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A remarkable example of coordination between IGOs to deal with corruption and fraud in public procurement is the “Agreement for the Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions” signed by the World Bank and the main regional Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in 2010. This article will try to examine the characteristics of the MDBsʼ cross debarment agreement and its significance for the MDBs that adhered to it in terms of the process of harmonization that resulted from it. Secondly, the article discusses the potential benefits and challenges connected to the extension of this agreement to other MDBs or to other initiatives that have been initiated in parallel to, or in imitation of, the MDBsʼ cross debarment agreement.

This paper aims to analyse sanctions regimes of multilateral development banks and to examine some of the topical issues surrounding sanctioning practices of these institutions. Under the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (the “Mutual Enforcement Agreement”), sanctions covering the sanctionable practices that are imposed and made publicly available by any participating MDB may be enforced by other participating MDBs. This dramatically amplifies the impact of debarment decisions taken by any one of the participating MDBs, while affirming the MDBs’ commitment to combating the sanctionable practices. Consequently, companies will need to invigorate their procedures with a view to managing their risks not only in relation to national legislation, but also in relation to the MDBs’ sanctioning frameworks, which have much broader geographic scope than that of national legislation. This paper first provides an overview of the tenets established by the Mutual Enforcement Agreement. Further, as all MDBs maintain their own sanctions mechanisms, the paper analyses individual sanctions regimes of the WBG, EBRD and ADB. The paper then describes the types of sanctions that may be imposed by MDBs and examines some of the challenging issues surrounding the banks’ sanctions practices.

This paper draws on the experience of senior lawyers who were intimately involved in the set-up of the sanctions regimes at the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the EBRD and the ADB and are currently involved in the work of sanctions boards at their respective institutions.

Companies and individuals dealing with MDBs should be aware of the fact that, as a result of the Mutual Enforcement Agreement, the profile of MDBs’ fraud and corruption cases has been raised significantly and could result in global sanctions for prohibited practices in a single country. Consequently, a company engaging in a prohibited practice in its business dealings with one MDB might find itself unable to obtain financing from the four other MDBs participating in the Mutual Enforcement Agreement, and furthermore its debarment would be published by all five participating MDBs (subject to the above-described limitations of ADB’s publication regime). As MDBs continue to develop their sanctions regimes, greater harmonisation among sanctions processes is to be expected and companies doing business with MDBs should, at the very minimum, ensure that their compliance and ethics programmes are up to date, both as a preventative measure or, if wrongful actions have already taken place, as a means of mitigating the severity of possible sanctions.

A lot has been written about the consequences of criminal convictions for bribery and other corrupt practices. However, much less attention has been paid to the evolution of anti-corruption policies and procedures which have been developed by a group of leading MDBs. In fact, for many corporates, sanctions regimes of MDBs remain unchartered territory, even though these sanctions proceedings can have far-reaching business consequences. This paper will, therefore, be of interest to all companies directly or indirectly involved with MDB-financed projects, as they need to be alert to the scope of MDB sanctions proceedings and the wide-ranging adverse business consequences that may result from any enforcement action.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 and its amendment – the Trade and Competitive Act of 1988 – are unique not only in the history of the accounting and auditing profession, but also in international law. The Acts raised awareness of the need for efficient and adequate internal control systems to prevent illegal acts such as the bribery of foreign officials, political parties and governments to secure or maintain contracts overseas. Its uniqueness is also due to the fact that the USA is the first country to pioneer such a legislation that impacted foreign trade, international law and codes of ethics. The research traces the history of the FCPA before and after its enactment, the role played by the various branches of the United States Government – Congress, Department of Justice, Securities Exchange commission (SEC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); the contributions made by professional associations such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICFA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the American Bar Association (ABA); and, finally, the role played by various international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). A cultural, ethical and legalistic background will give a better understanding of the FCPA as wll as the rationale for its controversy.

The purpose of this paper is to offer anti‐corruption experts' personal assessments of the progress international organizations have made in fighting corruption.

This paper contains a survey of the viewpoints of a number of anti‐corruption experts who themselves are current or former staff of international organizations, or who – from their positions within the private sector or in non‐governmental organizations – are able to offer a unique and distanced perspective on the key corruption‐related issues and challenges facing international organizations today.

It is agreed that international organizations today are at a cross‐roads in their individual and collective fight against corruption. International organizations must weather the corruption scandals that have recently plagued several organizations, and must confront the question of whether their staffs, boards, and member governments indeed have the ability, will, and commitment to fight corruption. To address these challenges, international organizations must adopt proactive investigative strategies when combating corruption, seek greater cooperation with each other, and must ensure that their respective investigation units have the necessary resources and independence to effectively detect, investigate, and prevent corruption.

The paper offers a realistic prognosis on the future of the anti‐corruption movement within and among international organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the extent to which the (changing) European Union (EU) constitutional context impacts on the investigation of fraud affecting the EU budget, with a focus on fraud affecting expenditure.

The paper is based on legal issues perceived by a European law specialist working within OLAF. The legal framework and several cases are used to illustrate various difficulties in operational work. First of all, the paper argues that cooperation between EU bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Judicial Network and European Anti‐Fraud Office (OLAF) is not yet optimal. Nor is the legal framework for OLAF's work. Internal blockages exist. This is illustrated in relation to a number of operational issues.

The paper argues that much has been achieved through secondary legislation in the criminal law sphere under the Treaty of Nice but real difficulties continue at the operational level. As far as operational cooperation, effectiveness and defence rights are concerned, some of the legal problems and internal blockages identified here can be removed regardless of the eventual situation in relation to the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor.

The paper focuses on legal problems and blockages experienced by OLAF investigators in the present legal framework.

The paper should be of interest to anyone engaging in the study of anti‐fraud enforcement and to investigators and prosecutors.

The paper provides an insight into European Commission anti‐fraud enforcement.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the scope of the legal responses to bribery and particularly foreign bribery in the global context. It identifies the corrosive effect of bribery and its negative effect on the economy, before turning to Australia’s mixed response to foreign bribery.

The paper is theoretical in nature as a review of policy, and the literature has been the main method used for analysis. Given the increasingly transnational and organised nature of foreign bribery, this paper adopts a comparative approach using Australia as the home base with some comparisons with the UK and the USA.

This paper finds that Australia’s response to foreign bribery is improving from a low base, and that this is recognised by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Further improvement could be expected if there were strong government leadership and coordination of law enforcement authorities, including the police, corporate regulators and corruption authorities at the Commonwealth, state and territory levels. This paper acknowledges the work of Australia’s unfinished Senate Foreign Bribery Inquiry, which is due to report by 30 June 2017.

This paper revisits the debate on bribery and the response of law enforcement, highlighting the importance of effective and coordinated law enforcement. The paper will provide background for those analysing the issues with foreign bribery and the solutions for law enforcement.

The paper enables the reader to gain insights into the problems and causes and effects of foreign bribery. It is hoped that this paper will contribute to, and facilitate, further analysis of the most effective way to deal with bribery and the legal response.

This study aims to investigate why anti-corruption statutes are not efficient in Nigeria’s upstream petroleum industry.

This study is a doctrinal legal research that embraces a point-by-point comparative methodology with a library research technique.

This study reveals that corruption strives on feeble implementation of anti-corruption legal regime and the absence of political will in offering efficient regulatory intervention. Finally, this study finds that anti-corruption organisations in Nigeria are not efficient due to non-existence of the Federal Government’s political will to fight corruption, insufficient funds and absence of stringent implementation of the anti-corruption legal regime in the country.

Investigations reveal during this study that Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) operations are characterised with poor record-keeping, lack of accountability as well as secrecy in the award of oil contracts, oil licence, leases and other financial transactions due to non-disclosure or confidentiality clauses contained in most of these contracts. Also, an arbitration proceeding limit access to their records and some of these agreements under contentions. This has also limited the success of this research work and generalising its findings.

This study recommends, among other reforms, soft law technique and stringent execution of anti-corruption statutes. This study also recommends increment in financial appropriation to Nigeria’s anti-corruption institutions, taking into consideration the finding that a meagre budget is a drawback.

This study reveals that corruption strives on feeble implementation of anti-corruption legal regime and the absence of political will in offering efficient regulatory intervention. Corruption flourishes due to poor enforcement of anti-corruption laws and the absence of political will in offering efficient regulatory intervention by the government.

The study advocates the need for enhancement of anti-corruption agencies' budgets taking into consideration the finding that meagres budgets are challenge of the agencies.

In 2011, the World Bank announced its intention to conduct a holistic review and reform of its procurement framework. This reform was intended to ensure that its procurement system, which is the means through which the Bank disburses developmental loans and grants is in line with modern trends in procurement, is flexible enough to respond to unforeseen challenges and is coherent. This paper examines both how Bank procurement has evolved since the first formal regulations were issued in 1964 and the implications of the recent reforms for the Bank and its borrowers. Readers will see that ongoing reforms evidence a significant change for the Bank's approach to procurement and its relationship with its borrowers and will dramatically affect the way the Bank-funded procurements are conducted.

This paper aims to examine whether the vigorous enforcement of anti‐bribery laws has had an impact on the propensity of firms to engage in bribe‐giving in international business.

A set of statistical analyses was performed on data – Bribe Payers Index, a measure of bribe‐giving – from four years spanning a nine‐year period to ascertain trends in bribe‐giving.

The results indicate that the perceived level of bribe‐giving by firms from the major exporting countries has been declining. This decline has occurred at a time when the enforcement of national anti‐bribery laws has been stepped up greatly and international treaties against bribe‐giving have been adopted and increasingly enforced.

A robust legal approach to curb bribe‐giving appears to have a general deterrent effect on the propensity of firms based in the countries studied to engage in bribe‐giving. Data availability is limited to about 20 countries.

International cooperation among law enforcement agencies anchored in national laws and international treaties provide an effective basis to successfully prosecute bribe‐giving in international business.

This study strongly suggests that enforcement of national laws against bribe‐giving, coupled with cooperation among national governments, can play a significant role in reducing the perceived level of bribe‐giving in international business.

This paper aims to analyse the extent to which the financial investigation function of an intergovernmental organisation (IGO) may be considered in policing terms, with a view to categorising it in relation to existing paradigms, while acknowledging the IGO’s unique context, in which it enjoys autonomy through various privileges and immunities.

This paper describes and analyses the internal investigation function of IGOs, drawing on practitioner experience as well as mandates, resolutions and reviews from the intergovernmental sector, before making comparisons with policing typologies.

Notwithstanding their expansion into inquiries of non-financial misconduct, IGO investigation offices are the primary means of addressing financial wrongdoing affecting their organisations. Comparisons are drawn with both the corporate policing role inherent in other employment-based organisations and with public policing as a function of the state. It is found that these two paradigms are insufficient to categorise policing within the unique context of the IGO, which has hybrid features of both.

In comparing IGO investigation alongside existing policing paradigms, this paper lays a foundation for further research into the accountability models applicable to this policing function.

This paper discusses the emergence of a form of policing with hybrid features of both internal corporate policing and state law enforcement and contributes to a field that is largely unaddressed in existing research.