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Cooperatives are formed with the idea of cooperation. Due to their features, cooperatives have the potential to address the issue of poverty alleviation and improvement in income distribution, which currently is the central focus of governments' economic policy making. Currently, Islamic cooperatives or shari'ah-based cooperatives have also been developing well. Shari'ah-based cooperative is essentially the transformation of conventional cooperative through an approach in line with the Shari'ah principles. It could be one of the best solutions in supporting Islamic banking and finance for unbankable customers. This chapter describes the development of cooperatives in Malaysia and Indonesia. The chapter also discusses the need for cooperative governance and highlights the features of cooperatives that results to their governance is more complex that the governance of business organisations. This chapter also highlights laws, regulation and shari'ah governance measures taken by both jurisdictions to promote growth of shari'ah-based cooperatives.

This paper aims to evaluate the relation between governance and financial efficiency of credit unions in Brazil. The study shows how poor financial efficiency in credit unions may result from undesirable configurations in executive management and other variables related to governance.

The study develops an innovative methodology to classify credit unions according to the level of governance using indicators of representativeness and participation, leadership, management and supervision. This methodology integrates the use of multiple correspondence and cluster analysis. The study then applies stochastic frontier models to analyze how governance affects the indicators of financial efficiency.

The results highlight that better governance substantially increases the efficiency of credit unions in terms of a higher level of credit operations per institution.

The paper uses a pioneering survey applied by the Central Bank to almost the total population of credit unions in Brazil. The results highlight how to operationalize a subjective and broad concept related to cooperative governance to identify the remarkable impacts of good governance practices on the financial efficiency of credit unions.

This paper builds upon recent advances in the corporate governance framework to extend and complement the economic literature on producer cooperatives. We argue that the problem of governance in a cooperative is twofold and consists in designing mechanisms and setting up institutions that (1) encourage workers to define a goal that maximizes workers’ welfare and (2) induce managers to pursue and internalize such a broad goal. When compared to capital‐controlled firms, the agency problems become more complex and harder to solve in the cooperative framework. As empirical evidence of this problem and its corresponding solution, we illustrate the case of the Mondragón cooperatives, explaining in detail the incentive system and the control mechanisms now in place in this successful business group. The study of the governance architecture of Mondragón may help us to propose solutions to traditional problems of the cooperative firm and to reach a better understanding of both the governance of cooperatives and corporate governance in general.

This study aims to analyze how multirational management relates to cooperatives’ corporate governance.

A typology of agricultural cooperatives’ potential for multirational management in relation to corporate governance is proposed. Coordinates based on data from assembly participation and separation of ownership and control are used to map cooperatives among these typologies. Four case studies representing each typology were conducted, allowing analysis of propositions.

By mapping the cooperatives from Mato Grosso do Sul, a reduced potential for multirational management is noted. By analyzing the four case studies, coded as Coop 1, 3, 13 and 16, this study found convergence with P1, P2 and P3. “Coop 1” shows signs of adopting exploitation practice. In “Coop 3,” evidence points to avoidance practice and, analyses of “Coop 13” indicates adoption of tolerance practice. In Coop 16, however, P4 could not be confirmed. Instead of polarizing practices, there is evidence of avoidance practice. Therefore, a positive relation between corporate governance and multirational management can partially be observed.

There are no records of a paper that has explored the relation of governance and multirational management. Therefore, this research broadens the understanding of how corporate governance can function in the context of cooperative organizations. As well, insight is given on how different mechanisms of corporate governance can influence organizations to adopt explicit or implicit and monorational or multirational methods of dealing with multiple rationalities.

From a perspective of ‘critical performativity’, John Lewis is of special interest since it is celebrated as a successful organization and heralded as an alternative to more typical forms of capitalist enterprise.

Our analysis uses secondary empirical material (e.g. JLP documents in the public domain, histories of John Lewis and recent empirical research). Our assumption is that engagement and interrogation of existing empirical work can be at least as illuminating and challenging as undertaking new studies. In addition to generating fresh insights, stimulating reflection and fostering debate, our analysis is intended to contribute to an appreciation of how structures of ownership and governance are significant in enabling and constraining practices of organizing and managing.

The structures of ownership and governance at John Lewis, a major UK employee-owned retailer, have been commended by those who wish to recuperate capitalism and by those who seek to transform it.

JLP can be read as a ‘subversive intervention’ insofar as it denies absentee investors access to, and control of, its assets. Currently, however, even the critical performative potential of the Partnership model is impeded by its paternalist structures. Exclusion of Partners’ participation in the market for corporate control is reflected in, and compounded by, a weak form of ‘democratic’ governance, where managers are accountable to Partners but not controlled by them.

Our contention is that JLP’s ownership and governance structures offer a practical demonstration, albeit flawed, of how an alternative form of organization is sufficiently ‘efficient’ and durable to be able to ‘compete’ against joint-stock companies.

By examining the cooperative elements of the John Lewis structures of ownership and governance, we illuminate a number of issues faced in realizing the principles ascribed to employee-owned cooperatives – notably, with regard to ‘democratic member control’, ‘member economic participation’ and ‘autonomy and independence’.

This paper aims to explore the formal (i.e. contracts, standards, processes, and structure) and informal (i.e. social structure, norms, information sharing, and value system and culture) governance instruments used in supply networks and their influence on quality.

This research is qualitative-exploratory in nature, involving semi-structured interviews with 20 managers from three essential layers in the dairy industry's supply chain: companies that supply essential inputs to milk producers; milk producers; and milk cooperatives.

Analysis of the generated data show that formal governance instruments have a strong and/or weak influence on products' and operations' quality in the dairy industry context; informal instruments have a strong and/or weak influence on quality, as a counterpart to formal instruments; and the integration of verified governance instruments positively influences the quality of products and operations.

This paper offers several managerial and practical implications. The first is to encourage suppliers of primary inputs and milk producers to invest in the formal structure, primarily in formal contracts with each other. The second implication suggests the relevance of creating different training and qualification courses with members from all organizational levels. Third, there is a need for cooperatives, encompassing all industries, to consider several informal instruments, complementary to contracts and standards currently used for processes.

Governance instruments can lead to desired supply chain outcomes, including those related to quality. Although previous supply chain studies have investigated the relationship between governance instruments and the supply chain, and quality management and the supply chain, studies on governance instruments' influence on supply chain quality are limited.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the structural characteristics, the governance and the performance of two French and Italian groups of wine cooperatives, with two objectives in mind. On one hand, the study will analyse the presence of similarities between the characteristics of the two groups of companies which were founded in the same period within a similar legal framework; on the other, it will study the presence of links between the strategic policy of the companies and their structural, governance and performance characteristics.

The study uses survey data obtained from interviews with 25 wine cooperatives. It covers the topics of their structure, organisation, strategies, management and performance in Italy (specifically in Umbria, a region in the centre of Italy), and in France (in Languedoc‐Roussillon, a region in southern France). Other indicators of performance, calculated from the balance sheets of the companies, were added to this analysis, and a careful analysis was drawn up to check the factors which condition the performance of the companies.

The main finding underlines some strong differentiating elements between those cooperatives selling the biggest part of their production as bulk wine and those selling it as packaged wine. But the first situation does not lead automatically to inferring a decline or an involution of these cooperatives. On the contrary, the mitigated performances that were found clearly question whether there is a strategic evolution towards more specialisation (intermediate phases of product transformation, leading to business‐to‐business differentiation strategies) which could be more profitable for their growers‐owners than further integration towards packaged wine sales.

The analysis deals with the problem of performance and governance of the transformation cooperative companies in the wine sector, which produce more than 50 percent of the entire wine production both in France and Italy.

This paper aims to investigate the cooperative governance mechanisms for personal information security, which can help enrich digital governance research and provide a reference for the formulation of protection policies for personal information security.

This paper constructs an evolutionary game model consisting of regulators, digital enterprises and consumers, which is combined with the simulation method to examine the influence of different factors on personal information protection and governance.

The results reveal seven stable equilibrium strategies for personal information security within the cooperative governance game system. The non-compliant processing of personal information by digital enterprises can damage the rights and interests of consumers. However, the combination of regulatory measures implemented by supervisory authorities and the rights protection measures enacted by consumers can effectively promote the self-regulation of digital enterprises. The reputation mechanism exerts a restricting effect on the opportunistic behaviour of the participants.

The authors focus on the regulation of digital enterprises and do not consider the involvement of malicious actors such as hackers, and the authors will continue to focus on the game when assessing the governance of malicious actors in subsequent research.

This study's results enhance digital governance research and offer a reference for developing policies that protect personal information security.

This paper builds an analytical framework for cooperative governance for personal information security, which helps to understand the decision-making behaviour and motivation of different subjects and to better address issues in the governance for personal information security.

This paper aims to analyze the relationship between bank institutional setting and risk-taking by exploring whether board education and turnover are drivers of the risk propensity of cooperative banks compared to joint-stock banks.

Based on a comprehensive data set of Italian banks over the 2011-2017 period, this paper examines whether these board characteristics affect the risk propensity of cooperative and joint-stock banks. Bank risk is measured by the Z-index, profit volatility and the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans.

The findings show that cooperatives take less risk than joint-stock banks and have lower board turnover and education. Furthermore, this study finds that while board education mediates the relationship between the cooperative model and bank risk-taking, there is no evidence for board turnover. Thus, the lower educational level of cooperative directors contributes to explaining the lower risk-taking of cooperative banks.

The findings have several implications. In terms of the more general policy debate, the results point to the need to strengthen the governance model for both joint-stock and cooperative banks while supporting the view that a more ad hoc perspective on the best models and practices for each type of institutional setting would be preferable. In particular, the study reveals how board education’s effects on bank risk-taking should be carefully monitored.

Through a mediation framework, this study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between bank institutional setting (by distinguishing between cooperative and joint-stock banks) and risk-taking behavior by exploring the underlying mechanisms at the board level, which is novel in the literature.

This study aims to examine the relationships between the rules that a cooperative membership decides upon and members' motives for action. It considers individual self-interest in relation with motives that are consistent with the values of cooperation.

This paper comprises two parts. The first is theoretical and discusses cooperative governance's features in the context of individual motives. The second part is empirical and based on survey data from Italian multistakeholder, worker-run social cooperatives. It uses cross-sectional data gathered from 4,134 workers and 310 managers in 310 cooperatives in Italy to provide evidence of rules and individual motives. Regression analysis confirms the existence of a linkage between individual self-interest and motives.

Rules mainly, but not exclusively, play an enabling function, which implies responding to both nonmonetary and monetary individual motives. With greater articulation within institutions – through the definition of multiple rights for accessing decision-making – the authors expect increases in individual capabilities to match motives with specific organizational rules in pursuit of consistent ends. This is confirmed by the association that the authors found between individual motives and commitment.

The authors’ illustration is limited to one specific type of cooperative, the social cooperative, in which prosocial motives are expected to be stronger than in other cooperative forms, although one could say that all cooperative models emphasize procommunity and prosocial aims. Data are cross-sectional and do not allow for the identification of causality, only of statistical relations' strength.

The continuous scrutiny and adaptation of motives and means imply that cooperators communicate and engage in a learning process.

While the institutional spheres that support investor-owned organizations and self-interested profit-maximizing behavior have been analyzed, a framework that accommodates personal control rights and a richer view of individual motives is lacking. The value added from the paper is to suggest one.