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Many synchronization approaches are based on low-level time capturing, causing a tight integration with the Media Access Control (MAC) layer. Alternatively, this study aims to present a hybrid approach combining both receiver–receiver and sender–receiver schemes to reduce the variation of two-way message exchange durations, in heavy-load networks. To achieve network-wide synchronization, a variant of Prim’s algorithm (Cormen et al., 2009) is used to build a spanning tree, guaranteeing the minimum number of ancestors and limited error propagation. The simulation results show that the proposed approach is very competitive with a set of the most-cited synchronization protocols. In addition, a new synchronization simulator SynSim was developed using C++ language

To achieve network-wide synchronization, a variant of Prim's algorithm (Cormen et al., 2009) is used to build a spanning tree, guaranteeing the minimum number of ancestors and limited error propagation.

Simulation results show that the proposed approach is very competitive with a set of the most-cited synchronization protocols. In addition, a new synchronization simulator SynSim was developed using in C++ language.

It can be concluded from the experiments that MDSP is suitable for WSNs especially if MAC layer timestamping is not possible. So, the mean delays synchronization protocol (MSDP) is suitable to achieve time synchronization in single-hop and multi-hop networks without the MAC layer timestamping in large wireless sensor network (WSN) deployments.

A future enhancement of MDSP could be switching between the traditional timestamping and the new proposed timestamping based on a given threshold, which is the number of nodes in the neighborhood and the load of the network. It will be also interesting to test it in a prototype. The proposed solution can be used in practice to implement the Time-division multiple access (TDMA) protocol in a WSN. In addition, the proposed simulator can be used in a computer network synchronization protocols course.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this study’s contribution is original. In addition, the authors implemented a new synchronization simulator

Organizational learning in inter‐firm exchange relationships poses a double‐edged sword. On one hand, inter‐firm learning is a desirable extension of organizational learning, developing a firm’s knowledge base, and providing fresh insights into strategies, markets, and relationships. On the other hand, inter‐firm learning can lead to unintended and undesirable skills transfer, resulting in the potential dilution of competitive advantage. This risk can be exacerbated by disparities in inter‐firm learning, resulting in uneven distribution of benefits and risks in the collaborative relationship. This paper articulates these two different views on inter‐firm learning, and second, develops a framework for the role of governance in regulating knowledge transfer. In particular, appropriate governance mechanisms must be crafted which match the learning intentions of the partners, the type of knowledge sought, and the designed duration for the collaboration, so as to maximize the benefits of learning while minimizing the risks. Implications for strategy and future research are offered.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse five biases in the valuation of financial investments using a mental time travel framework involving thought investments – with no objective time passing.

An investment’s initial value, together with any periodic funding cash-flows, are mentally projected forward (at an expected rate of return) to give the value at the investment horizon; and this projected value is mentally discounted back to the present. If there is a difference between the initial and present values, then this can imply a bias in valuation.

The study identifies (and gives examples of) five real-world valuation biases: biased funding cash-flow estimates (e.g., mega infrastructure projects); biased rate of return projections (e.g., market crises, tech stock carve-outs); biased discount rate estimates (e.g., dual-listed shares, dual-class shares, short-termism, time-risk misperception, and long-termism); time-duration misestimation or perception bias when projecting (e.g., time-contracted projections which lead to short-termism); and time-duration misestimation or perception bias when discounting (e.g., time-extended discounting which also leads to short-termism). More than one bias can be operating at the same time and we give an example of low levels of retirement savings being the result of the biased discounting of biased projections. Finally, we consider the effects of the different biases of different agents operating simultaneously.

The paper examines key systematic misestimation and psychological biases underlying financial investment valuation pricing anomalies.

This paper is aimed to investigate the impact of different categories of traders on price and volume durations at Euronext Paris. The two series are respectively related to the instantaneous volatility and the market liquidity; hence, they are particularly suited to test microstructure hypotheses.

A Log-autoregressive conditional duration model was adopted to include the information on the traders’ identity at the transaction level. High-frequency data were used and how the informed traders and the liquidity provider affect the arrival of market events was studied. The robustness of our results was also checked by testing different distributions and controlling for microstructure effects.

It was found that informed traders and the liquidity provider exert a dominant role in accelerating the market activity. This result depends on the state of the market, i.e. it is effective only during periods of high frequency of transactions. The estimates for price durations show that a high instantaneous volatility can be mainly ascribed to a great concentration of informed traders. Informed traders are also found to shorten volume durations by clustering small-size orders to disguise their private signal. For both durations, the liquidity provider is also found to foster the market activity, likely because of his contractual duties.

The article is of interest for researchers in the field of market microstructure, as well as for specialists in the high-frequency trading. Results provide an empirical confirmation of information models which theorize an accelerating effect for informed trading. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first contribution to study the impact of traders’categories at the transaction level and with different definitions of durations.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of the prior relationship length and employments of supplier specific investments on buyers' control, and compare this effect across international and domestic business-to-business relationships.

The sampling frame consisted of members of a National Association Purchasing and Logistics, and the respondents were asked to select one major supplier that would serve as a referent in answering the questions. In total, 156 purchasing firms responded to the questionnaire, and multiple regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

Under condition with substantial supplier specific investments, buyers' control relaxes significantly as the length of the relationship increases in international supplier-buyer relationships, while such change in governance pattern is completely absent in domestic relationships.

This study is based on a cross-sectional design and does not fully capture the dynamics of business-to-business relationships. Future research should use different methodologies such as longitudinal studies to examine dynamic relationships among the constructs in the study.

When strong inter-firm dependency is present, the level of buyer control in relationships with foreign suppliers is typically high in the early stage of the relationships in order to handle the problems of information asymmetry and prospective opportunistic behavior, and decline as the buyer's experiential knowledge with the foreign supplier increases with successive lower performance ambiguity. This governance pattern is less evident in domestic business-to-business relationships due to the potential effect of stronger reputation effects and stronger familiarity with current standards of trade.

The paper contributes to the understanding that the changes in governance form over time will be highly contingent on the level of information asymmetry and inter-firm dependency in the early stage of the exchange relationship.

This study considers a contracting problem between a fairness concerned entrepreneur (EN) and a fair-neutral venture capitalist (VC) to explore the effects of asymmetry, agency conflicts and fairness concerns.

The authors construct the model by assuming the EN's risk aversion degree is private information, which is more realistic but ignored in most studies. Under the principal–agent framework, the authors solve the VC's optimal contracting models by identifying the ranges of feasible solution, where the optimal solutions of these models are explicit and nicely reconcile the “private equity” puzzle. Moreover, validity of the optimal solutions is verified by numerical simulations.

In accordance with empirical evidence, information asymmetry lowers the optimal equity share that the VC provides to EN but raises EN's profit due to lower effort disutility and information rent. Moreover, the authors find that the fairness concerns is beneficial for the EN, where it not only increases the EN's optimal equity share, but also enhances the certainty equivalence of the EN's utility regarding its profit. Relative to the benchmark model where the EN's risk aversion degree is common knowledge, the EN's efforts recommended by the optimal contract is less sensitive to the EN's fairness concerns degree when the EN does not actually announce its risk aversion degree.

First, the authors incorporate asymmetry to study a two-period contracting problem and explore how it affects the equity shares allocated to the contractual parties. Second, the authors incorporate fairness concerns and analyze its effect regarding the decision-makings and profits.

As the complexity and uncertainty of megaprojects make it difficult for traditional management models to address the difficulties, this paper aims to design a performance incentive contract through IT applications, thereby promoting the formation of an information-based governance mechanism for megaprojects and facilitating the transformation and upgrading of the construction management model of megaprojects to informatisation.

This paper introduced IT applications into the performance assessment and used the proportion of IT applications replacing traditional manual management as a variable. It analysed different replacement ratios to obtain the optimal solution for the change of contractors behaviours and promote the optimal performance incentive for the informatisation in megaprojects.

The results show that under the condition of the optimal replacement ratio, achieving the optimal state of a mutual win-win situation is possible for the benefit of both sides. The counter-intuitive finding is that the greater the replacement ratio is not, the better, but those other constraints are also taken into account.

This study enriched the research of the performance configuration incentive from a practical perspective. It extended the research framework of IT incentive mechanisms in the governance of megaprojects from a management theory perspective. It clarified the role of IT applications in incentive mechanisms and the design process of optimal incentive contracts under different performance incentive states. The incentives made the contractors work harder to meet the owner's requirements, and it could improve the efficiency of megaprojects, thus better achieving megaproject objectives.

The stock market price time series can be divided into two processes: continuously rising and continuously falling. The authors can effectively prevent the stock market from crashing by accurately estimating the risk on continuously rising returns (CRR) and continuously falling returns (CFR).

The authors add an exogenous variable into Log-autoregressive conditional duration (Log-ACD) model, and then apply our extended Log-ACD model and Archimedean copula to estimate the marginal distribution and conditional distribution of CRR and CFR. Plus, the authors analyze the conditional value at risk (CVaR) and present back-test results of the CVaR. The back-test shows that our proposed risk estimation method has a good estimation power for the risk of the CRR and CFR, especially the downside risk. In addition, the authors detect whether the dependent structure between the CRR and CFR changes using the change point test method.

The empirical results indicate that there is no change point here, suggesting that the results on the dependent structure and risk analysis mentioned above are stable. Therefore, major financial events will not affect the dependent structure here. This is consistent with the point that the CRR and CFR can be analyzed to obtain the trend of stock returns from a more macro perspective than daily stock returns scholars usually study.

The risk estimation method of this paper is of great significance in understanding stock market risk and can provide corresponding valuable information for investment advisors and public policy regulators.

The authors defined a new stock returns, CRR and CFR, since it is difficult to analyze and predict the trend of stock returns according to daily stock returns because of the small autocorrelation among daily stock returns.

The construction industry has long been criticized for unethical conduct. The owner usually manages the contractor's opportunistic behaviors by employing a professional supervisor, but there is a risk of covert collusion between the supervisor and contractor. Based on the principal–agent theory and collusion theory, this paper aims to investigate optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts.

This paper presents a game-theoretic framework comprising an owner, supervisor and contractor, who interact and pursue maximized self-profits. Built upon the fixed-price incentive contract, cost-reimbursement contract, and revenue-sharing contract, different collusion-proof incentive contracts are investigated. A real project case is used to validate the developed model and derived results.

This paper shows that the presence of unethical collusion undermines the owner's interests. Especially, the possibility of agent collusion may induce the owner to abandon extracting quality information from the supervisor. Furthermore, information asymmetry significantly affects the construction contract selection, and the application conditions for different incentive contracts are provided.

This study still has some limitations that deserve further exploration. First, this study explores contractor–supervisor collusion but ignores the possibility of the supervisor abusing authority to extort the contractor. Second, to focus on collusion, this paper ignores the supervision costs. What's the optimal supervision effort that the owner should induce the supervisor to exert? Finally, this paper assumes that the colluders involved always keep their promises. However, what if the colluders may break their promises?

Several collusion-proof incentive contracts are explored in a project management setting. The proposed incentive contracts can provide the project owner with effective and practical tools to inhibit covert collusion in construction management and thus safeguard construction project quality.

This study expands the organization collusion theory to the field of construction management and investigates the optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts. In addition, this study is the first to investigate the effects of information asymmetry on contract selection.

Market sentiment has shown to influence housing prices in the global north, but in emerging economies, the nexus is rare to chance on in the current state of science for policy direction. More importantly in the recent decade where policymakers are yet to conclude on the myriad of factors confronting the housing market in sub-Saharan Africa inhibiting affordability. This paper therefore examines the impact of market sentiment on house prices in South Africa.

The study used the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach with quarterly data spanning from 2005Q1 to 2020Q4.

In all, it was established that market sentiment plays a minimal role in the property market in South Africa. But there was enough evidence of cointegration from the bound test between sentiment and house prices. Nevertheless, the lag values of sentiment pointed to a rise in house prices. Exchange rate volatilities and inflation had a statistically significant effect on prices in both the long and short term, respectively.

Policymakers could still monitor market sentiment in the housing market due to the strong chemistry between house prices and sentiment, as evidenced from the bound test, but focus on economic fundamentals as the main policy tool for house price reduction.

The findings and the creation of the sentiment index make an invaluable contribution to the paper and add to the paucity of literature on the study of market sentiment in the housing market.