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In 1988, Donald Cressey published a previously overlooked article. According to Cressey, there was a lack in the agenda of corporate crime research concerning theory and conceptual precision of what exactly the scientific object was and how it could reinforce the understanding of white-collar criminality. Cressey stated the idea that a fictitious person, such as a corporation, upon which were bestowed properties such as a will of its own (intentions and motivations) and a consciousness to act morally and ethically have a responsibility to follow the order of law, leds to a fundamental theoretical problem in terms of discovering the causes of crimes committed by such a fictitious person. I follow this line of thought about the arguments made by representatives of corporate crime. Specifically, I follow the concept of “decoupling,” by using various techniques of formal logic. The conclusion is that the concept of corporate crime is a logical contradiction (an eternal false statement), but the research has one analytical point which must be incorporated into the research of white-collar criminality: how structural conditions of a corporation’s policy and strategy “produce” or influence the individuals within the corporation to make decisions. The aim of the paper is to prove on logical grounds that the direction of research on corporate crime is on the wrong track to find the truth (basic elements and mechanisms) about white-collar crime.

Using formal logic, specifically modal logic.

The concept “corporate crime” is a logical contradiction.

Concerning the conclusion, the implications has to be that corporate crime is a misleading concept in the research agenda of white-collar crime.

The authors have to reconsider the whole research field of corporate crime research.

To best of my knowledge, no one has before done a critic of corporate crime concept by formal logic.

This empirical study aims to examine two areas: first, the characteristics of the audit committee and their relationship with corporate financial crime so as to ensure that their effectiveness as a corporate governance mechanism is still relevant; and second, the effectiveness of having a risk committee which is separated from the audit committee in the prevention of corporate financial crime.

This empirical research was carried out by using a Web-based data collection for corporate financial crime cases.

While the results for audit committee characteristics are not supported, the findings, however, indicate a significant relationship between the existence of a stand-alone risk committee with corporate financial crime incidences.

The result of the study serves as an empirical indicator of a firm’s consideration in deciding on the implementation of a stand-alone risk committee from its audit committee.

Both the descriptive and correlation analyses produced by this paper provide new insights into the extent of corporate financial crime, as well as the empirical evidence of the effectiveness of having a stand-alone risk committee.

Corporate crime affects the stability of the international financial system and the business world system has made considerable efforts to fight all aspects of corporate crimes. Fraud and white-collar crime has increased considerably over the recent years and this trend is expected to continue.

This chapter defines corporate crime and its categories as well as considering the ways in which such crime occurs. This is set within the context of other failures such as Enron.

These crimes are considered in the context of ethical behaviour but it is reported that the various measures taken to dissuade these crimes at various levels just have not seems to reduce such crime.

In many respects this chapter introduces the contexts and acts as preparation for the other chapters in the book and so is not exhaustive in scope.

Since not all fraud and abuse is discovered and reported, the cost of fraud to businesses is hard to be estimated.

The chapter discusses the context in which corporate crime occurs.

In his examination of the links between power and crime, Steven Box defined corporate crime as crime committed for the corporate organisation and not against it. Thus, employee theft, including fraud and embezzlement against an employer, would not be categorised as such. Braithwaite adopts a similar definition to Box, suggesting that corporate crime refers to ‘the conduct of a corporation or individuals acting on behalf of the corporation that is proscribed by law’. Corporate crime, then, involves illegal acts of an individual or group within a legitimate formal organisation which are in accordance with the goals of that organisation.

The chapter focuses on the personal characteristics of top executives in companies involved in corporate financial crime as well as the introduction of human governance as one of the mechanisms in preventing corporate misbehaviour. This chapter discusses directors’ and top management teams’ personal characteristics – in the context of corporate governance – that may influence the occurrence of corporate financial crime. The study further proposes the human governance factor as a possible mechanism to improve corporate governance in preventing such misbehaviour. This chapter highlights the personal characteristics of top executives, which may become the indicators of corporate financial crime, as well as human governance, which is shown to be one of the most important mechanisms of corporate governance for corporate financial crime prevention.

The purpose of this viewpoint paper is to assist in finding solutions for the growing moral and social issues of financial crime plaguing corporations today.

Methodology includes the synthesis of existing theories in economic sociology and criminology to “diagnose” and “treat” the existing flaws in corporate structures that have led to malaise and malfeasance. Theories include differential association, self‐control, and control balance, taking into consideration the characteristics of individuals and corporate structures.

Findings suggest that corporate structure has to be critically scrutinized and changes implemented, including close examination of informal and formal communication and salary structures.

This paper suggests concrete strategies and policy changes for regulators, corporate decision makers, and academics.

The synthesis of existing theories in white collar malfeasance and crime provides a template to increase corporate social responsibility and promote policy/regulatory changes in the current economic climate.

This paper aims to unveil the spheres that were silenced by the media and academia with regard to the collapse of the Fundão Dam that occurred in 2015, in Mariana (Minas Gerais - Brazil).

In an attempt to contribute to studies into the evil side of organizations, the authors use the theoretical contributions of corporate crime and the one-dimensional society. The authors used the “Samarco Mud” corporate crime case as an object of analysis, while a press conference with the company’s CEO and representatives from its parent companies was used as the analytical corpus. For the analysis, the authors used the content analysis technique.

The conclusions of this study point to the existence of subjects who were silenced about the phenomenon of the Fundão Dam collapse, a situation that reveals the power exercised by corporations and the totalitarian domination of the one-dimensional society as a social factor that favors the occurrence of corporate crimes.

The case in question is recent and not fully understood by academia. Neither is its organization around political and social movements understood with regard to the management implications for society and the environment. With a discussion that mixes the concepts of corporate crime and the one-dimensional society, this paper contributes to the base of critical studies in management, especially as far as concerns the mining policies used in the Southern Hemisphere.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the unexplained wealth inside the corporation and to initiate and apply unexplained wealth order in the Indonesian corporation based on the Indonesian legal system and prevailing laws. An effective tool needs to be implemented because of the facts that numerous corporate illegal activities lead to economic and financial crime. Meanwhile, there are difficulties to implement the corporate criminal liability. Non-conviction-based asset forfeiture will be a way out to deal with the current condition.

This paper explores and analyzes the Indonesian legal system, particularly a non-conviction-based asset forfeiture for corporate illegal activities. This paper is based on the research paper conducted with the legal normative approach.

Non-conviction-based asset forfeiture through unexplained wealth order will be an effective tool and a revolutionary pattern in the crime prevention perspective dealing with corporate crime. Corporate criminal liability in anti-corruption regime can be viewed from two perspectives by combining and integrating crime prevention approach as well as the repressive approach. The Indonesian Supreme Court Regulation number 13 of 2016 is a breakthrough in the criminal justice system to redesign case handling procedure toward corporate crime. It needs to be supported by precise asset forfeiture law. Furthermore it is necessity to strengthening and built corporations with moral and ethical business values.

This paper can be a source to explore the unexplained wealth that can occur in the corporation and the way to overcome it through unexplained wealth order and non-conviction-based asset forfeiture.

This paper contributes by initiating a non-conviction-based asset forfeiture, which is implementing the in rem proceeding, to make sure the crime does not pay and the victim and society suffer less because of the corporate crime.

The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate role of penal approach in corporate crime control and to assess if compliance program can be accepted in China, the largest developing country with relatively little regulatory capacity and an immature financial market when compared to developed economies.

Based on the general corporate crime control theory, a perspective from legal culture will be specially followed in studying control instruments.

This paper found that the criminal control approach has its limitations in corporate crime control in China and, therefore, argued that compliance programs are highly consistent with Asian legal cultures. However, unlike many developed economies, compliance programs have not been included in sentencing guidelines yet, which has been left to judges’ discretion.

The concept of compliance as a control instrument has been widely discussed in developed economies. Limited research observes areas such as China, which faces a notable dilemma, i.e. economics has been speedily booming, whereas regulation rules are relatively left behind.

Corporate crimes are crimes committed in the course of otherwise legitimate working procedures in respectable organisations. Although corporate crimes can cause many forms of physical, moral and financial damage, in practice the administration of criminal justice is rather lenient. Should the harmful behaviour of corporations be curbed by the intensification of criminal justice? In this paper the author rejects this option. He prefers fostering the social responsiveness of organisations, i.e. strengthening the ability of organisations to comply with existing social expectations. Responsive means that these expectations are properly assessed and are taken into account in the decision‐making. The author specifies two conditions which determined the extent of responsiveness and proposes several strategies for responsive regulation. Responsive regulation is based upon negotiation and persuasion. Only in this context can penal sanctions be effective; responsive regulation in the shadow of criminal law.