Search results

The paper aims to reveal some uncertain correlations and presumptions about corruption.

The paper defines corruption as a social phenomenon. It presents two basic components of that phenomenon: unreasonable preferential treatment and abuse of power. The paper addresses the moral issue that is implied in any phenomenon of corruption. The author will use the Corruption Perception Index and the Bribe Payers Index of Transparency International as well as the International Country Risk Guide, in order to check to what extent some correlations or presumptions about corruption could be reliable, at least as hypotheses.

Uncertain correlations and presumptions about corruption actually create an effect of distorted interpretation. They could cause ideological biases that distort our perception of corruption in developing and developed countries.

The paper does not take into account the multiple expressions of gift‐giving practices around the world and the way such practices could be confused with corruption.

Being aware of our “presumptions” about corruption will help us to choose relevant strategies to combat corrupt practices. This study has implications for business corporations, governments and IFIs. It reveals how the awareness of such uncertainties and presumptions about corruption is related to the CSR discourse.

The originality of the paper is to unveil some presumptions about corruption that have not been compared with the results obtained from the Corruption Perception Index, the Bribe Payers Index and the International Country Risk Guide.

Using indices of bribe for 19 countries, this study examines the determinants of bribe paying in international business. There is a strong positive correlation between countries where bribe taking is highly prevalent and those countries that are most likely to offer bribes. The propensity to give bribes is determined by economic factors such as per capita income and degree of economic freedom in the country, cultural factors such as power distance and masculinity; and legal regulatory factors such as accounting and tax treatment of bribes. It appears that, to eliminate international bribery, the supply side needs to be addressed in addition to the demand for bribes.

This paper seeks to examine the extent to which national cultural characteristics impact the propensity of firms based in the country to engage in bribery to gain advantages when conducting business overseas.

A set of statistical analyses – bivariate correlations and regression – was performed on data for five cultural variables and one economic variable for 30 countries to ascertain the relationship between these variables on a country's Bribe Payers Index, a measure of bribe giving.

The results indicate that firms from countries low on power distance or long‐term orientation, or high on individualism, are less likely to engage in bribe giving. However, when the level of economic development in the home country as measured by per capita income is included, the impact of cultural factors is muted considerably. Firms from high‐income countries are less likely to give bribes.

Richer countries are likely to have certain practices that create a business ethos where bribing is the exception, not the rule, in conducting business. The study is based on a one‐time sample of just 30 countries for which bribe‐giving data are available. The data culture is limited to the countries studied by Hofstede.

Bribery is less a cultural phenomenon; instead, it is bred in poverty and illustrative of business behavior occurring in a highly regulated and inward‐looking economy. As a country prospers and the domestic operating environment becomes more hygienic, it will have a salutary effect on the international behavior of the firms based in that country.

The study mediates the debate between cultural and economic determinism and provides empirical evidence that bribe‐giving is largely an expression of economic imperatives and not cultural predisposition.

This paper aims to examine whether the vigorous enforcement of anti‐bribery laws has had an impact on the propensity of firms to engage in bribe‐giving in international business.

A set of statistical analyses was performed on data – Bribe Payers Index, a measure of bribe‐giving – from four years spanning a nine‐year period to ascertain trends in bribe‐giving.

The results indicate that the perceived level of bribe‐giving by firms from the major exporting countries has been declining. This decline has occurred at a time when the enforcement of national anti‐bribery laws has been stepped up greatly and international treaties against bribe‐giving have been adopted and increasingly enforced.

A robust legal approach to curb bribe‐giving appears to have a general deterrent effect on the propensity of firms based in the countries studied to engage in bribe‐giving. Data availability is limited to about 20 countries.

International cooperation among law enforcement agencies anchored in national laws and international treaties provide an effective basis to successfully prosecute bribe‐giving in international business.

This study strongly suggests that enforcement of national laws against bribe‐giving, coupled with cooperation among national governments, can play a significant role in reducing the perceived level of bribe‐giving in international business.

This chapter critically surveys recent advances in the methodology of measuring corruption in the field. The issue of measurement is central in the corruption literature, and the choice of method can significantly influence our thinking about the determinants, the mechanics, and the impact of corruption on the economy. We provide a conceptual categorization of different methods of measuring corruption ranging from surveys to direct observation of bribe payments in the field, while discussing the methodological and conceptual advantages and disadvantages of each method. Finally, we highlight areas of complementarity across methods and discuss avenues for future research.

The research question is how home country corruption and nationalism may affect operations of BRIC multinational enterprises. BRIC composition permits a comparison of two authoritarian regimes and two constitutional democracies. Each BRIC features a different combination of corruption and nationalism. The chapter adds South Africa information for two limited reasons. First, from 2010 South Africa is a member of the BRIC summit process. South Africa is an important entry point to Africa, for BRIC multinationals and particularly for China. Second, concerning corruption and nationalism South Africa is analytically useful as a control context that helps illustrate but does not appear to change highly exploratory BRIC findings.

The chapter draws on limited literature and information concerning corruption and nationalism in BRICs to suggest tentative possibilities. Transparency International provides bribe payers index estimates for 28 large economies, with important multinational enterprises, and corruption perceptions index estimates including those 28 countries. These estimates include the four BRICs and South Africa. The available sources suggest some suggested findings about varying impacts of home country corruption and nationalism on operations of BRIC multinationals.

China and Russia are authoritarian regimes in transition from central planning-oriented communist regimes. They are global military powers, expanding influence in their respective regions. Brazil, India, and South Africa are constitutional democracies. India, a nuclear-armed military power, seeks a regional leadership role in South Asia. Brazil and South Africa are key countries economically in their regions. BRIC multinationals are positioned between home country and host country conditions. Chinese and Russian multinationals may reflect a stronger nationalistic tendency due to home country regimes and ownership structure.

The chapter is an original but highly exploratory inquiry into impacts of corruption and nationalism on BRIC multinationals. Extant BRIC literature tends to understudy effects of home country corruption and nationalism on managerial mindset and incentives in either commercial or state-owned enterprises.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) home country corruption in their decision to bribe officials in foreign host countries.

A model that predicts MNE bribing by controlling for a multitude of foreign host country factors is used. The information contained in the orthogonal residuals from this model is exploited to see whether MNE’s home country factors, particularly the level of public corruption, work to amplify illegal behavior by respective MNE in abroad.

MNEs pay more in bribes when the foreign officials they face are more corrupt. This behavior worsens when MNE’s home country has more corruption.

All UN member countries are signatories to the UN Convention against Corruption that proscribes the bribing of foreign public officials by respective MNEs. The Convention’s reliance on home country enforcement of stipulations against the bribing of foreign officials by respective MNEs exposes its efficacy of the malfeasance of home country public officials.

This paper extends the literature to an examination of MNE’s use of bribes in a world with a global anti-corruption regime. Additionally, it ties MNE behavior in foreign countries to corruption in MNE’s home country.

Since 1977, U.S. firms have been prohibited from bribing foreign officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. As a result, many traditional competitors of U.S. multinational firms have been willing to pay bribes to foreign officials as a marketing ploy to win sales at the expense of their American counterparts. Because bribery of public officials is widespread in many developing nations to facilitate overseas sales, U.S. firms lost significant overseas contracts while their foreign competitors gained market share. Recognizing the dilemma that American firms are in, successive U.S. administrations have led the charge against bribery and have attempted to get other nations to join in the battle. Now, after twenty years, these attempts are finally paying off. A growing number of international organizations have developed guidelines to help curb corruption in the future. This paper traces the U.S.'s attempts to curtail official bribery, and details new information outlets and laws passed by other nations to be used as weapons as they join in the U.S.‐led fight against bribery.

The aim of the study is to examine the effect of public attitude on petty corruption.

This is a survey study on customers of a licenses providing authority (N = 390) in Cairo, Egypt. The authors use Akers social learning theory of crime and deviance and take into consideration criticisms of it. The authors control for individual and organizational level determinants that are identified by scholars as influencing people's attitudes toward corruption and which could be known through the authority customers' experiences. Because the dependent variable is binary, whether a person paid a bribe during last transaction with this authority or not, the authors use binary logistic regression.

The findings indicate that people are more likely to engage in petty corruption when they see it as acceptable, have previous petty corruption experience and when they use a mediator. Also, of those who dealt with that civil service authority during and directly after the 25th of January Revolution (N = 161) 31% reported that they did not engage in petty corruption in comparison to previous years. They referred this to a change in attitude at the time.

The policy implications of the research are important. Social science theories could generate cultural and policy relevant solutions for petty corruption; however, they have not been taken full advantage of. Also, experience-based country-specific corruption survey studies are important input for an effective anti-corruption policy.