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This study aims to examine the influence of ownership structure and board composition on the probability and intensity of stock repurchases. The study’s sample comprises 3,744 firm-year observations, consisting of 53 repurchasing firms with 96 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2019.

Probit and fixed-effects regression models are used to obtain empirical results. Moreover, a probit model with a continuous endogenous regressor (IV-probit) and an instrumental variable method with two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) estimation are used to address endogeneity.

Corporations with high family or state ownership tend to inhibit stock repurchases to hoard excess free cash flow, supporting agency theory. Conversely, firms with high board independence tend to repurchase their stocks at least once to distribute free cash flows to shareholders, confirming agency theory. Nonetheless, corporations with more female directors on the board or CEO duality tend to conduct stock repurchases at least once but do not repurchase stocks with high values. Interestingly, more female directors on the board may send false signals about undervalued stocks.

This is the first study to reveal that firms with CEO duality repurchase their stocks at least once but avoid repurchasing shares with high values. It is also the first study to explore whether women on a board may cause false signaling about undervalued stocks. Furthermore, this study reveals that family and state ownership are potential determinants of stock repurchases in countries with high ownership concentration. This is the first study to address this issue in Thailand.

This paper examines stock prices reaction to open market repurchases announcements at the São Paulo Stock Exchange between May 30, 1997 and October 31, 1998. This institutional scenario is a good testing ground for some theoretical hypotheses about stock repurchases announcements, because during this period there were taxes on capital gains but not on dividends. Using an event study methodology, we examined 110 episodes and found very small abnormal returns. Those results can not be explained by two main competing theoretical explanations. The Cumulative Abnormal Returns pattern found clearly suggests that repurchase announcements affected the behavior of stock prices in ways not described in previous studies.

This paper aims to analyze the stock price reaction because of dividend reduction (DR) announcements in the Indian equity market, controlling for share repurchases.

The sample comprises National Stock Exchange (NSE) 500 companies listed in the NSE Ltd. covering a time span from year 2009 to 2019. Using the event study methodology, the authors measure the impact of DR announcements on security prices around the event day. The authors also examine the price response to DRs at the interim stage versus the final stage and identify the factors that drive the decision to reduce dividends at the interim level versus final level.

The authors find that overall DR announcements negatively impact abnormal returns. Firms that experience stronger adverse price reaction following DR announcements resort to share repurchase in the same year to boost stock prices. The authors find that interim DRs create more negative price reactions than final DRs. Finally, firms experiencing lower levels of prior year earnings, firms with smaller sizes and overvalued firms tend to reduce dividends at the interim level instead of postponing the reduction to the final level.

This paper examines stock price reaction because of DR announcements of Indian firms. The sample comprises firms that reduce dividends with contemporaneous share repurchases as well as firms that reduce dividends without contemporaneous repurchase activity. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, studies on substitution effect of dividends with buyback in the context of Indian equity market are rare. Further, investigating the difference in stock price movement because of DRs at the interim level versus the final level is the unique contribution of this paper.

One of the most complex and controversial issues confronting the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) over the last several years has been the accounting and financial reporting of stock options. In December 2004, the FASB issued Statement 123R, Share‐Based Payment, in the hope that the long process of revising the accounting and financial reporting for stock options will be put to rest. FASB Statement 123R requires the fair‐value‐based method of accounting for share‐based payments. In order to offset the dilutive effects of generous stock option compensation packages for employees, companies are seemingly participating in stock repurchase plans. In the past, stock buyback programs were viewed as a means of distributing excess cash flow to investors; however, it appears now that many companies are financing stock repurchases through the issuance of debt, which can significantly impact the financial flexibility of a company. So, why do companies engage in this behavior? One possible reason for stock buybacks is to reduce the dilutive effect of stock option plans. Companies have, however, disputed that there is a direct relationship between exercised stock options and stock buyback transactions. Nevertheless, several articles and studies have found that there is a relationship and the FASB seems to believe that there is an association between stock buybacks and stock options, as Statement 123R requires that companies disclose the relationship between stock buybacks and stock payment programs. Using a sample of technology firms, we find evidence of an association between exercised stock options and repurchase of stock.

Are firms able to time the market? The purpose of this paper is to focus on the study of own stock trading, emphasizing both repurchase and resell operations on the open market as well as over the counter.

The authors use data on 37,997 own stock transactions from 2005 to 2015 of Euronext Lisbon listed firms. Following Dittmar and Field (2015), this paper uses relative transaction prices to ascertain the relative performance of own stock transactions, in the open market and over the counter.

Results show that firms can time both repurchases as well as resales. Firms repurchase (resell) at lower (higher) prices than those prevailing in the market. Moreover, market-timing ability proves to be higher after the bailout period and to be influenced by the own stock trading frequency. Trading on the open market allows for increased timing ability for own stock repurchasing and reselling activity. Finally, results show seasonal effects both in repurchase and resale performance. Also, more efficient but less valuable firms are more likely to be successful in timing the market.

The authors study both the repurchasing and the reselling activity of the same set of firms, of already issued stock, using high-frequency (daily) data. In addition, the authors study own stock trading both in the open market and OTC, and also study the impact of a major economic shift on the firms’ ability to time the market.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the extent of stock repurchase and measures of corporate governance.

Using a sample of stock repurchase announcements by banks after the 2002 tax reform, the paper uses an event study methodology to confirm the positive market response to stock repurchase announcements. A regression analysis is then used to study the determinants of the abnormal response to the bank stock repurchases. Regression analysis is also used to analyze whether corporate governance variables are significant determinants of bank extent of stock repurchases and size.

Corporate governance techniques have little impact on market response to bank stock announcements, but are related to some extent to manager decisions regarding the stock repurchase. Board structure and executive/director stock ownership do not influence the market's response to repurchases. However, in some cases board structure is positively related to management's decision regarding the extent and size of the repurchase offer. Proportion of insider equity holdings has less influence on stock repurchase characteristics.

Board structure may have a more important role to play in the banking industry in regards to managerial decision‐making than equity ownership. Equity ownership in banks tends to be driven by bank size and therefore may have less of an impact on reducing agency problems within the banking industry.

The sample is taken after the 2002 tax reform, which provides an analysis of repurchases without tax effect implications. This is the first paper to study the contribution of board structure and equity ownership to stock repurchases in publicly‐traded banks.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of share repurchase announcements on the stock price of rival firms in the same industry in Vietnam during 2010–2017.

Both event study and t-test are employed to test the effects of share repurchase announcements on rival firms. In addition, cross-sectional analysis by ordinary least square regression is also applied for investigating the heterogeneous effects due to information transfer.

The finding shows that stock repurchase announcements result in a positive and significant valuation effect for both announcing firms and rival firms in Vietnam. Furthermore, the degree of signal to the industry is conditional on the degree of signal about the announcing firms as a contagious effect. Intra-industry effects are more favorable when profit performance of rival firms is good and when leverage of rival firms is low.

Rival firms can seize opportunities surrounding share repurchase announcements in the same industry in Vietnam. However, due to firm characteristics, intra-industry effects of stock repurchases differ among industries.

By examining different methods, the paper attributes valuable results to investigate the stock price behavior of rival firms in the same industry when firms announce stock repurchase in Vietnam.

The purpose of this paper is to integrate Modigliani-Miller (MM) theory and stock repurchases strategy to procure a practical concept for capital decision.

No-arbitrage proof model deduction was used in this study. The authors consider corporate tax and funding sources as two crucial factors drawn in the model. The paper derives some propositions by trichotomy property and keeps the key assumptions of MM Capital Structure Theory.

There are two different effects on firm's value through stock repurchases. The positive effect occurs on firm's value through stock repurchases with loan fund. And the negative impact exists on firm's value through stock repurchases with idle fund.

Notably, in the real world there are three limitations with such an arbitrage transaction (Stulz, 2000). The first one is the default risk, and the second one is transaction costs and the last one is the perfect credit market assumption. In the near future, the authors suggest it would be interesting to involve the interest rate factor and contingent tax variable into our model.

On the basis of no arbitrage opportunity, this paper considers both trichotomy property and MM theory. It proves the share repurchase strategy should be financed by borrowing fund. In contrast, share repurchase should not be executed with idle fund because of opportunity cost.

In this study, the authors extend upon Brockman et al. (2008), who provide evidence that managers opportunistically accelerate bad news prior to share repurchases, but provide limited evidence that managers withhold good news until after repurchases. The authors examine management forecasts surrounding share repurchases in periods when companies must disclose detailed repurchase information. The authors argue these disclosures increase managers' legal and reputation risks of accelerating bad news, but have a lesser effect on delaying good news.

First, the authors examine whether managers alter the information released to the market before buying back shares by comparing managerial forecasts made within 30 days before the beginning of a repurchasing period with those made outside of this window. Second, the authors examine whether managers are more likely to provide good news forecasts, in terms of both magnitude and frequency, after buying back shares. Lastly, the authors examine the impact of CEO stock ownership on managerial forecasting behavior surrounding share buybacks.

Consistent with the authors’ hypotheses and contrary to Brockman et al. (2008), the authors find limited evidence that the likelihood or magnitude of bad news forecasts is greater in the period before share buybacks. Instead, the authors document that the frequency and magnitude of good news forecasts increase in periods following share buybacks and that these associations are positively moderated by managerial equity incentives. The authors also find that the withholding of good news is associated with lower average repurchase prices and greater repurchase volume. The authors further show that, when litigation risk is greater, managers are less likely to accelerate bad news prior to repurchases and more likely to withhold good news until after. Overall, the study results are consistent with managers balancing the benefits of opportunistic repurchase behavior with the costs.

This study contributes to the management forecast and share repurchase literatures by providing evidence consistent with managers opportunistically releasing earnings forecasts in the period after buying back shares. Most importantly, the authors show that after the rule revision, managers refrain from actively disclosing bad news that carry higher legal costs. Instead, they opt for the omission of good news to repurchase stocks at lower prices. The study results reconcile the conflicting evidence of Brockman et al. (2008) and Ge and Lennox (2011).

Existing studies show that firms may have an incentive to use share repurchases opportunistically, thereby taking advantage of market participants’ confirmation bias that share repurchase is a signal of undervaluation. This study aims to investigate whether signaling costs and accounting transparency can serve as tools to identify opportunistic share repurchases.

The authors measure signaling costs by using two share repurchase methods (direct and indirect share repurchase) with different share repurchase costs, and measure accounting transparency using the history of earnings timeliness. The authors further measure long-term performance following share repurchases using operating performance and stock returns. Lastly, the authors compare the long-term performances between the groups defined by share repurchase method and earnings timeliness level.

The authors find that indirect share repurchase firms with a history of poor earnings timeliness experience unfavorable long-term performance, while other share repurchase firms do not. This finding reinforces the view that some share repurchases may be driven by managerial opportunism. In particular, when firms with a history of poor earnings-reporting behavior choose a low-cost repurchase method, their share repurchases may be motivated by managerial opportunism.

The findings suggest that past earnings timeliness and the signaling costs of a repurchase together are useful predictors of false signaling. Moreover, they suggest that investors can – at least in part – predict opportunistic share repurchases by using signaling costs and accounting transparency.