Search results

In the mid-2000s, the operator of New York City’s mass transit network committed more than a half-billion dollars to military contractor Lockheed Martin for a security technology capable, in part, of inferring threats based on analysis of data streams, of developing response strategies, and taking automated action toward alerts and calamities in light of evolving circumstances. The project was a failure. This chapter explores the conceptualization and development of this technology – rooted in cybernetics – and compares its conceptual underpinnings with some situated problems of awareness, communication, coordination, and action in emergencies as they unfold in one of the busiest transport systems in the world, the New York subway. The author shows how the technology, with all the theatrical trappings of a “legitimate” security solution, was apparently conceived without a grounded understanding of actual use-cases, and the degree to which the complex interactions which give rise to subway emergency can be anticipated in – and therefore managed through – a technological system. As a case-study, the chapter illustrates the pitfalls of deploying technology against problems which are not well-defined in the first place, to the neglect of investments against much more fundamental problems – such as inadequate communication systems, and unstable relationships with emergency response agencies – which might offer guaranteed benefits, and indeed lay a firm groundwork for future deployment of more ambitious technology.

Most research ethic review procedures refer to the principles of safety and security only as sub-criteria of other ethical principles such as the protection of human subjects in research, thereby ignoring the public good aspect of safety and security. In addition, Research Ethics Review Committees (RECs) are usually dominated by philosophers, ethicists, medical doctors, and lawyers with limited practical backgrounds in safety and security risk management. This gap of knowledge restricts ethics reviews in carrying out project-specific safety and security risk management and defers this responsibility to lawmakers and national legal authorities. What might be sufficient in well-regulated and well-understood environments, such as the safety of individuals during clinical research, is insufficient in managing rapidly changing and emerging risks – such as with emerging biotechnologies – as well as addressing the public good dimension of safety and security.

This chapter considers governance approaches to safety and security in research. It concludes that legal mechanisms are insufficient to cope with the complexity of and the fast progress made in emerging technologies. The chapter also addresses the role and potential of research ethics as a safety and security governance approach. It concludes that research ethics can play an important role in the governance of such risks arising from emerging technologies, for example through fundamental rights and public good considerations. However, in reality the current capacity of ethics in the safety and security governance of emerging technologies is limited. It is argued that in newly emerging areas of research currently applied legal compliance–based approaches are insufficient. Instead, inclusion of fundamental risk management knowledge and closer interactions between scientists, safety, and security experts are needed for effective risk management. Safety and Security Culture provide frameworks for such interactions and would well complement the current legal compliance–based governance approaches in research ethics.

Purpose: Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are the most significant contributors to maximum employment generation, the gross domestic product (GDP) of many countries, and the overall global economy. It is also evident that cyber threats are becoming a big challenge for SMEs, which is directly impacting global economy.

Methodology: Existing research inputs were accessed to understand current cyber threats for SMEs and their cybersecurity posture. Additionally, this research has collected the latest insights by taking direct inputs from SMEs and conducting a well-designed research survey. It has provided a few direct inputs to designing solutions for the SME segment. For analysis and recommendations, cybersecurity best practices and core cybersecurity concepts are considered at the centre of the solution.

Findings: Implementing existing cybersecurity standards or frameworks is not easy for SMEs, as they generally have limited resources and different priorities for their business when it comes to the implementation of any cybersecurity controls. Currently, many cybersecurity standards are not able to support the implementation of business domain-specific controls.

Practical implications: Along with the research findings shared in this chapter, as a resolution to the problems faced by SMEs, the authors will propose a new framework as a solution. This framework is designed using core concepts of cybersecurity such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA triad) as well as defence in depth (DiD) mechanisms in each layer of organisation. The authors will also share a high-level idea about how reliable artificial intelligence-based software can help identify recommended controls for particular SMEs.

Cyber threats present constantly evolving and unique challenges to national security professionals at all levels of government. Public and private sector entities also face a constant stream of cyberattacks through varied methods by actors with myriad motivations. These threats are not expected to diminish in the near future. As a result, homeland security and national security professionals at all levels of government must understand the unique motivations and capabilities of malicious cyber actors in order to better protect against and respond to cyberattacks. This chapter outlines the most common cyberattacks; explains the motivations behind these attacks; and describes the federal, state, and local efforts to address these threats.

During the period 1962-2001 (9/11), the author identified 25 terrorist acts in the English-speaking Caribbean. Apart from US action in Grenada in 1983, the extra-regional response to these acts was minimal. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US has introduced a number of counter-terrorist measures into the region from Washington through such agencies as Southcom, the FBI, the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security, now including the Coast Guard, to forestall future acts of terrorism. Also the UN, the OAS, and the CARICOM, at the instigation of the US, have encouraged Caribbean nations to adopt resolutions and pass anti-terrorist legislation at the local level in the fight against terrorism. US policy toward the region is based on its own self-interest since it considers the Caribbean its “Third Border,” one that is difficult to close to security threats. In all of this, the Caribbean nations welcome the security, more so because of the incidental protection it offers to their fragile tourist-dependent economies that are sensitive to political and other threats. This coincidence of interest has seen the US merge drug-trafficking and terrorism into one consolidated threat. Traditionally, the Caribbean region has not allocated a large part of its budget to security concerns, but with external assistance, particularly from the US, the region's police and military forces have been called upon to adapt to the global threats of the post-9/11 era by strengthening operational capacity, mission readiness, and intensify regional cooperation. This new thrust also includes making border tightening security measures more comprehensive and robust as well as the sharing of information, including intelligence. As long as the US perceives the terrorist threat a priority, Caribbean security policy will continue apace.

Target 16.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) refers to the need for ‘responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making’ to facilitate just, peaceful and inclusive societies. This chapter discusses why it is important that security and justice institutions, and decision-making therein, are responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative; how to develop such institutions; and how to measure success in this regard. It is argued that the limited scope of the official SDG indicators used to measure progress risks action being taken on less tangible and less measurable but often more meaningful aspects of building just, peaceful and inclusive societies. The chapter argues that facilitating more inclusive decision-making, especially in the security and justice sector (redistributing power), and evaluating progress in this regard (determining what success looks like) are both highly political undertakings. These undertakings are thus, fraught with practical difficulties and likely to generate resistance from those who have a vested interest in retaining the status quo. Retaining focus on the Target and overarching Goal, however, can help avoid implementation being derailed by being distracted by a huge data gathering exercise to respond to a narrow set of quantifiable indicators. It can also ultimately help facilitate transformational change towards just, peaceful and inclusive societies.

The unpredictable distribution of globalization has directed the world economy and revealed the need to establish cooperation in all business processes. This global structure also highlights the necessity of designing an agile supply chain that is capable of continuous information sharing during end-to-end transportation for the purpose of creating sustainable connections. In this process, various strategies enhanced with contemporary information and communication technologies have been developed to create a fast and accurate data-sharing network between logistics service providers and supply chain parties. However, unlike the short-term interruptions experienced in the past, COVID-19 has caused unprecedented problems in the dynamics of most economies. In eliminating these problems, it has been seen that information communication technologies, which provide the advantage of digital visibility in normal operations, need to be redesigned with the technology of the autonomous age. To meet this requirement, Industry 4.0, a revolutionary conceptual trend that started roughly a decade ago but that has become considerably more widespread during COVID-19, has been integrated into business models as a key concept that governs intelligent transformation in the chain. This process, which is today considered a compulsory intelligent transformation rather than an alternative method, has however led to some conflicts, especially in adaptation, expertise, and security subjects. This chapter of the book evaluates, within the scope of cybersecurity and workforce in logistics services, the conflicts created by the digital solution methods that have been integrated into business models to reduce the negative effects of COVID-19.

In their contribution, Maja Apelt and Jana Hunnius ask how the physical proximity of organizations in a network impacts the creation of organizational boundaries. They assume that against a background of shared experiences, members of organizations can develop a community and cooperate on a basis of trust, but that this is not tantamount to organizational boundaries becoming permeable. Here, Apelt and Hunnius draw on Lefebvre’s (2006) concept of space and adapt this to the practice of organizations by drawing a distinction between three dimensions of spatial practice: spatial practice in the narrow sense, in other words, how the organizations structure the space; organizational practice or, in other words, which formal and informal structures they establish; and representative practice, that is, how they speak about space, legitimize their actions, and thus give them meaning. Empirically, the chapter is based on case studies at two German airports. Using the evidence provided by these studies, Apelt and Hunnius are able to show that the organizations develop different practices. While at one of the airports the community is strengthened, but the organizational boundaries are protected at the same time, the other airport establishes cooperative structures through which the organizational boundaries are weakened. The airport community plays a less important role here.