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An individual should be indifferent between a rebate subsidy of rate sr and a matching subsidy of rate sm=sr/(1-sr), and the total amount received by the charity should be the same regardless of subsidy type. Recent laboratory and field experiments contradict these straightforward predictions of standard economic theory: subjects consistently make decisions that result in larger amounts going to the charity under a matching subsidy than under an equivalent rebate subsidy. This paper tests whether this result is due to rebate-aversion – a preference by donors for a match over a rebate subsidy. Consistent with theory, we find no significant preference for one or the other subsidy scheme. However, we do find that, as in previous studies, participants selecting the matching subsidy made decisions that resulted in approximately twice the donations of participants selecting the rebate subsidy donated.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare the costs of price and income subsidies when the food security policy targets the urban poor. The result may help policymakers choose a desired subsidy scheme to ensure food security for the urban poor facing food price surge.

The analysis consists of three parts: constructing an empirical model on provincial panel data in 1993‐2009 estimating the impact of grain price on food security among urban residents by different income level; evaluating the potential costs of shifting to income subsidy aiming to maintain the real income levels of the low income, lowest income or the poor residents if grain price increases by 20 percent; and comparing with the cost of price subsidy to achieve the same policy goal.

The paper finds that, food price surge will hurt the urban poor much more seriously than the high income population; the rich residents may receive more benefit from price subsidy; and income subsidy has obviously a cost advantage while the targeted people benefit more.

The obvious value of the paper is to show that income subsidy is much more desired than price subsidy, if the policy goal is to help the poor during food price surge.

The synchronous failure of conventional policies to achieve “acceptable” levels of employment, growth and price stability has provoked scepticism and led researchers to build up a pantheon of countercyclical credit motives. In this article we focus on Greek employment level, a method to promote employment and an empirical investigation. More specifically, using Greek time‐series data we shall concentrate on employment subsidies whose aim is to endorse labour‐intensive technology in Greek production process

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to expand the traditional economic effect analysis of export subsidy, which has previously ignored the incentive of export subsidies in terms of competition from re‐importation.

The paper performs a comparative static analysis based on the traditional welfare analysis of export subsidies by introducing different transportation costs and using small country model and large country model, respectively.

Compared with the traditional analysis, exporting countries that implement export subsidies suffer less welfare loss and induce intra‐industry trade of homogeneous products. Due to export subsidy policy incentives, transportation costs heavily influence trade patterns, trade volumes and welfare. Trade patterns evolve from unidirectional export to intra‐industry trade as transportation costs are reduced, with the main source of welfare loss coming from transportation costs. The distribution of export subsidies is biased when domestic transportation costs are high. Under low domestic transportation costs, inefficient intra‐industry trade would emerge as a result of export subsidy incentive.

The findings could be helpful to understand the impact of export subsidy policy on trade pattern, trade volumes and welfare when considering international and domestic transportation cost.

The paper emphasizes the incentive of export subsidy on re‐importation, and links it with transportation costs, which expand the traditional export subsidy analysis.

Discusses the importance of government subsidies on the Norwegian export market. Highlights the strength of exports within Norway – 45% of GNP. Examines the various types of grant aid available and defines general and specific subsidies and centralized and decentralized subsidies. Outlines the grant application process. Describes a variety of types of export activities which have received subsidies. Explores sources of potential conflict between the firms applying for grants and the government. Concludes, inter alia, that: Size is an advantage when starting exporting or introducing new export activity; The initiative to apply for subsidies requires resources and insight; The perceived usefulness of export strategies varies across firms.

To contribute to the economic understanding of alternative food‐grain policy options for Morocco, examines the fiscal implications of instituting, in addition to the current soft wheat subsidy, a consumer and producer subsidy in the related markets of hard wheat and barley. Subsidizing the two related markets has been suggested by some economists as a possible means of alleviating the subsidy burden through shifting supply and demand in the soft wheat market. The analysis shows that the additional subsidies will not alleviate the problem.

This study reveals the green building development path and analyzes the optimal government subsidy equilibrium through evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation. This was done to explore the feasible measures and optimal incentives to achieve higher levels of green building in China.

First, the practice of green building in China was analyzed, and the specific influencing factors and incentive measures for green building development were extracted. Second, China-specific evolutionary game models were constructed between developers and homebuyers under the market regulation and government incentive mechanism scenarios, and the evolutionary paths were analyzed. Finally, real-case numerical simulations were conducted, subsidy impacts were mainly analyzed and optimal subsidy equilibriums were solved.

(1) Simultaneously subsidizing developers and homebuyers proved to be the most effective measure to promote the sustainability of green buildings. (2) The sensitivity of developers and homebuyers to subsidies varied across scenarios, and the optimal subsidy level diminished marginally as building greenness and public awareness increased. (3) The optimal subsidy level for developers was intricately tied to the building greenness benchmark. A higher benchmark intensified the developer’s responsiveness to losses, at which point increasing subsidies were justified. Conversely, a reduction in subsidy might have been appropriate when the benchmark was set at a lower level.

The expeditious advancement of green buildings holds paramount importance for the high-quality development of the construction industry. Nevertheless, the pace of green building expansion in China has experienced a recent deceleration. Drawing insights from the practices of green building in China, the exploration of viable strategies and the determination of optimal government subsidies stand as imperative initiatives. These endeavors aim to propel the acceleration of green building proliferation and materialize high-quality development at the earliest juncture possible.

The model is grounded in China’s green building practices, which makes the conclusions drawn more specific. Furthermore, research results provide practical references for governments to formulate green building incentive policies.

Purpose – This study examines parents’ financial stress associated with obtaining care for young children while employed in unstable low-wage jobs. The child care subsidy program aims to both improve child care quality and support employment, and we expect that a substantial infusion of resources into this program would reduce parents’ financial stress.

Methodology/approach – We use a mixed-methods research design to study parents’ financial costs of child care, how predictable the cost of child care is to a parent, and what strategies parents employ to manage child care costs.

Findings – We find that parents perceive the subsidy program essential to their ability to manage the needs of their children and working. Yet, receiving subsidies does not appear to alleviate parents’ financial stress because child care costs continue to consume a large share of the family's income and subsidy policies make it difficult for parents to predict their portion of the costs. Parents manage the large and unpredictable expense of child care by decreasing other expenditures and increasing debt.

Practical implications – Changing subsidy policies so they better fit the reality of these families’ lives could result in a more substantive stress reduction. States can reduce unpredictability by reducing and stabilizing participants’ child care cost burden and revising eligibility policy.

Originality/value of paper – This research project fills an important gap in our knowledge about financial stress of low-income working families, provides insights into the role subsidy program participation plays in these parents’ lives, and informs discussion of subsidy policy.

This chapter investigates the relationship between heterogeneous social preferences and charitable giving under alternative prices of giving and types of subsidies. Using 10 allocation decisions, we categorize participants’ social preferences as self-interested, inequity averse, or social surplus maximizing. In subsequent charitable giving treatments, analysis of within-person decision-making gives support for several predictions consistent with social preference types: social surplus maximizers are most likely to give to a charity that increases production; inequity averters give more to charity than do other groups; all preference types give more when the price of giving declines; and social surplus maximizers are more responsive to the price of giving than are inequity averters.

Although tax relief on pensions is a controversial area of government expenditure, this is the first study of the tax effects for a real-world defined benefit pension scheme. First, we estimate the tax and national insurance contribution (NIC) effects of the scheme's change from final salary to career average revalued earnings (CARE) in 2011 on the gross and net wealth of the sponsor, government, and 16 age cohorts of members, deferred pensioners, and pensioners. Second, we measure the size of the twelve income tax and NIC payments and reliefs for new members and the sponsor, before and after the rule changes. We find the total subsidy split is roughly 40% income tax subsidy and 60% NIC subsidy. If lower tax rates in retirement and the risk premium effect of the exempt-exempt-taxed (EET) system are not viewed as a tax subsidy, the tax subsidy to members largely disappears. Any remaining subsidy drops, as a proportion of pension benefits, for high earners, as does that for NICs.