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The article investigates the patterns of asset impairment recognition in search of signs of “big bath” earnings management practices across an internationally diversified sample of public companies. It also elucidates the incentives that may underlie such practices and explores possible safeguards embedded in the existing corporate governance mechanisms.

The article applied static panel and binary logit models to an international firm-level panel dataset of 1045 public companies observed between 2003 and 2018.

Our empirical results suggest that recognition of asset impairment has no determinate impact on earnings volatility. Investigating the possibility of “big bath” earnings management practices, the authors found no impact of asset impairment recognition on total senior executive compensation in firms, which pay performance-based remuneration. The quality of corporate governance has appeared to impact the firms’ intertemporal proclivity to recognize asset impairment with those having the more entrenched and management-controlled boards being more likely to time impairment recognition by delaying it during exceptionally good and exceptionally bad years. While generally unlikely, recognition of asset impairment in a period with a recorded negative operating performance is found to be closely associated with key executive departures.

The article corroborates the salient role of corporate governance mechanisms in shaping the intertemporal patterns of asset impairment recognition. The possible remedies to the phenomenon should be derived therefrom.

The relationship between risk and return has been widely analysed in the scope of listed companies. However the present literature leaves uncovered an important study area with regards to privately held firms. In order to cover this gap, this study analyses the risk-return trade-off in the context of private enterprises. Furthermore, the authors incorporate the contingent effect of being a family firm on the abovementioned relationship.

Using information from the SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos) database, a sample of 2,297 private manufacturing firms were analysed for the period of 2009–2016. So as to ascertain the proposed hypotheses, dynamic panel data methodology was applied. Specifically, the authors estimated the two-step general method of moments (GMM).

The obtained findings reveal that, according to prospect theory arguments, privately held firms adopt a conservative attitude toward risk when results are higher than a target level, while becoming risk seeking when results are lower than a target level. Moreover, the fact of being a family firm softens the risk-return relationship both when performance is above the target level and also when firms find themselves in the lowest performing case.

This article is, to the best of the authors' knowledge, one of the first studies dealing with the risk-return relationship in a privately held firm context. Moreover, the inclusion of being a family firm as a contingent factor in the abovementioned link is a complete novelty.

La relación riesgo-rentabilidad ha sido ampliamente analizada en el ámbito de las empresas cotizadas. Sin embargo, la literatura existente deja al descubierto una importante área de estudio en relación con las empresas no cotizadas. Para cubrir esta brecha, el presente estudio analiza el binomio riesgo-rentabilidad en el contexto de empresas privadas. Adicionalmente, incorporamos el efecto contingente de ser una empresa familiar sobre esta relación.

Utilizando información de la base de datos SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos) se analizó una muestra de 2.297 empresas manufactureras privadas para el período 2009–2016. Para comprobar las hipótesis propuestas se aplicó la metodología de datos de panel, específicamente, utilizamos el Método de los Momentos Generalizado (GMM).

Los resultados muestran que, de acuerdo con la Teoría Prospectiva, las empresas no cotizadas presentan una mayor aversión al riesgo cuando su nivel de rentabilidad es superior al valor de referencia establecido, mientras que presentan una mayor propensión al riesgo cuando su rentabilidad es inferior al valor de referencia. Además, el hecho de ser una empresa familiar suaviza la relación riesgo-rentabilidad en ambos escenarios.

Este es uno de los primeros estudios en abordar la relación riesgo-rentabilidad en el contexto de empresas no cotizadas. Además, la inclusión de ser una empresa familiar como factor contingente es completamente novedosa.

CEOs’ (chief executive officer) term of office may explain discretionary accruals as a result of opportunistic behavior arising during certain periods of the term of office. Therefore, CEOs, in their early years of office, have incentives to report results that meet market expectations. In turn, CEOs in their senior year may be motivated to use discretionary accruals to gain private benefits. In this scenario, corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in monitoring relationships. Hence, the purpose of this study is to verify the influence of monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between CEOs’ term of office and discretionary accruals.

Descriptive statistics, multiple cross-sectional regression to estimate the accruals and regression of panel data to test the hypotheses were used. The sample comprised 195 companies listed on BM&FBovespa.

The results indicated that CEOs’ long term of office has a negative impact on the level of discretionary accruals, and thus, Brazilian CEOs with a longer term of office tend to establish a certain reputation in the stock market. On the other hand, it is concluded that CEOs’ intentions, in the first years of term, are positively related to the use of accruals and that the monitoring mechanisms can minimize these CEOs’ opportunistic practices.

The results broaden the literature on corporate governance, pointing that different systems of variable remuneration may influence CEOs’ willingness to manage results in their last year of term.

The European Union (EU) has recently adopted gender quotas for corporate boards (CBQ), anticipating ripple effects on women’s careers in the companies concerned, as well as throughout the economy. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether CBQ has spurred ripple effects and discuss mechanisms hindering or facilitating women’s occupancy of top executive positions.

Norway was the first country in the world to introduce CBQ in 2003, with full effect from 2008. The policy requires company boards to be composed of 40% of each gender. Drawing on original data mapping boards and executive committees in Norway’s 200 largest companies, the authors analyze the association between CBQ and the gender composition of executive management almost 15 years after the full implementation. The data include both companies covered by the CBQ and large companies not covered.

The investigation does not find a positive association between CBQ and more women in executive positions. Thus, the ripple effect hypothesis of CBQ is not supported. CBQ may have contributed to an increased awareness of gender imbalances, yet these findings indicate that to achieve more gender balance in executive positions, scholars and practitioners may need to focus more on gendered conditions and processes in organizations and society throughout executive careers than on the gender composition of boards.

This paper provides empirical analyses of original data 15 years after the implementation of CBQ. The authors further contribute to scholarly debate by identifying and discussing possible mechanisms that explain how requiring more women on corporate boards may – or may not – have ripple effects on executive management.

This study aims to explore the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and stock price crash risk in India. Furthermore, it seeks to analyse how insider trades may moderate the impact of CEO power on stock price crash risk.

A study of 236 companies from the S&P BSE 500 Index (2014–2023) have been analysed through pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression in the baseline analysis. To enhance the results' reliability, robustness checks include alternative methodologies, such as panel data regression with fixed-effects, binary logistic regression and Bayesian regression. Additional control variables and alternative crash risk measure have also been utilised. To address potential endogeneity, instrumental variable techniques such as two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) and difference-in-difference (DiD) methodologies are utilised.

Stakeholder theory is supported by results revealing that CEO power proxies like CEO duality, status and directorship reduce one-year ahead stock price crash risk and vice versa. Insider trades are found to moderate the link between select dimensions of CEO power and stock price crash risk. These findings persist after addressing potential endogeneity concerns, and the results remain consistent across alternative methodologies and variable inclusions.

This study significantly advances research on stock price crash risk, especially in emerging economies like India. The implications of these findings are crucial for investors aiming to mitigate crash risk, for corporations seeking enhanced governance measures and for policymakers considering the economic and welfare consequences associated with this phenomenon.

The aim of this article is to highlight the major part played by executives in the escalation of corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). Based on the upper echelons theory, the authors developed a model which shows the essential role of CEOs in explaining CSI. The authors proposed that the key personality traits of CEOs—narcissism—, as well as their power, could explain the degree of CSI.

Due to the significant methodological challenges when investigating CSI, the authors explored a novel method for measuring CSI in order to assess the degree of irresponsible behaviors. The authors build a CSI scale based on the perceptions of key informants, i.e. experts with diverse professional backgrounds. The authors apply CSI scale in a sample of 84 Spanish companies that were involved in CSI.

The results of the authors’ empirical study show the positive and significant influence of CEO narcissism and CEO power on the degree of CSI.

On the one hand, corporate irresponsibility scandals have relevant social consequences and practical implications. On the other hand, narcissism is a natural feature of managers in top positions that is increasing in societies.

The authors’ findings may help CEOs, TMTs and corporate boards to acknowledge potential sources of CSI decreasing its likelihood through counterbalancing CEO's power and considering the dark side of narcissism.

On the one hand, corporate scandals have relevant social and practical implications. On the other hand, narcissism is a natural feature of managers in top positions that is increasing in societies.

In this paper, the authors highlight the role of CEOs characteristics and their firms as the key actors for explaining and understanding the degree of CSI.

本研究擬強調行政主管在加劇企業無社會責任感上所扮演的主要角色。我們根據高層梯隊理論, 開發了一個模型, 來顯示執行長如何在解釋企業無社會責任感上所起的關鍵作用。我們提出一個見解, 就是: 執行長的主要人格特質-自戀和其權力-或許能解釋企業無社會責任感的程度。

由於面對在關於企業無社會責任感的研究法上的重大挑戰, 我們探索了一個估量企業無社會責任感的新穎方法, 以能對企業無社會責任感行為的程度進行評估。我們根據主要的資訊提供者的觀念和看法, 制定了一個企業無社會責任感的等級 (這些主要的資訊提供者均為具有不同專業背景的專家), 我們在84間西班牙公司的樣本裡, 使用了這企業無社會責任感等級, 而這些公司均涉及企業無社會責任感的。

我們這實證研究的結果顯示, 執行長的自戀和其權力, 對企業無社會責任感的程度, 起著正面和顯著的影響。

在本學術論文裡, 我們強調了執行長的特徵和他們的公司, 是瞭解和解釋企業無社會責任感的程度的關鍵行為者。

一方面, 企業無社會責任感的醜聞會帶來相關的社會後果和實務方面的影響;而另一方面, 自戀是高層主管的自然特徵, 而這些特徵, 在我們的社會裡不斷增強。本研究的結果, 或許可幫助執行長、高層管理團隊和公司董事會去承認企業無社會責任感的潛在原因, 並以透過平衡執行長的權力和考慮自戀的陰暗面而減低企業無社會責任感產生的可能。

The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the implications of board human capital heterogeneity for company innovation by focusing on the educational and the functional background of directors. Moreover, it examines the moderating effect of the CEO expertise-overlap within the innovation domain on the relationship between board human capital heterogeneity and firm innovation.

The hypotheses are tested through a set of ordinary least squares regressions on a unique dataset of 149 Italian high-tech companies observed between 2012 and 2015.

Findings show that the educational and the functional background heterogeneity of directors increase both the innovation input and output. However, results highlight that these relationships are negatively moderated by the CEO expertise-overlap within the innovation domain.

The paper emphasizes the importance of appointing directors with different and specific educational and functional backgrounds to foster the company innovation.

The paper fills a gap in the literature as it has devoted limited attention to the performance implications of board human capital heterogeneity in the high-tech industry where knowledge and skills are the primary sources of value. Moreover, the paper integrates the research on the CEO-board interface by shedding light on how the CEO expertise within the innovation domain affects the contribution of heterogeneous boards to company innovation.

The aim of this paper is to examine how managerial ability affects corporate tax aggressiveness.

The study follows the work of Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) and quantifies managerial ability by calculating how efficiently managers generate revenues from given economic resources using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach. The study uses a wide range of measures of tax aggressiveness. Firm fixed-effects regressions and a difference-in-differences approach using information regarding CEO turnover to control for endogeneity are used.

The study finds a negative relationship between managerial ability and corporate tax aggressiveness. Further tests show that this negative relationship is more pronounced for firms with higher investment opportunities or firms with more reputational concerns.

Given the significant costs associated with tax aggressiveness and the negative effect it can have on managerial reputation if discovered, the results suggest that more able managers invest less effort in aggressive tax avoidance activities. This study furthers the understanding of how managerial personal traits affect corporate decision-making.

This research aims to examine and understand the rationales and modalities behind the use of disclosure before, during and after a corporate governance scandal involving CPA Australia (CPAA).

Data beyond CPAA's annual reports were collected, such as news articles, media releases, an independent review panel (IRP) report, and the Chief Operating Officer's letter to members. These disclosures were manually coded and analysed through the word counts and word trees in NVivo. This study also relied on Norbert Elias' conceptual tool of power games among networks of actors – figurations – to model the scandal as a power game between the old Board, the press, concerned members, the IRP and the new Board. This study analysed the data to reveal a collective and in fieri power balance that changed with the phases of the scandal.

A mix of voluntary, involuntary, requested and absent disclosures was important in triggering, managing and ending the CPAA scandal. Moreover, communication and disclosure fulfilled a constitutive role since both: mobilised actors, enabled coordination among actors, contributed to pursuing shared goals and influenced power balances. Such a constitutive role was at the heart of the ability of coalitions of figurations to challenge and restore the powerful status quo.

This research introduces to accounting studies the collective and in fieri dimensions of power from figurational theory. Moreover, the research sheds new light on using voluntary, involuntary, requested and absent disclosures before, during and after a corporate crisis.

While the value of human capital for technological innovation is well acknowledged, literature on the role of vocational training in corporate innovation is notably scarce. The purpose of this study is to assess the effect of government support for small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) competencies on Korean firms’ innovation. The author investigates SMEs’ patent applications (supported by the government to varying degrees) while accounting for firms’ market position, ownership and management structure, as well as prior changes in firms’ technologies, products, processes and other characteristics. Alternative hypotheses about management motivation – the “lazy manager”, “career concerns” and “special East Asian institutional constraints” hypotheses – are also evaluated.

Censored and count data analysis methods are used on a panel of 595 Korean firms covering 2005–2015 from the Korean Human Capital Corporate Survey, Intellectual Property Office and National Investment Commission. A regression discontinuity estimator accounts for potential endogeneity because of support for vocational training at firms.

Firms receiving training support are more innovative than firms without support, but latent effects may play a role. The regression-discontinuity model suggests that firms that succeeded only marginally in obtaining support had higher innovative output than non-recipients near the eligibility threshold.

The findings of this study establish that government support had the intended effect on SMEs’ technological capacity. This cannot be discounted as a simple crowding-out effect. The author also establishes that management–ownership separation within firms was conducive to innovation, that product competition had an inverse U-shaped effect and that management–ownership separation had a substitutable relationship with competition in overcoming managers’ effort avoidance. The findings support the “lazy manager” hypothesis over the “career concerns” and the “special East Asian institutional constraints” hypotheses.