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Target 16.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) refers to the need for ‘responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making’ to facilitate just, peaceful and inclusive societies. This chapter discusses why it is important that security and justice institutions, and decision-making therein, are responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative; how to develop such institutions; and how to measure success in this regard. It is argued that the limited scope of the official SDG indicators used to measure progress risks action being taken on less tangible and less measurable but often more meaningful aspects of building just, peaceful and inclusive societies. The chapter argues that facilitating more inclusive decision-making, especially in the security and justice sector (redistributing power), and evaluating progress in this regard (determining what success looks like) are both highly political undertakings. These undertakings are thus, fraught with practical difficulties and likely to generate resistance from those who have a vested interest in retaining the status quo. Retaining focus on the Target and overarching Goal, however, can help avoid implementation being derailed by being distracted by a huge data gathering exercise to respond to a narrow set of quantifiable indicators. It can also ultimately help facilitate transformational change towards just, peaceful and inclusive societies.

Donors promoting public sector institutional reforms do not clearly understand what works and why. Yet, despite the limited practical knowledge of how to reform and build high-quality public sector institutions, the ambitions and the scope of donor-promoted institutional reforms have been increasing. Over the last five decades, various bilateral, regional, and international development agencies – such as the U.K.'s Department for International Development (DFiD), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OSCE), and others – have experimented with different approaches to promoting development, with little coordination and consensus. In the last two decades, donors have converged in their approach to development by emphasizing institutions – governance mechanisms, including rules and organizations that structure individual and organizational behavior. Research and experience have led to the acceptance that strong, effective government institutions are essential for addressing donors’ key concerns in developing countries, concerns including poverty, corruption, and, especially since 9/11, security. Emphasis on country ownership further highlights the importance of institutional reform as part of donors’ capacity-building agenda. Therefore, donors’ emphasis on institutional reforms in developing countries has significantly increased as a share of their total lending and technical assistance.

Hungary has been part of NATO's peacekeeping project in Afghanistan since 2003 and currently has more than 240 soldiers in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO's first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Hungary officially took over the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Baghlan Province from October 2006, and currently we have the 5th rotation of the Hungarian PRT in Afghanistan. The Hungarian unit serves in conjunction with representatives of several other nations.

Hungarian participation in NATO's UN-mandated peace support operation in Afghanistan has raised many questions not only in the field of operations, but also at home (mainly in the context of civil–military relations). Many of the Hungarian PRT-related challenges seem to be connected to the difficulties of proper management of civil–military interface, civil–military partnership and cooperation process, and financial backing of the mission.

Well-coordinated, multidimensional proactive and reactive responses to the conflict, and a comprehensive security sector transformation and reform can be vital to consolidate peaceful relations in Afghanistan; may help to win the “hearts and minds” of the local population; can help to establish security and provide improvement to Bahlan province; and might contribute to the success of the whole peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building process in Afghanistan.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the development of the private security sector in several former Yugoslav countries that have gone through difficult post‐conflict reconstruction including the field of security.

The paper takes a qualitative approach to data collection that includes interviews with experts in the field of private security from several ex‐Yugoslav countries.

While much effort is invested in the rebuilding of new, democratic public police forces in post‐conflict societies, little attention is usually paid to non‐state providers of security, for example, private security industry. Private security could, potentially, be both a crucial additional stabilising factor in assuring security in post‐conflict environments and a cause of instability if it lacks legislative control, professionalism and ethical guidance. Hence, both the state and the police should support the private security industry in helping it to achieve legitimacy and, where appropriate, partner state bodies. A well‐regulated private security sector could also become a substantial employer of large numbers of demobilised combatants in post‐conflict societies. Analyses of private security sectors in several former Yugoslav countries that experienced conflict identify a number of potential advantages and challenges. On one hand, in those countries with appropriate legislation in this regard, private security is becoming a valuable additional provider of security, while on the other hand, even strict regulation has failed to prevent some private security companies maintaining links with paramilitary, political and organised crime groups. Legal regulation is a precondition for the stable development of private security in those countries focussed upon in this paper, and this is not possible without appropriate action regarding the training, integrity and ethical behaviour of private security officers.

The results are limited to developments in ex‐Yugoslavia, and may not be easily generalized to other situations and venues.

This paper provides a useful source of information for security policy makers and security experts in post‐conflict societies.

This paper extends understanding of the development of private security in post‐conflict societies.