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Economic integration is an agreement among countries in a geographical region or unification of economic policies between different states aiming to reduce and ultimately remove tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade. The fruit of globalization is the tremendous rise of economic integration as globalization loosens barriers among the nations through reduction in cross-border duties and eases trade policies. Trumponomics is defined as the economic policies of US President Donald Trump that prefers high import tariff to bring “America First.” There is a debate among the researchers about the choice between free trade and protection or imposition of tariff. Some of them prefer free trade because during the start of the great depression, the world economy experienced a huge shift toward protectionism. Choice between no-tariff and tariff represents a prisoner’s dilemma situation whereby each player’s best response is to employ tariffs. This results in a sub-optimal outcome for all where the total volume of world trade falls, which is a Nash solution. The present chapter deals with theoretical discussions on trade war and throws light on the developing country’s choice between non-protectionism supported by globalization and Trump’s protectionism.

Sustainability performance of the global trade as well as of the traded products are affected by the trade policies and trade tariffs. Trade tariffs and policies can either encourage or discourage trade among the countries affecting feasibility of trade. In other words, the scope and amount of these trade tariffs have impact on the trade globally. Based on an in-depth literature review, this chapter aims to examine impacts of the trade policies and trade tariffs on the environmental footprint of the global trade. With this aim, recent trade policies and trade tariffs as well as roles of the trade policies, trade tariffs in reducing environmental footprint of the global trade are examined. It arrives at the conclusion that trade tariffs can affect environmental footprint of the global trade as well as of the traded products. They can have impact on the feasibility of the trading activities influencing their profit margins and costs. Based on these findings, recommendations for trade policies and trade tariffs are thereby provided to enhance sustainability performance of the global trade.

In the context of the trade war in full swing, the global supply chain systems have experienced a serious shock and become very vulnerable. The purpose of this paper is to explore the intertwining effects between the export-supporting subsidy policy and the import-deterring tariff policy to develop better insights for trade policy-making under the intra-industry-trade (IIT) conflicts. The research results may provide the trade policy makers and international businesses with better insights in making rational trade policy and business decisions.

Two-stage game-/bargaining-theoretical models for the dual competing international supply chains with a unilateral/bilateral tariff imposing or subsidy implementing under six different scenarios of IIT conflict are developed, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the corresponding numerical analyses are conducted to assess the impact of the tariff and subsidy policies and derive the trade policy implications and business insights.

The research results indicate that: (1) the bilateral subsidy implementing from both governments is the best policy for all stakeholders in two countries, which would lead to the highest profits, social welfare and consumer surplus than those of the other scenarios; (2) the bilateral tariff imposing of both governments is the worst policy for all stakeholders in two countries, which would lead to the lowest profits, social welfare and consumer surplus than those of the other scenarios; (3) the fair trade scenario without tariff imposing and subsidy implementing turns out to be the second-best trade policy for the governments. Under the World Trade Organization rule and fair-trade principles, the bilateral subsidy policy is not allowed in most of the cases. Thus, adopting a fair-trade policy may be the most appropriate trade policy for two trading countries.

The modeling approach developed for this study is original and innovative due to the following characteristics. First, based on three trade policy alternatives – fair trade, tariff imposing and subsidy implementing – of two generic governments under IIT conflict, nine different combinations of three policy alternatives are defined. Second, excluding the symmetrical combinations, six IIT conflict scenarios under various tariff/subsidy policy pairs ranging from no conflict to high conflict are assumed for two dual competing international supply chains. Third, a novel two-stage game-/bargaining-theoretical modeling approach is applied to investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions regarding pricing, ordering quantity and their critical economic outcomes for all possible trade policy scenarios. Fourth, this study lays down a research foundation for the future trade conflict study using a game-theoretical modeling approach.

The level and structure of protection from tariff and non‐tariff measures confronted by developing country exports of oilseeds, vegetable oils, and related products are examined to assess the gains available to these countries through further rounds of trade liberalisation. Although developing country exporters of these products can expect only limited benefits from a removal of tariffs by major developed market economy country (DMEC) importers, considerable gains could be realised by removing the relatively higher tariff rates imposed by the developing countries, and by removing the many non‐tariff measures which developing countries and DMECs use as well.

The promotion of low tariffs and free trade has been the underlying driver of global economic growth. The recent political developments in the United States and Great Britain calls into question, whether free trade will be supported by the governments of the industrialized world in the future. Shortly after being inaugurated in 2017, the President of the United States has repeatedly announced his plans to impose punitive tariffs on the import of foreign products in order to protect the country’s domestic economy. Besides a controversial border adjustment tax, he has frequently brought up the possibility of imposing a 35% tariff on automobile imports. The chapter aims to analyze the effects of such a tariff on trade in the automotive sector between the United States and Germany as well as on German automobile manufacturers. It takes a quantitative approach to draw a conclusion about the relationship between import tariffs on automobiles and passenger vehicle imports from Germany to the United States utilizing a fixed effects regression model based on panel data. The model finds a significant negative correlation between the examined variables, but even in a worst case scenario, German manufacturers are resilient to the predicted revenue losses caused by a tariff increase.

The principle of tariffs dispersion, or differential tariffs depending on country of origin, is well known. For instance, Canada adapted a double column of tariffs after 1846, Spain in 1877, and Switzerland in the 1880–1890s. But there has never before been a comprehensive measure for any national economy, to our knowledge. This contribution proposes an original and exhaustive measure of customs tariffs dispersion depending on the origin of imported products for France between 1850 and 1913. Part of this dispersion arises indirectly as the result of compiling the nomenclature – or the schedule of categories – for France’s general trade chart. Our study nevertheless reveals the existence of direct discriminatory practices applied to certain countries for certain products. The creation of this measure yields important insights. First, tariff dispersion’s evolution completes the analysis of the chronology of trade policy. Second, it is possible to link tariff discrimination, imports in particular sectors, and national production. In our opinion, the paper should pave the way to work that reintroduces a country-specific dimension into the study of late 19th century commercial policy.

Taking global economic integration into consideration, this study investigates the effects of the imposition of the tariff. For every tariff increase, a percentage of the trade volume is reduced. This means, there is a tradeoff between globalization and restricted trade. This chapter presents empirical evidence from the European Union and the Sub-Saharan Africa region using annual times series for the period, 1980–2019. Result indicates that with coefficient of 4.31 percent, the tradeoff in European Union is higher than Sub-Saharan Africa region with coefficient of 2.66 percent. Implied is that developing countries are more likely to suffer more from the negative effect of globalization due to trade restrictions than the developed countries of the world. This is an indication that whether in developed or developing countries, a tradeoff exists between globalization and restricted trade. Hence, the imposition of tariffs and counter-tariffs is capable of shutting down globalization.

The open objective of liberalization or globalization for the developed nations is the expansion of market or the creation of opportunities to produce and sale more and more goods and/or services beyond the domestic market which ultimately lead the nation in the right path of development. On the other hand, this economic environment is a challenge for the developing or less developed or small nations with respect to share of world trade to compete with the developed or large nations with respect to the quality of the product, technology, skill of human resources, etc. There arise tariff impositions to protect the domestic economies to defend against the challenges. Under these circumstances, this chapter tries to investigate the impact of such tariff war measured by trade as a percentage of GDP on the per capita GDP of the nations. It finds that all the variables are cointegrated. The effect depends on how we measure world tariff, for example, the effect of tariff on trade is positive and significant when we measure the world tariff as simple mean of all products but the effect of tariff on trade is negative and statistically significant when we take tariff as weighted mean of all products. Similarly, the effect of tariff on per capita income is positive if tariff is measured with simple average of all products but this effect is negative and significant when it is measured with weighted mean of all products. In this case, imposition of world tariff (weighted mean of all products) declines world per capita income especially in short run.

The increased integration of national economies and the belief that international trade is beneficial to societies has led to the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to regulate the conduct of international trade by national governments. Using US domestic legislation and case laws, as well as the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the legality or otherwise of the recent imposition of unilateral trade tariffs by the USA on China.

This paper adopts a doctrinal approach through a critical review of extant legislation and case laws. Drawing from existing literature in the area of WTO and international trade law, the paper argues that the imposition of tariffs by the Trump administration is outside the scope provided for by the WTO rules.

The paper finds that the imposition of unilateral tariffs by the Trump Government, while in breach of US domestic legislation and case laws, as well as the country’s obligations under the GATT 1994, portends a clear danger to the continued existence of the WTO and to international trade in general.

This paper is an original study of the author, which extends the body of knowledge in the area of international trade law, by analyzing the possible implications of the imposition of trade tariffs by the USA on China and offering suggestions on how the impasse can be resolved.

Most current modeling approaches identify very small gains from trade reform. In this chapter, we examine recent developments in the literature to assess whether standard modeling approaches are mis-specifying, understating, or overstating the gains from trade reform. Key areas where the impacts of trade barrier reduction appear to be understated include the measurement of barriers; the aggregation of these barriers; process productivity gains, particularly those resulting from reallocation of resources between firms; product quality improvements and expansion of product variety; factor supply; and investment of gains from trade.