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1 – 10 of over 6000Yoonhee Choi and Namgyoo K. Park
This paper aims to examine the economic and psychological mechanisms in turnover at the managerial level. The paper investigates how (1) the ease of moving posed by alternative…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the economic and psychological mechanisms in turnover at the managerial level. The paper investigates how (1) the ease of moving posed by alternative jobs (i.e. the economic mechanism) and (2) the desire to move due to low job satisfaction (i.e. the psychological mechanism) simultaneously influence top management team (TMT) turnover and these managers' subsequent job position and pay.
Design/methodology/approach
Using 25 years of panel data on more than 2,000 top managers in the United States, the paper utilizes fixed-effects logistic regressions and the ordinary least squares model to test the hypotheses.
Findings
The authors find that CEO awards (an economic mechanism) and low compensation (a psychological mechanism) independently have positive effects on turnover. Turnover due to the economic mechanism leads to a higher position and pay, whereas turnover due to the psychological mechanism does not guarantee the same outcome. Further, when examining how pay dissatisfaction influences turnover simultaneously with CEO awards, the authors find that managers with the highest pay leave their firm, and not those with the lowest pay.
Originality/value
The paper employs the pull-and-push theory in the employee turnover literature and applies it to the top management team literature. By doing so, this paper contributes original insights to how economic and psychological mechanisms simultaneously affect managerial turnover and its subsequent outcomes.
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Research has focused primarily on the antecedents that influence the risk taking of CEOs themselves. This study examines how an important event experienced by a CEO at a direct…
Abstract
Purpose
Research has focused primarily on the antecedents that influence the risk taking of CEOs themselves. This study examines how an important event experienced by a CEO at a direct rival firm influences a CEO's risk-taking. It also examines how prior firm performance relative to aspirations moderates the relationship.
Design/methodology/approach
In order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an a difference-in-differences methodology.
Findings
Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that when a CEO wins a prestigious CEO award, competitor CEOs increase their firm risk-taking in the post-award period. The proclivity becomes stronger when their prior firm performance relative to aspirations is better. These findings suggest that a CEO winning a prominent CEO award influences competitor CEOs' risk-taking.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the literature on managerial risk-taking by highlighting that a star CEO winning a prominent award may serve as a striving aspiration and induce competitor CEOs to take risks, and that two different types of aspirations – striving and competitive aspirations – interact to influence the competitor CEOs' risk-taking.
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Ji Li and Yuhchang Hwang
The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper uses coarsened exact matching and propensity score matching to match the dual-class firm sample with a control group of single-class firms. This study uses matching estimators to provide an analysis of how a dual-class structure affects the design of performance measures in performance-based stock awards. In addition, regression models are used to investigate the effect of a dual-class structure on performance measure choices.
Findings
This paper finds that market-based metrics are less likely to be used by dual-class firms relative to single-class firms. In addition, peer-based measures are much less common for dual-class than single-class firms. This study also finds that the length of the CEO’s performance evaluation period does not differ between dual-class and single-class firms.
Research limitations/implications
This paper attempts to investigate the choice of performance measures to find out the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on firms’ long-term versus short-term objectives.
Practical implications
The findings reveal the relationships between the dual-class stock structure and the contractual features of CEO performance-based stock awards, provide empirical evidence for the company’s compensation committee and provide implications for the evolving practices of performance measures regarding CEO stock compensation. The findings are also useful to regulators, compensation consultants and firms pursuing efficient design of executive compensation.
Originality/value
This paper is among the first to study the determinants of compensation contracts. Second, prior literature seldom controls for CEO stock ownership, but this study matches dual-class firms to a control group of single-class firms that are similar in terms of CEO stock ownership and other important firm characteristics. Finally, these findings suggest that dual-class firms shield their executives from short-term market pressures and design stock compensation contracts that deemphasize volatile stock prices.
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Brian M. Lucey, Yulia Plaksina and Michael Dowling
The paper aims to examine whether and under what circumstances social status of chief executives can be associated with corporate financial decisions, in particular via risk…
Abstract
Purpose
The paper aims to examine whether and under what circumstances social status of chief executives can be associated with corporate financial decisions, in particular via risk aversion or risk loving to the extent of mergers and acquisitions.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use mixed methods, drawing metrics of social status (acquired and ascribed) from anthropological and sociological research, applying these, and then using panel econometrics to check the statistical importance of the uncovered relationships.
Findings
The authors find in the paper that it is possible, for FTSE companies, to successfully measure and apply measures of social status from public records; they find strong evidence of a negative relationship between CEO ascribed and achieved social status and his or her acquisitiveness. However, the influence of achieved status appears to be more consistent and significant than that of the ascribed status, indicating its dominant role in determining overall attained status.
Research limitations/implications
The research is limited in its data coverage, to FTSE members. However, it does show that it is possible to take useful and meaningful concepts from areas quite removed from traditional finance and to incorporate these into a traditional finance methodology.
Practical implications
The paper has practical implications for both aspirant and existing corporate officers and for investors.
Social implications
Social status is omnipresent and poorly understood as a mitigator or enabler of financial transactions, although there is some evidence that it is important.
Originality/value
This research bridges a gap that has heretofore only been very sparsely mapped, and provides suggested routes for further research.
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Moncef Guizani and Ahdi Noomen Ajmi
This study aims to explore the role of board gender diversity in mitigating chief executive officer (CEO) luck. CEOs are “lucky” when they receive stock option grants on days when…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to explore the role of board gender diversity in mitigating chief executive officer (CEO) luck. CEOs are “lucky” when they receive stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses a logistic regression analysis and an instrumental-variable analysis. The sample consists of 3,249 firm-year observations from 2010 through 2015.
Findings
The results show that female directors significantly deter the opportunistic timing of option grants. This study finds that gender diversity – as measured by the percentage of women on the board, the percentage of female independent directors and the percentage of female directors on the compensation committee are likely to reduce the odds that CEOs receive opportunistically timed lucky grants. The results are consistent with those in prior research that documents the benefits of board gender diversity.
Practical implications
The research findings are beneficial to policymakers and regulators, as it allows them to assess the importance of diversity on boards in the monitoring of the managers, particularly as it pertains to the design of CEO compensation packages. Furthermore, these findings have implications for Ibero-American countries as they shed light on the importance to undertake measures and reforms to promote board effectiveness by the introduction of gender diversity.
Originality/value
While prior research has examined the effect of board gender diversity on firm performance, the study is the first to investigate the effect of female directors on the opportunistic timing of option grants, using a rigorous empirical framework that explicitly accounts for endogeneity.
Resumen
Propósito
Este estudio busca explorar el papel de la diversidad de género en la junta directiva para mitigar la suerte del CEO. Los directores ejecutivos tienen “suerte” cuando reciben subvenciones de opciones sobre acciones en los días en que el precio de las acciones es el más bajo en el mes de la subvención, lo que implica un momento oportunista.
Diseño/Metodología
Empleamos un análisis de regresión logística, así como un análisis de variables instrumentales (IV). La muestra consta de 3249 observaciones de las firmas desde 2010 hasta 2015.
Hallazgos
Nuestros resultados muestran que las directoras disuaden significativamente el momento oportunista de la concesión de opciones. Descubrimos que la diversidad de género, medida por el porcentaje de mujeres en la junta directiva, el porcentaje de directoras independientes y el porcentaje de directoras en el comité de compensación probablemente reduzcan las probabilidades de que los directores ejecutivos reciban subvenciones afortunadas en el momento oportuno. Nuestros resultados son consistentes con los de investigaciones anteriores que documentan los beneficios de la diversidad de género en la junta.
Implicaciones practices
Los resultados de la investigación son relevantes para los responsables de la formulación de políticas y los reguladores, ya que les permite evaluar la importancia de la diversidad en los directorios en el seguimiento de los gerentes, particularmente en lo que respecta al diseño de paquetes de compensación de los directores ejecutivos. Además, estos hallazgos tienen implicaciones para los países iberoamericanos, ya que arrojan luz sobre la importancia de emprender medidas y reformas para promover la efectividad de los directorios mediante la introducción de la diversidad de género.
Originalidad
Si bien investigaciones anteriores han examinado el efecto de la diversidad de género de la junta en el desempeño de la empresa, nuestro estudio es el primero en investigar el efecto de las directoras en el momento oportunista de las concesiones de opciones, utilizando un marco empírico riguroso que explica explícitamente la endogeneidad.
Resumo
Objetivo
Este estudo busca explorar o papel da diversidade de gênero no conselho de administração para mitigar o destino do CEO. Os CEOs têm “sorte” de receber opções de compra de ações nos dias em que o preço das ações é mais baixo no mês de concessão, o que é um momento oportunista.
Desenho/Metodologia
Foi utilizada uma análise de regressão logística, bem como uma análise de variáveis instrumentais (IV). A amostra é composta por 3.249 observações de empresas de 2010 a 2015.
Conclusões
Nossos resultados mostram que as diretoras inibem significativamente o momento oportunista de outorga de opções. Descobrimos que a diversidade de gênero, medida pela porcentagem de mulheres no conselho de administração, a porcentagem de conselheiros independentes e a porcentagem de diretoras no comitê de remuneração, provavelmente reduz as chances de CEOs receberem subsídios da sorte em tempo hábil. Nossos resultados são consistentes com pesquisas anteriores que documentam os benefícios da diversidade de gênero no conselho.
Implicações práticas
Os resultados da pesquisa são relevantes para os formuladores de políticas e reguladores, pois permitem que avaliem a importância da diversidade nos conselhos na gestão de gerentes, especialmente no que se refere ao desenho de políticas. Além disso, esses achados têm implicações para os países ibero-americanos, uma vez que lançam luz sobre a importância de empreender medidas e reformas para promover a eficácia dos conselhos por meio da introdução da diversidade de gênero.
Originalidade
embora a evidência científica prévia tenha examinado o efeito da diversidade de gênero do conselho no desempenho da empresa, nosso estudo é o primeiro a investigar o efeito das diretoras no momento oportunista de concessões de opções, usando uma estrutura empírica rigorosa que explica explicitamente a endogeneidade.
Details
Keywords
- Diversidade de gênero no conselho
- CEO
- Eficácia do conselho
- Governança corporativa
- Outorga de opções de ações
- Endogeneidade
- Corporate governance
- CEO
- Endogeneity
- Board gender diversity
- Board effectiveness
- Diversidad de género en la junta
- Director ejecutivo
- Efectividad de la junta
- Gobierno corporativo
- Concesiones de opciones sobre acciones
- Endogeneidad
Kumaran Rajandran and Fauziah Taib
– The purpose of this paper is to examine how Malaysian CEO Statements represent corporate social responsibility (CSR).
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine how Malaysian CEO Statements represent corporate social responsibility (CSR).
Design/methodology/approach
A corpus of 27 CEO Statements was analyzed using Fairclough's three-dimensional critical discourse analysis (CDA) model, which proposes analyzing text, discourse practice and social practice. The analysis emphasized image and language features in text while it explored intertextuality in discourse practice and ideology in social practice.
Findings
The analysis revealed that selected image and language features contribute to six themes about CSR, namely achievement, identification, aspiration, disclosure, recognition and appreciation. The analysis also revealed that policies, standards and studies are often cited to reduce a credibility gap. These analyses indicate that CEO Statements represent CSR as a corporation's philanthropic initiatives for stakeholders. This representation reflects the ideology of CEO Statements. It establishes corporations as an agent of positive change in society, which helps to improve the social legitimacy of corporations.
Research limitations/implications
Since the corpus was limited to ten corporations in three years, the findings might not be representative of the genre of CEO Statements. The corpus could be extended to include CEO Statements from other years, countries and languages and it can launch a productive enterprise in intercultural studies.
Originality/value
This paper demonstrates CDA as an approach to understand CEO Statements. It may be useful to people practicing and teaching corporate communication because it encourages them to consider the meaning implied by image and language features, which can influence the meaning of CEO Statements.
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Researchers have investigated the distinctions between founder and nonfounder chief executive officers (CEOs) for different performance variables. Researchers have also…
Abstract
Purpose
Researchers have investigated the distinctions between founder and nonfounder chief executive officers (CEOs) for different performance variables. Researchers have also investigated the use of media as supplemental information that investors review to make decisions about initial public offering (IPO) firms. Research that investigates founders and nonfounder CEOs of IPO firms in the media is limited but growing. This paper aims to explore how founder and nonfounder CEOs' narratives are portrayed differently in business media following an IPO.
Design/methodology/approach
Using insights from the narrative paradigm, 1,057 news paragraphs about CEOs from 19 matched pairs (38 firms) were content analyzed using a contrasting coding strategy.
Findings
Founders and nonfounders' narratives differ in three ways. Specifically, founder CEOs are more likely to (1) have their personal background detailed in the media, (2) translate technical business information to easy-to-understand general language and (3) be quoted talking about positive information than nonfounder CEOs.
Research limitations/implications
The results of this study show the media's role in creating narratives about management and how the experiences of founders and nonfounders are represented differently in the media. The study is limited by only investigating media articles about CEOs and not investigating the entire organizational narrative.
Originality/value
This study adds to the growing literature that investigates the role the media plays in portraying management in the media at time of IPO.
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This study aims to examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) integrity on organizations’ strategic orientation. The authors propose that CEOs who have high degrees of…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) integrity on organizations’ strategic orientation. The authors propose that CEOs who have high degrees of integrity tend to negatively influence each of the three core dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) – innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking. They also argue that this impact of CEO integrity is likely to be stronger for overconfident CEOs and the CEOs with high power. Furthermore, this negative relationship is expected to attenuate when the firm has high customer orientation and when the CEO is compensated with high equity-pay ratio.
Design/methodology/approach
Seemingly unrelated regression analysis was conducted on panel of 741 firm-year observations of 213 firms across 2014–2017. CEO integrity and each of the three dimensions of EO were measured using content analysis of CEOs’ letters to shareholders. CEO power was measured using CEO stock ownership and CEO duality. CEO overconfidence was measured by using options-based measure. Customer orientation was measured by using content analyses on annual reports. CEO equity-pay based ratio was measured as sum of value of stock and option awards divided by CEO’s total compensation. This study considered alternative measures and performed treatments for potential endogeneity, sample selection bias and outliers.
Findings
The research findings conclude that organizations with CEOs who have high integrity tend to have lower levels of all sub-dimensions of EO – innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking. Further, the results indicate that the negative effect that CEO integrity has, affects one of its dimensions – proactiveness, such that the relation is strengthened when the CEO has high power and is highly overconfident. This negative effect weakens when the CEO is compensated with high equity-pay ratio. The results also indicate that the negative effect of integrity and innovativeness and risk-taking weakens when the firm has high customer orientation.
Research limitations/implications
The research contributes to upper echelon theory literature by adding to the discussion of how business executives’ psychological traits map onto firm behavior. This research also finds common ground between literature on innovation and upper echelons, contributing to awareness about the drivers of firms’ EO.
Practical implications
This research addresses the question of firm relation to EO by highlighting that firms’ EO is also shaped by the psychological traits of their CEOs and the interaction of these traits with CEOs’ cognitive biases. Thus, board members of firms led by CEOs with high integrity can limit CEO’s risk-averse behavior by focusing on their training and by creating incentive systems. It is also advantageous for CEOs to understand that integrity is a double-edged sword, thus leveraging the strengths of their integrity, while simultaneously using tools such as training to diminish its negative aspects.
Originality/value
This paper fulfils a twofold identified need to: study the antecedents of each of the three dimensions of EO, not limited to corporate governance; and unearth the counterproductive behaviors associated with bright traits that make up their dark side
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Elizandra Severgnini, Valter Afonso Vieira, Gustavo Abib and Ronei Leonel
The authors extend the recent research using the risk component of human resource’s (HR’s) compensation plans to examine the effects of risk components on two strategic outcomes…
Abstract
Purpose
The authors extend the recent research using the risk component of human resource’s (HR’s) compensation plans to examine the effects of risk components on two strategic outcomes: within-firm temporal change, or strategic variation, and firm strategic divergence from the industry, or strategic deviation. In addition, the authors examine the role of previous financial performance as a boundary moderator condition of the effects of risk components in the compensation plan and firm strategic outcomes.
Design/methodology/approach
To examine the effects of low- and high-risk components of executive compensation on strategic variation and deviation over time, the authors collected data from 2,510 companies listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500 index in a panel data format of a 12-year period. The authors gathered financial and other firm-level data from COMPUSTAT, and executive compensation and executive-level data from ExecuComp.
Findings
The findings support the main effects of risk components on strategic change, while both high- and low-risk components act on strategic deviation contingent on the moderating role of total shareholder return (TSR). In the theoretical framework, the authors test the moderating role of total shareholder return (TSR) as a boundary condition of the effects of risk components in the compensation plan. In doing so, the authors provide a fine-grained understanding of the influence of compensation plan risk components on outcomes proximal to executives, such as the maintenance of the status quo and the search for financial gains.
Research limitations/implications
New studies can explore a three-way moderating effect on performance indicators, such as TSR, Tobin’s Q and return on asset. The authors addressed this limitation and did a comparative analysis, but the authors did not include additional moderating mechanisms in these interactive effects.
Practical implications
By disaggregating the executive’s compensation based on the risk components, boards of directors can mitigate any possible unwanted biases in the relationship between principal and agent.
Originality/value
By considering the influence of both low- and high-risk components of compensation plans on strategic outcomes –instead of firm performance – this study expands strategy literature supporting the influence of compensation schema on a firm’s outcomes. This path is new because it offers a moderating perspective to understand the strategic deviations and changes that chief executive officers imprint in their firms.
Propósito
Los autores amplían la investigación reciente usando el componente de riesgo de los planes de compensación de RH para examinar los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en dos resultados estratégicos: cambio temporal dentro de la empresa, o variación estratégica, y divergencia estratégica de la empresa de la industria, o desviación estratégica. Además, examinamos el papel del desempeño financiero anterior como una condición moderadora límite de los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en el plan de compensación y los resultados estratégicos de la empresa.
Diseño/metodología/enfoque
Para examinar los efectos de los componentes de alto y bajo riesgo de la compensación ejecutiva en la variación y desviación estratégica a lo largo del tiempo, recopilamos datos de 2510 empresas que figuran en el índice Standard & Poor's 500 en un formato de datos de panel de un período de 12 años. Los autores recopilaron datos financieros y de otro tipo a nivel de empresa de COMPUSTAT, y compensación de ejecutivos, y datos a nivel ejecutivo de EXECUCOMP.
Hallazgos
Nuestros hallazgos respaldan los efectos principales de los componentes de riesgo en el cambio estratégico, mientras que los componentes de alto y bajo riesgo actúan sobre la desviación estratégica dependiendo del papel moderador del rendimiento total del accionista. En el marco teórico, los autores prueban el papel moderador del Retorno Total del Accionista como condición límite de los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en el plan de compensación. Al hacerlo, brindamos una comprensión detallada de la influencia de los componentes de riesgo del plan de compensación en los resultados próximos a los ejecutivos, como el mantenimiento del statu quo y la búsqueda de ganancias financieras.
Originalidad
al considerar la influencia de los componentes de bajo y alto riesgo de los planes de compensación en los resultados estratégicos, en lugar del desempeño de la empresa, este estudio amplía la literatura de estrategia que respalda la influencia del esquema de compensación en los resultados de una empresa. Este camino es nuevo porque ofrece una perspectiva moderadora para entender las desviaciones y cambios estratégicos que los CEOs imprimen en sus firmas.
Limitaciones/implicaciones de la investigación
los nuevos estudios pueden explorar un efecto moderador de tres vías en los indicadores de rendimiento, como TSR, Tobin's Q y ROA. Abordamos esta limitación e hicimos un análisis comparativo, pero no incluimos mecanismos moderadores adicionales en estos efectos interactivos.
Implicaciones prácticas
al desagregar la compensación del ejecutivo en función de los componentes de riesgo, las juntas directivas pueden mitigar cualquier posible sesgo no deseado en la relación entre el principal y el agente.
Objetivo
Os autores estendem a pesquisa recente usando o componente de risco dos planos de remuneração de RH para examinar os efeitos dos componentes de risco em dois resultados estratégicos: mudança temporal dentro da empresa, ou variação estratégica, e divergência estratégica da empresa do setor, ou desvio estratégico. Além disso, examinamos o papel do desempenho financeiro anterior como uma condição moderadora dos efeitos dos componentes de risco no plano de remuneração e nos resultados estratégicos da empresa.
Projeto/metodologia/abordagem
Para examinar os efeitos dos componentes de baixo e alto risco da remuneração executiva na variação e desvio estratégico ao longo do tempo, coletamos dados de 2.510 empresas listadas no índice Standard & Poor's 500 em um formato de dados de painel de um período de 12 anos. Os autores coletaram dados financeiros e de outros níveis da empresa da COMPUSTAT, remuneração executiva e dados de nível executivo da EXECUCOMP.
Resultados
Nossos resultados suportam os principais efeitos dos componentes de risco na mudança estratégica, enquanto os componentes de alto e baixo risco atuam no desvio estratégico contingente ao papel moderador do Retorno Total ao Acionista. No referencial teórico, os autores testam o papel moderador do Total Shareholder Return como condição limite dos efeitos dos componentes de risco no plano de remuneração. Ao fazer isso, fornecemos uma compreensão refinada da influência dos componentes de risco do plano de remuneração nos resultados próximos aos executivos, como a manutenção do status quo e a busca por ganhos financeiros.
Originalidade
ao considerar a influência dos componentes de baixo e alto risco dos planos de remuneração nos resultados estratégicos -em vez do desempenho da empresa- este estudo expande a literatura de estratégia que apoia a influência do esquema de remuneração nos resultados de uma empresa. Esse caminho é novo porque oferece uma perspectiva moderadora para entender os desvios e mudanças estratégicas que os CEOs imprimem em suas empresas.
Limitações/implicações da pesquisa
Novos estudos podem explorar um efeito moderador de três vias em indicadores de desempenho, como TSR, Q de Tobin e ROA. Abordamos essa limitação e fizemos uma análise comparativa, mas não incluímos mecanismos moderadores adicionais nesses efeitos interativos.
Implicações práticas
Ao desagregar a remuneração do executivo com base nos componentes de risco, os conselhos de administração podem mitigar possíveis vieses indesejados na relação entre principal e agente.
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Hongyan Fang and David Whidbee
– The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence in support of incentive and retention-based explanations for backdating.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence in support of incentive and retention-based explanations for backdating.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use matching-firm techniques and the bivariate logistic model.
Findings
Backdating firms tend to be younger and faster growing – the characteristics of firms with growing demand for skilled labor. Further, rather than experiencing poor performance, backdating firms tend to outperform matching firms in both prior- and post-backdating years.
Originality/value
The results suggest that backdating reflects a firm's demand for valuable employees rather than strictly a manifestation of agency problems, as evidenced by previous study.