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This study aims to verify the circumstances under which managing the allowance for uncollectible accounts is used as a tool of earnings management.

The authors investigate whether bad debt expense, which is an income statement counterpart of allowance for uncollectible accounts, is adjusted downward when pre-managed earnings is slightly above zero earnings, prior year’s earnings or analysts’ forecasts.

The findings of this study show that firms manage bad debt expense downward to avoid losses, sustain the prior year’s earnings and meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. The authors also find that the understatement of bad debt expense to meet earnings benchmarks is pronounced for firms with high tax costs.

Standard setters and auditors can gain a better understanding in detail of the practices and methods of managing earnings via the allowance for uncollectible accounts.

This study is the first to examine earnings management via the allowance for uncollectible accounts in non-financial Korean firms. In addition, the findings provide the evidence that firms prefer to use the allowance for uncollectible accounts as a strategic tool to meet benchmarks, especially when their tax costs are high.

The governing role of bank-appointed directors (BADs) on the boards of non-financial firms has a potential to reduce information asymmetry between the firm and non-bank lenders. This should increase the confidence of other creditors in firm activities, thus performing the certification role. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the certification role of BADs.

The authors test their hypotheses by using a panel of Indian non-financial firms. Our approach involves examining whether there is a significant difference in the number of different debt sources, the dispersion of debt among different debt sources, and leverage for BAD and Non_BAD Firms. The authors use univariate analysis and multivariate regression models to test the difference.

The authors find that firms with BADs on their board have (1) access to a higher number of different debt sources, (2) debt distributed evenly among different sources and (3) a higher debt ratio. Overall, our study provides supporting evidence for the certification role that BADs play on the boards of non-financial firms.

The authors contribute to the literature in two aspects. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the only study that examines the effect of the governing role of banks on the lending decisions of non-bank lenders. Second, our study is associated with the growing body of the governance literature in the emerging markets context by examining the interaction of financial policies and governance in an institutional framework, which is very different from that of the developed world.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the level of bad debt provisions of financial institutions is affected by internal governance mechanisms (IGMs) from the perspective of the Type II principal‐principal (PP) conflicts between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders.

The authors’ sample covers all listed financial institutions in China, comprising a panel data set of 139 firm‐year observations covering 1999 to 2009. Within China's two‐tier corporate governance context, the three IGMs – ownership structure, board of directors and supervisory board – are measured to examine the level of bad debt provisions.

The findings suggest that state ownership and legal person ownership are negatively related to the level of bad debt provisions, but board size reveals a positive association. Other factors including foreign ownership, independent directors, board meeting, supervisory board size and supervisory board meeting were found to have no impact.

The spirit of corporate governance reform has not been transferred to financial institutions sufficiently. The board of directors and supervisory board actually act the roles of “window dressing” or “rubber stamp” within the current two‐tier system. From the Type II PP perspective, the controlling shareholders are found to moderate the conflicts between other parties but they still expropriate the interests of minority shareholders and are the real beneficiaries of recent reforms. Thus, further financial reforms seem necessary in China.

The paper provides an empirical analysis of factors that underlie IGMs during an important period of regulatory change and organizational reform, and fills a literature gap concerning the effectiveness and efficiency of financial institutions.

To examine bad credit experiences in the context of identity to understand the entanglement between bad credit and the deformation of identity.

A qualitative method using depth interviews and hermeneutical analysis.

Bad credit is a major life event and plays a critical role in identity. By restricting or eliminating identity construction and maintenance through consumption, identities are deformed. Consumer identities are deformed as they are consumed by the identity deformation process as normal patterns of consumption that have built and supported their identities are disrupted and demolished. Bad credit is overwhelmingly consumptive of consumers – it consumes their time, energy, patience, lifestyle, relationships, social connections, and perhaps most importantly, it consumes their identity as it deforms who they are.

Researchers need to examine more closely not just the creation and maintenance of identity, but also how identity is deformed and deconstructed through consumption experiences that can no longer be enjoyed.

Government agencies may want to reexamine policies toward the granting of credit to reduce the incidence of loading up consumers with credit they are not able to pay for. The deformation of identity may result in anti-social behavior, although our study does not address this directly.

This study is different from previous work in several ways. We focus on identity deformation due to bad credit. By analyzing a crisis response that transcends the specific impetus of bad credit, we extend identity theory by developing an insight into “identities-in-crisis.” We also provide a theoretical framework and explore how consumers’ identities are deformed and renegotiated.

Examines the problem of bad debt and how it was solved by the mobile communications industry. Discusses the factors responsible for the high level of bad debt in the industry, such as rapid growth, payment structure, and a lack of end‐user appreciation of the costs, which led to the launch of the information sharing system being launched. Surmises that the system will ultimately benefit the credit‐worthy customer since he will no longer have to subsidize bad debts

This chapter examines how the everyday interactions that are fostered with the circulation of debt impact the socioeconomic order in which they operate. Employing the theoretical framework of “circuits of commerce,” scholars have examined how social relations and economic activities intertwine, are negotiated and transformed through the circulation of debt. The focus of such studies has been on the motives of actors, such as the desire for relationship-making, and structural conditions, like the inaccessibility of formal institution, that necessitate the emergence of debt-centered circuits of commerce (Hampton, 2003; Heslop, 2016; James, 2014). However, such circuits also have broader impacts and affect socially pervasive moral evaluations and work cultures (Ho, 2009; Zelizer, 2011). Building on these findings, I examine commission-based alliances among showroom owners and tour guides in Agra’s tourism market to understand how “bad debt” between them shapes Agra’s local tourism economy.

This chapter is based on ethnographic research conducted in 2012–2013 with Agra’s tourism entrepreneurs, like showroom owners, tour guides, and convincers.

Entrepreneurs’ everyday practices around the circulation of debt impact how tourism in Agra is perceived and conducted. Although debt is initiated to mitigate uncertainty of getting clientele, its circulation exacerbates that very uncertainty.

This chapter contributes to the theory of economic practice, highlighting how economic actors, through their everyday practices, shape the macro-structure of the economic system in which they operate.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the intricate ways in which accounting is implicated in the unfolding of strategizing in a pluralistic setting. The authors treat strategizing as a practical coping mechanism which begins in response to a problem and unfolds over time into an episode. This approach enables the authors to explore strategizing pathways and the ways they can mobilise accounting to advance from practical coping to explicit strategic intent.

The authors conducted semi-structured interviews with Clinical Directors, Business Managers and Finance personnel at three NHS hospitals. Documents were also collected, such as business cases and financial reports. The authors employed theories on strategizing agency, episodes and practical coping to select examples of strategizing and indicate how strategizing is constructed and performed. The authors present the results of this qualitative analysis in three strategizing narratives.

The analysis highlights how Clinical Directors’ strategizing with accounting, in response to their financial problems, can take on contesting, conforming and circumventing modes. As the strategizing pathway unfolds, accounting acts as an obligatory passage point through which Clinical Directors pursue their strategic intent. Along each pathway the authors identify, first, where practical coping takes on a clear strategic intent and, second, whether this emergent strategy proves efficacious.

The authors contribute to the nascent body of accounting and strategizing studies through seeing strategizing with accounting, not as the formulation of explicit organisational strategy as “done” in board rooms and strategy meetings, but as an impromptu response to a critical financial problem within a localised organisational setting. In response to a problem, actors may realise their immanent strategizing through their engagement with accounting practices.

Sees the objective of teaching financial management to be to help managers and potential managers to make sensible investment and financing decisions. Acknowledges that financial theory teaches that investment and financing decisions should be based on cash flow and risk. Provides information on payback period; return on capital employed, earnings per share effect, working capital, profit planning, standard costing, financial statement planning and ratio analysis. Seeks to combine the practical rules of thumb of the traditionalists with the ideas of the financial theorists to form a balanced approach to practical financial management for MBA students, financial managers and undergraduates.

Before the September–October 2008 Financial Crisis, investment banks were hooked on debt. In 2007, a year before its failure, Lehman Brothers held equity just 3.3% of its balance sheet (that is, its debt/equity ratio well exceeded 29); virtually all the rest was financed by borrowing. Leverage is an elixir that makes profits soar when times are good but magnifies losses when the economy sours. Currently in India, several companies have seen their balance sheet out of shape because of overleverage, but banks continue to be benevolent, often forced by political interventions (see Cases 6.1 and 6.2). Most of these business groups are nearly dead, with their equity almost wiped out. There is little chance they will survive but for their banker’s largesse. Ever-greening of loans is keeping them alive, but what could be the end game? For instance, just a year before economic liberalization in India, few enterprising men invested in the steel business. They borrowed monies from the banks and banks continued to finance their operations, and now they are realizing that the promoters cannot meet with their debt obligations. The banks, however, did not want to accept financial loss and hence commonly agreed to ease the payment obligations so that the loans remained good and not degenerate to NPAs. This is tantamount to refinancing to service your loans. But now the banks overwhelmed with accumulated NPAs are trying to sell debt. How do you legally, ethically, morally, and spiritually (LEMS) justify share-market concentration in the hands of very few promoter investors? What are their long-run unintended economic, legal, ethical, and moral consequences, and why? This chapter studies this market turbulence and the role of bankruptcy laws and court systems in bringing about some change in the debt-overleveraged corporations.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate the effectiveness of the credit evaluation system using the borrowing data from China’s leading P2P lending platform, Renrendai.com.

The current credit valuation systems are classified into the forward-looking mechanism, which judges the borrowers’ credit levels based on their uploaded information, and the backward-looking mechanism, which judges the borrowers’ credit levels based on their historical repayment performance. Probit models and Tobit models are used to examine the effectiveness of credit evaluation mechanisms.

The results show that only the “hard” information reflecting borrowers’ credit ability can explain the default risk on the platform under the forward-looking credit evaluation mechanism. The backward-looking credit evaluation mechanism (BCEM) based on the repeated borrowings produces both promise-enhancing and “fishing” incentives and thus fails to explain the default risk, and weakens the effectiveness of forward-looking credit indicators in explaining the default risk because it encourages borrowers to invest in forging forward-looking credit indicators. Additional information such as the interest rate and the repayment periods reveals borrowers’ credit and thus can also be used as a predictor of borrowers’ default risk.

The findings suggest that current ex ante screening based on the information collected from the borrowers or repeated borrowings is inadequate to control the default risk in P2P lending markets and thus needs be improved. Ex post monitoring and sharing on defaulter’s information should be strengthened to increase the default cost and thus to deter potential bad borrowers.

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper classifying the credit evaluation system in online P2P lending market into the forward-looking type and the backward-looking type, which is important since they provide different incentives to borrowers. The paper also investigates and provides evidence on the promise-enhancing and “fishing” incentives of BCEMs.