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Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

Observes that supply chain management is a rapidly‐evolving subject which offers many insights into how industries are organized and into the efficiency gains which can be made under different organizational structures, pointing out that it is an interdisciplinary concept, drawing on aspects of marketing, economics, logistics, organizational behaviour, etc. Presents a framework from the economics literature which may be useful for those interested in understanding and exploring the concept of supply chain management. Describes the origins and development of transaction cost analysis and explains the key concepts of the framework. Discusses the potential effects of transaction costs on vertical co‐ordination within an industry and, hence, on supply chain management. Finally, suggests methods for empiricizing transaction cost analysis, resulting in recommendations for closer co‐operation between researchers and business managers.

There is a growing concern of the non-balance of the final output of construction works in comparison the financial resources invested with during the course of construction projects. One propelling factor to this is the opportunistic disposition often sought out by construction contractors. This study aims to investigate the relationship between construction contractors’ opportunism and construction project transaction costs from the viewpoint of construction professionals.

Questionnaire survey was deployed in eliciting responses from construction professionals. A total of 337 questionnaires were distributed and 264 were retrieved and deemed fit for analysis. Methods of data analysis used for the study are Mean Item Score, Kruskal–Wallis H-test, Student Newman Kauls Post Hoc Test, Factor Analysis, Spearman Rank Correlation and Regression Analysis.

The study showed that the most-ranked factor influencing contractors’ opportunism that affects transaction cost is “Unclear scope of work”. Revealed from the study is the differing view of construction professionals of the effect of contractors’ opportunism on transaction costs. Equally revealed through Spearman correlation analysis is the potent effect that contractors’ opportunism has on transaction costs. Likewise, the study established that there is a discovered difference among construction professionals’ perceived effect of contractors’ opportunism on construction transaction costs.

The study establishes the nexus between construction contractors’ opportunistic disposition and construction transaction costs, which are shown to be highly correlated. The study went further to recommend that efforts should be made to ensure that issues like contract documentation should be well and appropriately carried out; roles and responsibilities of stakeholders should be well defined so as to fully keep all parties to a contract abreast with the expectations of their duties in relation to the project objectives.

In a departure from the efficiency theory assumptions implicit in most supply chain risk management (SCRM) literature, this study aims to explore the role that external neo-institutional pressures play in shaping the risk management strategies deployed to mitigate transaction cost risks in construction supply chains (CSC).

A theory-elaborating case study is used to investigate how regulatory, normative and mimetic neo-institutional pressures underpin SCRM strategies in state-led and private-led CSC in China.

The study finds that institutionalized Confucianist networks serve as proxies for regulatory accountability and thereby create a form of dysmorphia in the regulatory, normative and mimetic drivers of SCRM strategies in state-led and private-led CSC in China.

The findings reveal that relational costs such as bargaining, transfer and monitoring costs underpin SCRM in state-led CSC. Behavioral costs associated with search, screening and enforcement are the core drivers of SCRM in private-led CSC. These differences in transaction cost drivers of SCRM arise from the risk-buffering effect of personalized Guanxi networks, creating variants of institutional pressures on actors' risk analysis, identification and treatment strategies in China. Considering China's global hegemony in construction and related industries, this study provides valuable insights for practitioners and researchers on the need for a constrained efficiency view of SCRM in global CSC.

Presents a study of the procurement of beef by UK supermarkets. Investigates the hypothesis that a retailer’s choice of beef supplier is influenced by the transaction costs incurred in different supply relationships. Measures the relative importance of the transaction costs incurred by retailers as a result of concerns over quality consistency, traceability and farm animal welfare using conjoint analysis. Data for the conjoint analysis were collected through a postal survey of UK supermarket retailers. From the results, suggests that the information and monitoring costs arising from the need to ensure that beef supplies are of a consistent quality are relatively important influences on the choice of supplier, followed by the traceability of cattle, whether the beef originates from a farm assurance scheme and the price paid by the retailer. Also analyses procurement preferences of individual respondents, revealing some interesting differences between the retailers. Concludes that strategic alliance partnerships between retailers, processors and marketing groups composed of farmers may emerge as the method of vertical co‐ordination which minimizes transaction costs.

Williamson's systematic treatment of transaction costs in explaining governance structures has rarely been applied to the field of environmental economics. The aim of this chapter is to address this oversight by analysing how transaction cost economics can help choose among environmental policy tools.

We apply the analytical framework of discrete structural alternatives – market, hybrid forms and hierarchy – to the choice of environmental policy instruments. Environmental-related transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with categories of policy instruments, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction costs economizing – result.

First, we suggest defining the transaction as the trading of property rights to the use of natural resources. Second, the characteristics of the transaction are described as mainly measurement costs. Third, we determine the conditions under which a particular ‘governance structure’ that is a policy instrument is chosen.

A major contribution of our analysis is to question the relevance of many economists’ prescription in favour of incentive-based instruments. Indeed, in some plausible circumstances a command-and-control instrument may be more efficient by economizing on transaction costs.

Environmental economics has employed the seminal contribution of Ronald H. Coase (1960) intensively but has remained relatively unaffected by the contributions of perhaps his most influential follower, Oliver E. Williamson. Our chapter is a first step towards an operationalization à la Williamson of Coase's (1992, p. 778) ‘fundamental insights’ in the environmental realm.

This chapter analyzes the efficiency levels of a circular economy (CE) with an emphasis on transaction costs. It examines the governance aspect of CE activities in comparison to the predominant linear value creation. Extant CE research in business studies tends to be descriptive and lacks a theoretical foundation, particularly in understanding CE management. Transaction cost theory explains efficiency in economic organizing, lending itself to the study of arrangements that maximize resource efficiency at continued economic virtue. The conceptualization proposes that CE transaction costs are greater than those within the linear economy (LE), primarily due to the uncertainties about reciprocal dependencies, looping material complexities, exchanging novel information, and increased contracting efforts. Geographically bounded and institutionally homogeneous CE initiatives may curb these rising costs. By bringing efficiency concerns into CE analysis, the chapter demonstrates the applicability of transaction cost theory and highlights CE relevance to international business by pointing out spatial choice implications.

The article examines the firm from the perspective of transaction costs and property rights analysis. It is concluded that in the absence of transaction costs, indivisibilities and diseconomies can be dealt with through market transactions, and size of firm is independent of technological considerations. In such circumstances, size of firm is indeterminate in neoclassical theory irrespective of initial assumptions regarding market structure. It is argued that Neoclassical theory is self‐contradictory in its assumptions and that an institutionalist approach to the theory of the firm is required to resolve problems of this nature.

The process of managing the design and construction of a project on behalf of a client may be analysed using project management theory based on a contingency approach. The analysis provided by this approach, whilst useful for understanding the interaction of the parts of the system, the functions of project management and the effectiveness of the organization structure, may be limited by not incorporating an economic explanation of how a project organization structure is chosen. The transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization may provide a theoretical basis for such an explanation. This approach holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations as it determines whether functions are provided by the market or by hierarchy. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between these two powerful approaches in explaining the structuring and management of project organizations on behalf of clients and to explain the benefits of combining these approaches in furthering construction project management theory.