Search results

Recently, the concept of financial technology (FinTech) has attracted extensive attention from international organisations and regulators, in particular, how to achieve a “win–win” situation between financial institutions' FinTech innovation and effective regulation has become a hot topic. This study purposes to explore the evolutionary game relationship between FinTech innovation and regulation by constructing both static and dynamic earmarking game models.

A simulation experiment was conducted using primary data obtained from a commercial bank in China.

The results of the theoretical analysis of evolutionary game models were consistent with the corresponding simulation results, proving the validity of the proposed evolutionary game models. It was also found that the dynamic earmarking game model was more stable and effective than the static earmarking game model in promoting FinTech innovation and regulation. Furthermore, when the regulators utilised a dynamic earmarking mechanism, the evolutionary path of financial institutions and regulators' behaviour strategies took the shape of a spiral and eventually converged to a central point, indicating the existence of an evolutionary stable strategy and Nash equilibrium. Finally, because the behaviour strategies of financial institutions were mainly influenced by the regulators' policies, the regulators were inspired to adjust the corresponding regulation policies on FinTech innovation.

This study bridges the knowledge gap in the existing literature on financial innovation and regulation, in particular by establishing evolutionary game models from the perspective of financial earmarking policies. Also, the case study for simulation experiments can gain a more intuitive insight into FinTech innovation and financial earmarking policies.

This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.

The exposition is presented as a mathematical model in order to cover the formal underpinnings of evolutionary game theory. The paper aims to illustrate the theory using some simple examples.

The paper discusses population games and describes the notion of revision protocols that agents use to change strategies. As an example of an evolutionary dynamic, the paper discusses the replicator dynamic in detail. It shows convergence of this dynamic to Nash equilibrium in simple 2 strategy games. The paper then applies this dynamic to a particular class of 3 strategy games to establish the possibility on cyclical behavior around a Nash equilibrium.

The paper can serve as an educational briefing for students and researchers who are new to the field of evolutionary game theory.

With the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.

An evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.

First, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.

In this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

The equipment manufacturing industry, as a strategic industry of China, is experiencing a transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation. The achievements of independent innovation have not been as good as could have been expected. Based on evolutionary economics, the purpose of this paper is to explore the evolutionary path of the two innovation modes, respectively, and analyze the internal and external factors that hinder the mutation from imitative innovation routine to independent innovation routine. According to the results of the evolutionary game model, several policy suggestions are proposed to promote the transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation.

This paper is based on the concepts of evolutionary economics. Routine, mutation, path dependence and selection are included in the analysis of the evolutionary path of the two innovation modes. Especially, the evolutionary game model of innovation modes selection is established to explain how internal and external conditions work in the transition.

The paper explores the evolutionary path of the transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation in the equipment manufacturing industry of China, and analyses the obstacles and factors (internal path dependence, and the lack of benefit incentive and external mutation conditions such as fiscal support and intellectual property protection) that hinder the mutation from imitative innovation routine to independent innovation routine. The results of the evolutionary game model show that the pursuit of the benefit (innovation return or the profit), as an internal mutation condition, is the most fundamental motivation for independent innovation, while policy incentives, as the external mutation conditions, have a significant impact on the evolutionary transition. According to the results, several policy suggestions are proposed to promote the transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation.

Taking the equipment manufacturing industry as a particular object, this paper tries to explain the evolutionary path and the obstacle factors of the transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation from the perspective of evolutionary economics, involving routine, mutation, path dependence, selection, and so on. The evolutionary game model of innovation modes selection is established to investigate the influence of these factors.

In China, external supervision on construction safety mainly comes from the government and supervision engineers (SEs). However, the construction safety supervisory mechanism (CSSM) contains some dilemmas affecting the improvement of safety performance, such as the declining impact of SEs, the increasing rent-seeking behaviors of contractor and excessive government interference. This study aims to depict and analyze the CSSM in China from an evolutionary game view. The objectives are to understand the supervision strategy and evolutionary behaviors of different stakeholders, propose suggestions for improving safety performance and help the key safety supervision stakeholders, especially the government, formulate a suitable safety supervision strategy.

This research uses tripartite dynamic evolutionary game theory to study the CSSM in China and solve the stable equilibrium solution using system dynamics.

This study has revealed the game relationship of construction safety supervision mechanisms in China and solved the stable equilibrium solution. The results prove that a supervision engineer (SE) plays a crucial role in the CSSM, and “supervision engineer useless” is an unreasonable assertion. For government supervision agency (GSA), excessive inspection and free-market regulation are neither wise strategies. GSA can reduce the inspection frequency when general contractors (GCs) input high safety investments and SEs implement responsible supervision. But keeping proper government supervision to avoid GC's unlawful behaviors and SE's rent-seeking is indispensable. In addition, excessive governmental supervision will weaken SE's role, so the government should transfer some supervision powers to SE.

This study focuses on the dynamic evolution process between GSA, GC and SE. This method is different from most research that neglected the dynamic characteristic of system and game solution stability. The research methods not only contribute to construction safety supervision policy-making in China but also help to improve supervision efficiency in other countries and other fields.

Owing to multiple superiorities to traditional counterparts, prefabricated construction (PC) has gained increasing attention worldwide. The development of PC projects reflects the effects of both policy supervision and PC practice, which aids the government in reasonably identifying the key issues of PC's promotion and rationally improving the policy deployment. However, existing studies fail to address this aspect, especially lacking quantitative exploration. This study explores the micro mechanism of PC's promotion, from the perspective of developing PC projects.

A tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory of the government, developers and contractors is constructed. After rigorous theoretical deduction, this study adopts Changchun in China as a case city and collects the data using the Delphi technique, policy documents and literature analysis.

Results indicate that contractors are generally willing to implement PC projects and the government chooses to actively supervise PC's promotion. The negative investment behavior of developers is the main obstacle to promote PC in Changchun currently.

The conclusions are applicable to other comparable regions. This study is of value to promote PC with high efficiency and effect.

The tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory proposed in this study is conducive to reveal the essence of PC's promotion. This is an important breakthrough in extant studies, with a broad applicability in the PC domain beyond China.

This paper aims to show that evolutionary game theory not only provides a general and unified theory of political philosophy and strategic management theories but also a positive theory of interactive behavior.

This study suggests a way of the evolutionary game-theoretical model.

The model presented in this paper demonstrates coopetition is derived from balance points in multi-actor games. As the political–philosophical address of those strategic games will of all becomes convention in this balance point at which common knowledge occurs global optimum.

This study explores the connections between several streams in philosophy and strategic management. What does a particular philosophy contribute to strategic management with respect to game theory? When addressing this question in historical or exploratory terms, or in a combination of both, the end result is similar: particular philosophical issues, properly explained, are discussed in relation to important questions in strategic management.

What are the psychological and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decisions of this kind? What type of cognitive frames and managerial mental models, such as the game-theoretical model, might enable or hinder the integration of real-world problems in strategic decision-making?

What explains the evolution of such mental models, as well as the development of philosophical ideas, in informing the origins? How does the evolution of social and political contexts influence change in the cognitive and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decision-making?

This study highlights the overt power of strategic management ideas – competition, cooperation and coopetition – which have historically been built on the foundations of organizational theory, while also underlying the potential of philosophies, collective wisdom and Condorcet’s jury theorem and Rousseau’s (1998) correctness theory in games of evaluation. This study investigates whether the many produce better decisions than the wise few.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the short-term development pattern and long-term development trend of the digital supply chain.

This study uses the combination of short-term game and long-term evolutionary game theory.

Findings of this study suggest that irrational decisions can make the evolutionary path of the digital supply chain complex and unpredictable.

This study proposes an evolutionary game model for the digital supply chain that can provide good guidance for the digitalization process of enterprises.

This paper aims to recognize whether government policy supervision or social network platform supervision can effectively promote the control of misconducts of web celebrity brand eWOM marketing and to identify the key factors influencing the unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment.

Theoretical research was employed to develop a practical approach for applying evolutionary game theory to eWOM marketing controlling strategies modeling via dynamic visualization, systematic simulation experiments.

Evolutionary game theory combined with dynamic simulation modeling can provide a formal approach to understanding web celebrity brand eWOM marketing decision-making in social media, which can thus support the control of unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment. The results demonstrate that the reasonable control of social platform control costs may be more effective than the government policy on web celebrity fake brand eWOM marketing behaviors.

The study enriches the research on the management and control of eWOM marketing as well as provides guidance for the sustainable development of the web celebrity economy in social media.

Knowledge sharing in a master-apprentice pattern is the process of transferring tacit knowledge from masters to apprentices. In addition, 90 per cent of knowledge required for organizational innovation is tacit knowledge in the master-apprentice pattern. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the evolution of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern and explore the consequences of how to improve the knowledge sharing in the master-apprentice pattern.

This paper uses asymmetric evolutionary game theory to study the evolutionary track of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern of innovative organizations by analyzing the utility of masters and apprentices during the process of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern of the innovative organization.

The results reveal that when the masters obtained utility from sharing knowledge is greater than that from hoarding knowledge, and the apprentices obtained utility from studying hard is greater than the costs, the innovative organization can get the largest utility from the knowledge sharing in the mater-apprentice pattern.

The limitation of the research is that this paper mainly studies knowledge sharing among individuals and does not research knowledge sharing between individuals and organizations.

This research has extended the understanding of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice and its evolution path. Also, the obtained findings are conducive to promoting knowledge sharing in master-apprentice and improving human resource management in innovative organizations.

This paper attempts to construct the evolution path of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern, which is a useful exploration of the dynamics of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern and makes up for the shortcomings of the existing research.