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In the real world, developed countries are permitted to impose tariffs only on a small range of imports (partial tariff). For this reason, tariff policies have been replaced in many countries by other policy devices such as a competition policy. This study compares a competition policy with a partial tariff policy. It demonstrates that if a country can impose a tariff on only a small part of the imports and at sufficiently low tariff rates, optimal partial tariff policy may not create as large a protective effect as optimal competition policy.

Sustainability performance of the global trade as well as of the traded products are affected by the trade policies and trade tariffs. Trade tariffs and policies can either encourage or discourage trade among the countries affecting feasibility of trade. In other words, the scope and amount of these trade tariffs have impact on the trade globally. Based on an in-depth literature review, this chapter aims to examine impacts of the trade policies and trade tariffs on the environmental footprint of the global trade. With this aim, recent trade policies and trade tariffs as well as roles of the trade policies, trade tariffs in reducing environmental footprint of the global trade are examined. It arrives at the conclusion that trade tariffs can affect environmental footprint of the global trade as well as of the traded products. They can have impact on the feasibility of the trading activities influencing their profit margins and costs. Based on these findings, recommendations for trade policies and trade tariffs are thereby provided to enhance sustainability performance of the global trade.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the interdependencies between trade and environment policies, as they get jointly determined in a political‐economy model of a small open economy. In theoretical literature, government is usually modeled as benevolent. In real economies, however, it is not a pure social welfare maximizer. Lobbies have stakes in the specific policies, and they negotiate with/bribe the government over the latter's policy stance. The influence of industry lobbying on both trade and the environment policies at the political equilibrium is the focus of the paper.

Concepts from non‐cooperative game theory are used to incorporate a Nash‐bargaining game between the industry lobby and government. Government is not benevolent. Campaign contributions help win elections and provide incentive to distort policies to attract lobby contributions. Several situations are modeled. Given a politically set environment policy, tariffs may be zero in view of the free trade agreements. Or, a sequential game is modeled where environment policy is set to maximize social welfare, given a politically determined trade policy. Alternatively, in the full political equilibrium, government and lobby bargain simultaneously over tariff and the environmental tax.

Lobbying implies that government may trade‐off one policy for another. When only environment policy is politically manipulable by the lobby, pollution tax is lower than the Pigouvian tax. If, instead, the lobby can influence trade policy only, government provides protection to domestic import‐competing sector. In a sequential game, the trade policy outcome does not change, but pollution tax is always higher than the Pigouvian level, even with the environmental lobby absent. With both the policies political, the government “concedes” and offers positive tariff protection, but, not on environment policy; that is, imposes a pollution tax higher than the Pigouvian level.

The paper provides useful insights into how, under the influence of special‐interest politics, and bargaining between the government and lobbies, the trade and environment policies interact with each other. In comparison with the existing literature on this issue, it derives several stronger and (apparently) counter‐intuitive conclusions.

In the context of the trade war in full swing, the global supply chain systems have experienced a serious shock and become very vulnerable. The purpose of this paper is to explore the intertwining effects between the export-supporting subsidy policy and the import-deterring tariff policy to develop better insights for trade policy-making under the intra-industry-trade (IIT) conflicts. The research results may provide the trade policy makers and international businesses with better insights in making rational trade policy and business decisions.

Two-stage game-/bargaining-theoretical models for the dual competing international supply chains with a unilateral/bilateral tariff imposing or subsidy implementing under six different scenarios of IIT conflict are developed, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the corresponding numerical analyses are conducted to assess the impact of the tariff and subsidy policies and derive the trade policy implications and business insights.

The research results indicate that: (1) the bilateral subsidy implementing from both governments is the best policy for all stakeholders in two countries, which would lead to the highest profits, social welfare and consumer surplus than those of the other scenarios; (2) the bilateral tariff imposing of both governments is the worst policy for all stakeholders in two countries, which would lead to the lowest profits, social welfare and consumer surplus than those of the other scenarios; (3) the fair trade scenario without tariff imposing and subsidy implementing turns out to be the second-best trade policy for the governments. Under the World Trade Organization rule and fair-trade principles, the bilateral subsidy policy is not allowed in most of the cases. Thus, adopting a fair-trade policy may be the most appropriate trade policy for two trading countries.

The modeling approach developed for this study is original and innovative due to the following characteristics. First, based on three trade policy alternatives – fair trade, tariff imposing and subsidy implementing – of two generic governments under IIT conflict, nine different combinations of three policy alternatives are defined. Second, excluding the symmetrical combinations, six IIT conflict scenarios under various tariff/subsidy policy pairs ranging from no conflict to high conflict are assumed for two dual competing international supply chains. Third, a novel two-stage game-/bargaining-theoretical modeling approach is applied to investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions regarding pricing, ordering quantity and their critical economic outcomes for all possible trade policy scenarios. Fourth, this study lays down a research foundation for the future trade conflict study using a game-theoretical modeling approach.

Corn, which has the highest domestic production, planting area and consumption, is the top cereal in relation to demand and supply in China. However, the comparative advantage of China in corn has continuously deteriorated in recent years and based on the recent situation and possible supply and demand trends, it is widely accepted that a corn self-sufficiency rate of 95% is difficult to achieve. Under current import-restriction policies, corn may stand at the crossroads of reforms to solve its predicted insufficient supply. In this study, the authors analyse the necessity of relaxing trade restrictions on corn in China and explore the effects of trade restrictions by reducing tariffs and expanding tariff-rate quotas on corn and related industries and the welfare change caused by possible relaxations.

The authors construct a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and design nine scenarios for the analysis.

The results show that relaxations of import restrictions are probable methods to meet the aim of sufficient corn supply during shortages. They are simulated to reduce corn's domestic production and price, increase import and import prices and lead to a decline in self-sufficiency but benefit the production of corn-related industries of corn. The results also imply that expanding the quota is a better method for releasing trade restrictions in China.

The comparative advantage of China in corn deteriorated with an increase in prices. Based on the current situation and possible trends of supply and demand, the referenced goal of achieving 95% corn self-sufficiency appears difficult, implying that reliance on imports is probably imminent and vital. This study provides simulation results in future scenarios and offers policy implications for China's corn trade policies.

Political economy of trade policies and tariffs can affect welfare distribution and resources allocation as well as sustainable development. Political economy of trade between two countries can be affected by trade between other countries. Global trade can be affected by the bilateral trades of the countries. Impact of their bilateral trades on the global economy and global trade can be increased in case these two particular countries have big share in and influence on the global economy. Based on an in-depth literature review, this chapter aims to investigate political economy of the trade tariff and trade policies with particular focus on China’s economy, US, and China trade policies as well as their roles and impacts on global policy. Furthermore, recommendations for future trade policies and trade tariff strategies have been provided for enhancing global wealth and sustainable development. This chapter emphasizes the importance of sustainability in trade and trade policies’ roles in efficient resource allocation, welfare increase, and sustainable delvelopment. Furthermore, trade policies, taxes, and tariffs are recommended to be balanced based on the mutual trust, and common goals among trading countries. This chapter further emphasizes that trade policies need to promote ­sustainable supply globally.

Outlines the massive loan default problems faced by the Bangladesh banking industry and discusses the importance of consistent and adequate public policy in reducing them. Critically reviews the government’s industrial, fiscal, monetary and tariff policies since independence in 1971, referring to relevant research; and relates them to the loan repayment performance of industrial borrowers. Castigates its excessive bureaucratic controls, lack of co‐ordination or consistency and over‐supply of credit; and its failure to recognize entrepreneurs’ general lack of experience. Puts at least part of the blame for industrial loan defaults down to “flawed” policies.

Despite the government’s efforts to protect domestic industries from foreign competition through tariffs, the industrial sector’s contribution to GDP continued to decline in Nigeria. Based on the scenario, this study assessed the symmetric and asymmetric effects of tariffs on industrial performance in Nigeria for the period 1988–2021. Tariff was captured with a tariff rate applied to the weighted mean of all products, while industry value added as a percent of GDP was used as a proxy for industrial performance.

Linear and nonlinear ARDL techniques were used for the analysis.

The symmetric (linear ARDL) results revealed that tariffs have a significant positive effect on industrial performance in both the short and long term. The asymmetric (nonlinear ARDL) results showed that a long-term asymmetry exists between tariffs and industrial performance. It revealed positive effects on industrial performance for both positive and negative tariff changes, with the negative change having a greater impact.

Generally, the results showed that the use of tariffs to protect domestic industries in Nigeria promotes industrial performance. The implication is that the declining contribution of the industrial sector to GDP in Nigeria is not a result of the tariff policy. It shows that the government should look beyond tariff policy to enhance the industrial contribution to GDP.

Nigeria should exercise caution in using tariff policies to protect domestic industries to avoid retaliation from their trade partners that could reverse the positive impacts.

The principle of tariffs dispersion, or differential tariffs depending on country of origin, is well known. For instance, Canada adapted a double column of tariffs after 1846, Spain in 1877, and Switzerland in the 1880–1890s. But there has never before been a comprehensive measure for any national economy, to our knowledge. This contribution proposes an original and exhaustive measure of customs tariffs dispersion depending on the origin of imported products for France between 1850 and 1913. Part of this dispersion arises indirectly as the result of compiling the nomenclature – or the schedule of categories – for France’s general trade chart. Our study nevertheless reveals the existence of direct discriminatory practices applied to certain countries for certain products. The creation of this measure yields important insights. First, tariff dispersion’s evolution completes the analysis of the chronology of trade policy. Second, it is possible to link tariff discrimination, imports in particular sectors, and national production. In our opinion, the paper should pave the way to work that reintroduces a country-specific dimension into the study of late 19th century commercial policy.