised stock options can motivate managers to engage in actions that increase the value of their company’s stock, including buying back their firm’s stock. The objective of granting stock options to managers is to align their interests with stockholders by tying a portion of their compensation to the company’s stock performance. However, unexercised stock options may have unintended consequences by providing managers with a vested interest in artificially boosting stock prices via stock buybacks. The primary objective of this research is to study the main factors that influence firms' buyback decisions amongst hospitality firms at a time when these firms were clamoring for taxpayer bailouts. Results from logistic regression seem to suggest that outstanding executive stock options are a major contributory factor in a firm’s buyback decision. Estimates also indicate that larger, more profitable firms will likely engage in stock buybacks. These findings survive a battery of tests.

The authors use logistic regression to predict the probability of a firm’s buyback decision based on a given set of exogenous explanatory variables.

The paper supports the hypothesis that buyback decisions are guided by the motive to prop support stock prices in the presence of outstanding restricted stock options/warrants granted to firms' executives.

The paper focuses on the buyback decision of U.S. hospitality firms. The results, therefore, might not be generalizable to firms in other industries or countries.

U.S. share repurchase corporate policy and government regulation needs to be revisited given the economic imperative for firms to invest in activities to restore employment and put them in a position for economic recovery.

Public criticism of the size, structure and form (i.e. loan vs grant) of COVID-19 bailouts warrants an examination of whether the factors that drive hospitality and tourism firms to repurchase shares support economic recovery.

Consistent with agency theory, the authors find a significant positive association between outstanding restricted stocks and a firm’s decision to support the stock prices by buying back shares.

This paper aims to verify whether the integration of sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance and whether corporate governance characteristics enhance the relationship between sustainability compensation and firms’ non-financial performance and to expand the domain of the impact of sustainability on non-financial performance.

This analysis is based on a sample of companies listed on the Milan Italian Stock Exchange from the Financial Times Milan Stock Exchange Index over the 2016–2020 period. Regression analysis was used by using data retrieved from the Refinitiv Eikon database and the sample firms’ remuneration reports.

The findings of this paper show that embedding sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance. The results of this paper also reveal that specific corporate governance features can improve the impact of sustainability on non-financial performance.

This analysis is limited to Italian firms included in the Financial Times Milan Stock Exchange Index; however, the findings are highly significant.

The findings provide regulators with useful insights for considering the integration of sustainability goals into executive remuneration. Another implication is that policymakers should require – at least – listed firms to fulfil specific corporate governance structural requirements. Finally, the findings can provide investors and financial analysts with a greater awareness of the role played by executive remuneration in the long-term value-creation process.

This paper contributes to addressing the relationship among sustainability, remuneration and non-financial disclosure, drawing on the stakeholder–agency theoretical framework and focusing on Italian firms. This issue has received limited attention with controversial results in the literature.

This study aims to examine the role of returnee managers that can affect the strategic-divestment decision of emerging-market firms (EM firms). Drawing on arguments from the upper echelons theory and international human resource mobility perspectives, this study aims to propose that returnee managers influence corporate divestitures when the business outlook is negative. In addition, this study aims to examine the interplay between returnee managers and CEOs, whose characteristics can foster or undermine the efforts of returnee managers to engage in corporate divestments.

This study examines 278 firms from nine emerging economies. The negative binomial regression was employed to estimate the model. In the robustness checks, the logistic regression was adopted to confirm the earlier findings.

The empirical results support the notion that returnee managers strengthen the relationship between firm performance and divestments. Because of the limited liabilities of foreignness and outsidership, returnee managers can gain social trust and credibility through communication and social interaction. Furthermore, the results provide mixed support for the moderating effect of CEO characteristics on the performance–divestment relationship.

This study reveals that returnee managers are a great asset for EM firms that aim to find synergies and upgrade their capabilities through asset reconfiguration, which is an essential activity of emerging market firms to integrate themselves into the global competition. Meanwhile, CEO characteristics can foster (through their education level) or hinder (due to their age) divestment attempts, influenced by returnee managers.

This study explores an understudied phenomenon in international business (IB): strategic divestment of EM firms. The literature that examines strategic divestment and corporate refocusing in emerging markets is extremely limited. Furthermore, this study explores the novel topic that intersects the international business (IB) and international human resource management (IHRM) research areas. Specifically, this study investigates the impact of returnee managers on strategic divestments.

This study sheds new light on the personality trait and provides evidence regarding the relation between narcissism and desirable accounting practices, specifically the impact of CEO narcissism on accounting conservatism.

The authors test the relation between CEO narcissism and accounting conservatism for a sample of 907 US companies and their corresponding CEOs for the period between 2010 and 2018. The authors apply three established models of accounting conservatism and measure executives' narcissism using a non-intrusive approach ubiquitous in the literature.

The authors find that CEO narcissism is associated with speculative accounting practices in the form of timely recognition of positive news and more prudent financial reporting of anticipated negative news. The authors provide the first empirical evidence that, despite its well-known negative effects on corporate financial reporting, executive narcissism can also produce positive outcomes.

While managerial overconfidence has received much attention, the effects of executives' narcissism are still widely unexplored (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). The authors thus contribute to the literature by investigating the relationship between CEOs' narcissism and accounting conservatism. The authors conjecture CEO narcissism should have a twofold effect on prudent financial reporting. On the one hand, CEOs' narcissism should be associated with low levels of unconditional conservatism due to excessively fast good news recognition. On the other hand, narcissistic executives should be associated with early recognition of negative news and hence with higher levels of conditional conservatism.