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Although principal–agent theory has gained a prominent place in research, its negative image of self-serving managers is frequently criticized. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine how existing theories of agency and stewardship can be combined by using behavioral characteristics.

This study reviewed articles on the behavior of agents and stewards from the domains of finance, economics, management, corporate governance and organizational research. Additional theoretical and meta-analytical empirical literature from the fields of psychology and sociology was used to account for general patterns of human behavior.

The results indicate that goal congruency and the perception of fairness can serve as moderators distinguishing agency theory and stewardship theory. Goal congruency can be achieved by stipulating psychological ownership. The perception of distributive and procedural fairness is demonstrated by two major corporate governance mechanisms: performance-based compensation and board monitoring. The results are summarized in six hypotheses that allow a situational, customized corporate governance. These hypotheses can be tested in future research.

Prior work either focused on the merits of principal-agent theory or advocates the utilization of positive management theories, such as stewardship theory. However, little work has been done on bridging the gap between both constructs and develop a more extensive view of management theory.

Corporate governance scholars have built on agency theory premises to document chief executive officers' (CEOs’) debt-based compensation, also known as inside debt, as an effective tool to control excessive risk and deter risky corporate strategies. In this study, the authors draw on behavioral agency model to put these well-established assumptions to the test in a different setting and argue for the context-specific effects of CEOs' long-term compensation.

Focusing on corporate mergers and acquisitions in a post-crisis period (2011–2017), the authors cast doubt on agency theory predictions on debt-like compensation, point to the more realistic assumptions of behavioral decision models, and call for more contingency approaches in theoretical arguments.

An analysis of more than 4000 observations reveals that neither CEOs nor shareholders react significantly to inside debt after the economy recovers. Firm risk is also influenced only marginally by long-term compensation in a normal period of time.

While extant literature is rather unanimous on risk-reducing impact of inside debt, the study periods span the financial crisis of 2007. This research is the first conducted in regular times to demonstrate that previous findings are biased and heavily influenced by an exogenous shock.

The paper aims to explain how agency theory can be used to inform our understanding of the dynamics surrounding supply chain behaviours and relationships.

A structured review of the literature using a three‐stage refinement process is used. The articles were sourced through online databases and keyword classifications, such as “agency theory”, “principal‐agent relationships” and “supply chain management”. The search initially identified over 86 articles. After further screening these were reduced to 19 for final assessment and comparison.

Despite agency theory's prevailing descriptive and predictive qualities there is scarcity in its application to the SCM discipline. The authors posit that agency theory provides valuable insights for relationship engineering within supply chains where social, political, legal and behavioural dynamics dominate.

It is a critical task for managers to understand and mitigate abnormal behaviours across the supply chain. Agency theory serves this need by providing them with a useful tool to respond to transaction cost dilemmas through contractual and non‐contractual remedies.

This is one of the first studies that examines the current state of agency theory application in the SCM literature and suggests potential avenues for future research.

Organizational climate is an essential dynamic to leverage in salesforce performance. This study aims to develop a model that explores the determinants of independent manufacturers’ representatives’ (i.e. IMRs’) intentions to comply with their principals’ requests for additional tasking. Using agency theory, the authors explore the application of behavior and outcome-based controls upon dyadic manufacturer-IMR relationships for these additional performance/task requests.

Data from over 1,000 US-based IMRs were used to test two constructs; inter-organizational climate and perceptions of mutual satisfaction within the agency-principal dyad. Compliance behaviors tested were IMRs’ intentions to engage in non-selling-related tasks and intentions to allocate additional selling time to principals’ products. The following four exogenous controls were tested: perceived goal congruence between IMRs and principals; IMRs’ perceptions of principals’ expertise; mutual communications between IMRs and principals in the supply chain dyad; resources and sales support programs provided by principals to IMRs; and IMRs’ perceptions of the adequacy and fairness of the principals’ compensation plans.

Two constructs – inter-organizational climate and perceptions of mutual satisfaction with the agency-principal dyad – mediated the effects of exogenous sales controls on two compliance behaviors. The model’s data were analyzed using Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). A marker variable was deployed to check for common method variance also supported using the Partial least squares (PLS) factor solution. Most variables demonstrated significant direct and mediated effects on each compliance behavior. Variables that emphasized behavioral-based controls dominated intentions for IMRs to engage in non-selling tasks. The principal commission structure, the only sales outcome-based control in the study, most influenced IMRs’ intentions to commit additional sales time to their principals’ products.

This study only examined the intentions of IMRs to engage in additional selling activities and their intention to engage in non-selling tasks. Principals may desire longer-term commitments from IMRs. The model developed here can be modified to capture additional behavioral and attitudinal outcomes including, for example, the exit intentions of IMRs.

Principals are well-advised to foster a positive inter-organizational climate that fuels perceptions of mutually satisfying working relationships with their IMRs. These mutually satisfying working relationships can, by themselves, positively influence IMRs to acquiesce to reasonable requests made by principals. This advice appears to be particularly crucial when asking IMRs to engage in additional non-selling tasks. The total pattern of path estimates points to the conclusion that capable sales control plays an important role in fostering positive inter-organizational climates. The inter-organizational climate – mutual satisfaction link proved crucial as a mediator of the impact of sales controls on IMRs’ behavioral compliance intentions.

Knowing the impact of sales controls on IMR’s affords businesses the ability to use these controls for behavioral compliance intentions on non-selling tasks.

Traditional agency theory assumes monitoring is good for the principal, but we investigate an unintended effect: diminishment of the agent’s preference for honesty. We hypothesize greater dishonest behavior in a monitored environment than in a non-monitored environment, when the agent has the opportunity to cheat outside the scope of monitoring. Relevant theories to explain such behavior are behavioral agency theory, where trust and reciprocity are thought to alter contractual outcomes, and the fraud-triangle theory, where the ability to rationalize deviant acts affects behavior. We utilize participants who have been acclimated to either a monitored or an unmonitored condition in an immediately preceding experiment and seamlessly continue that treatment. Within each of these conditions, participants perform a simple task with a performance-based monetary reward. Half self-report and can safely cheat, while the other half are verified; the difference between verified and self-reported scores is a proxy for dishonest reporting. As hypothesized, unmonitored individuals reciprocate with honest behavior, while monitored individuals tend toward dishonest behavior when the opportunity arises. Implications for fraud prevention are discussed.

This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.

The M&A literature lacks coherence and consistency when explaining the role of CEO power in influencing post-acquisition firm performance in both theoretical and empirical terms. This study uses meta-analytic techniques to quantitatively synthesize and evaluate the impact of 11 CEO power constructs (CEO duality; compensation; ownership; founder CEO; acquisition experience; functional area experience; outside directorship; elite education; CEO celebrity; age; and tenure) on acquiring firms’ post-acquisition performance. Results of 85 independent studies show that CEO ownership, functional area experience, and tenure are significantly positive predictors for better acquisition performance. At the same time, CEO duality and CEO elite education are significantly negative predictors of different measures of acquisition performance. These findings indicate the importance of integrating different theories to enhance our understanding of the nature of strategic leadership in acquisition performance.

On the basis of behavioural agency theory and resource-based view, this study investigates the influence of family firm birth mode (i.e. indirect-established or direct-established), family entering time on R&D investment and the moderating role of the family entering time on the relationship between birth mode and R&D investment.

The authors collected 2,990 firm-year observations from family firms listed on A-share in China from 2008 to 2016 in the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database. They used pooled regression for data analysis and Tobit regression for robustness checks.

Indirect-established family firms show more inclined behaviour towards R&D investment than direct-established counterparts. Family entering time positively affects the R&D investment of family firms. Moreover, family entering time plays a significant moderating role in the relationship between family firm birth mode (i.e. indirect-established or direct-established) and R&D investment.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this work is a pioneering study that introduced the concept of family firm birth mode (i.e. indirect-established or direct-established) and family entering time. This work is novel because it differentiated family firms according to their birth modes, an approach which is a contribution to the existing literature of family firms. Moreover, the investigation of the moderating role of family entering time has also produced notable results that help understand the impact of family entering time on different types of family firms. The interpretation of outcomes according to behavioural agency theory also produced useful insights for future researchers as well as for policymakers.

Investigation of family firm radical innovation is burgeoning but far less prevalent than studies of family firm innovation in general. Concurrently, studies repeatedly report that family firms exhibit mostly conservative and incremental innovation rather than more radical ones. This is unfortunate because without radical innovation, family firms risk a competency trap in which long-term competitiveness is lost to more innovative rivals. This situation has led to urgent calls among scholars to explicitly acknowledge the heterogeneity of family firm innovation and to understand the conditions for family firm radical innovation.

A systematic review of 51 papers categorized into four scholarly conversations build the foundation for a critical discussion of each line of inquiry.

The authors analyze 51 leading articles and identify four persistent theoretical positions: (1) RBV and capabilities, (2) agency and stewardship, (3) behavioral agency and socioemotional wealth, and (4) the ability and willingness paradox. The authors identify key research problems and research questions needing urgent scholarly and present a framework that captures their complementary and competing assumptions to enable rigorous future research.

To galvanize and spearhead future research efforts, this paper provides a critical analysis of our understanding of family firm radical innovation with a specific emphasis on the theoretical assumptions at the core of existing investigations and the eight most important research questions in need of answers.

The purpose of this paper is to propose using agency theory for assessing the likelihood of quality fade in buyer‐supplier relationships and prescribing contractual mechanisms for reducing quality fade. In this paper, quality fade, an element of supply chain vulnerability, is defined as the unforeseen deterioration of agreed to or expected quality levels with respect to product and/or service requirements. The use of outcome‐based, behavior‐based, or mix contracts can be used to reduce the likelihood of quality fade and illustrate preferred scenarios for buyer and suppliers.

This paper proposes a conceptual model for using agency theory to explain and address a type of supply chain vulnerability called quality fade. A 2×2 matrix is proposed that contrasts outcome measurability with outcome uncertainty to illustrate buyer and supplier vulnerability and to suggest contractual mechanisms that can be used to mitigate vulnerability for both parties.

A typology of governance mechanisms is presented and described with the use of a manufacturer third‐party logistics provider example to illustrate the theoretical framework. Four different scenarios are discussed and described. Contractual mechanisms are provided to mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce quality fade.

Quality fade is a term that has not been described extensively in academic literature but is a term that is relevant in the broader discussion of supply chain vulnerability. Given that quality fade is a behavioral, as opposed to process oriented, approach, it requires a theoretical framework rooted in behavioral considerations. Agency theory is an appropriate framework for studying governance options.