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Interorganizational dependence is considered as a liability for each firm and needs to be managed properly. Rather than exploring the opportunistic outcome of dependence, the authors focus on the moderating role of supply chain boundary spanners' guanxi. This study tends to uncover the way and the conditions under which boundary spanners' guanxi influences dependence-opportunism relationships.

Using a survey of 380 buyer–supplier exchanges in China, this study first examines the relationship between dependence and opportunism, then assesses the contingent role of boundary spanners' guanxi and further tests how unfairness perception and legal inefficiency alter the role of guanxi in managing dependence.

This study finds that buyer dependence increases supplier opportunism while supplier dependence lowers supplier opportunism. Boundary spanners' guanxi weakens the opportunism-facilitating impact of buyer dependence and mitigates the opportunism-restricting effect of supplier dependence. However, unfairness perception would attenuate the value of guanxi in restricting depended sides' opportunism but strengthen the value of guanxi in motivating depending sides' opportunism; legal inefficiency would amplify the value of guanxi in facilitating depending suppliers' opportunism.

First, the study enriches supply chain dependence studies by incorporating interpersonal guanxi into the investigation of dependence-opportunism relationships. Second, the study adds to the supply chain management literature by uncovering a contrasting role of guanxi in influencing the dependence-opportunism relationship. Third, the study incorporates an agency view to uncover two boundary conditions under which guanxi is mobilized for personal interest seeking or for organizational purposes.

Firms often struggle with opportunistic behavior from supply chain partners. Relying on Transaction Cost Economics and its extensions, this study developed a conceptual model theorizing the antecedence, consequences and conditional factors of opportunism within a buyer–supplier–supplier triadic relationship.

This study employed a cross-sectional survey data collected from 200 U.S. firms. The collected data were analyzed with SPSS and AMOS, the two statistical software, for reliability, validity, confirmatory factor analyses and structural equation modeling.

First, opportunism negatively influences operational performance and business performance, and such an effect is fully mediated by relationship stability. Second, this study classified power asymmetry as asymmetrical power discrepancy and asymmetrical power advantage with these two forms playing different roles in influencing opportunism. Results indicate that asymmetrical power discrepancy induces opportunism while asymmetrical power advantage strengthens the negative influence that opportunism has on relationship stability. Additionally, the mediated moderating effect of asymmetrical power advantage by relationship stability is confirmed.

The results provide significant academic and managerial insights that can guide managerial efforts in distinguishing types of power asymmetry, controlling opportunism and further mitigating the consequences of opportunism within a triadic relationship.

In this paper, the authors seek to contribute to the supply chain digitalisation literature by investigating a potential dark side of supply chain digitalisation from the viewpoint of the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) suppliers, namely digital capability asymmetry and the partner opportunism of more digitally capable large buyers against SME suppliers. The authors seek to contribute further to the governance literature by investigating the effectiveness of the governance mechanism (legal contracts and relational contracts) in suppressing partner opportunism of this nature.

Using survey data collected from 125 Korean SMEs, the authors employed a hierarchical regression method to test a set of hypotheses focussing on the dark side of supply chain digitalisation and the effectiveness of the governance mechanism.

The study’s findings suggest that supplier-perceived digital capability asymmetry, wherein a buyer has a superior digital capability than its SME supplier, increases the SME supplier's dependence on the more digitally capable buyer, with the result that it is more exposed to buyer opportunism. Moreover, the results suggest that only relational governance is effective in protecting SME suppliers from buyer opportunism of this nature.

So far, the overwhelming majority of supply chain digitalisation research has debated its “bright side”. On the contrary, from the resource dependence theory perspective, this paper explains its dark side by providing empirical evidence on (1) the links between supplier-perceived digital capability asymmetry and a buyer's opportunism through an increased supplier's dependence and (2) the effectiveness of different types of governance in opportunism suppression.

Digitalization encourages the manufacturer to engage in inter-organizational technological activities (i.e. supplier IT integration and supply visibility) with its major supplier, which influences supply chain (SC) governance. This study tests a moderated mediation model that considers supplier IT integration and supply visibility as mediators between supply-side digitalization and supplier opportunism, and relational ties as a moderator in the relationship between inter-organizational technological activities and supplier opportunism.

Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used to examine data from 200 firms in China describing their supply chain management (SCM) practices and perceived relationships with their major suppliers.

Supply-side digitalization is positively related to supplier IT integration and supply visibility. Supply-side digitalization has a positive indirect effect on supplier opportunism through supplier IT integration but a negative indirect effect through supply visibility. Relational ties weaken the positive effect of supplier IT integration and the positive indirect effect of supply-side digitalization on supplier opportunism. Relational ties also weaken the negative effect of supply visibility and the negative indirect effect of supply-side digitalization on supplier opportunism.

This study enriches understanding of SC governance in the digital age by empirically confirming that digital transformation brings both challenges and opportunities to SC governance and by clarifying the interplay of relational governance and technological activities. In addition, this study contributes to the SC digitalization literature by empirically validating the role of digitalization in promoting inter-organizational technological activities, as well as by revealing its potential dark side.

In fragile institutional environments, firms often have no choice but bribery as the means to access the services monopolized by the government. Corrupt government officials whose resources are valuable to many different firms can easily find other firms willing to offer bribes. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how this imbalanced interdependence exposes the bribing firm to the hazard of opportunism from the bribed officials.

This study draws on World Business Environment Survey (WBES) data and the instrumental variable (IV) Probit estimator with Heckman correction for the potential selection bias.

The authors find that the more firms depend on bribery to acquire governmental resources, the severer the level of opportunism they encounter from the government officials. In addition, the authors find that although the presence of a legal alternative to bribery reduces the level of a corrupt government official's opportunism that a bribing firm experiences, the more firms depend on bribery despite the presence of a legal alternative, the higher the level of the corrupt official's opportunism that the firm will experience. Finally, the authors find that establishing a relational contract with government officials reduces the hazard of opportunism.

The study contributes to the resource dependence literature by finding that a greater imbalance in the interdependence between two parties in bribery exposes the more dependent party to a larger hazard of opportunism. The finding that an ineffective alternative to a current resource provider would not strengthen but weaken a resource seeker's bargaining power expands the literature. The authors also contribute to the corruption research by showing the significant strategic, not legal, risk to bribing firms of engaging in bribery, which to date has not been sufficiently discussed.

This study aims to argue that opportunism is central to management thought and illustrate its evolution into a central element of the entrepreneurship theory. The authors show that many criticisms of opportunism tend to conflate the concept with other theoretic traditions.

The authors trace foundational works by Taylor, Mayo, Fayol, Barnard, Follett and Simon to limit opportunism under the guise of promoting cooperation in organizations.

Opportunism is conceptualized in transaction cost economics as one of the most controversial concepts in management. While modern management is based on handling opportunism, it is bad for practice, as it ignores innovation, and damages trust and goodwill among organizational members. These interventions serve as a knowledge filter, damaging organizational entrepreneurship.

By tracing the roots of opportunism in early management thought, the authors clarify ethical and entrepreneurial issues of mutual obligations in organizations. The authors also place workplace conflict to be a more coherent framework that better reflects the core concept of opportunism.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual model investigating the impact of three constructs, environmental uncertainty, power asymmetry and information sharing on opportunism engagement in exchange relationships.

Data were collected from procurement or sales managers of 99 manufacturing firms in Kampala, Uganda’s capital using a cross-sectional survey. Hypotheses were tested in both the agricultural and non-agricultural manufacturing sectors using multiple regression runs in the SPSS software.

Environmental uncertainty increases opportunism in the agricultural sector whilst power asymmetry increases opportunism in the non-agricultural sector. Across both sectors, information sharing does not have a significant impact on opportunism.

This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of opportunism in a developing country context by highlighting the contextual factors within the agricultural and non-agricultural manufacturing sectors that influence opportunism engagement under conditions of environmental uncertainty, power asymmetry and information sharing. This paper presents implications for practice and policy to minimise opportunism with the goal of enhancing the participation of Ugandan manufacturing firms in global supply chains.

This study explores a seller’s perspective in business relationships to validate whether the findings reported in previous studies based on buyer business relationships apply to seller business relationships. The purpose of this study is to test whether satisfaction functions as a connector between positive antecedents (trust and commitment) and negative postcedents (opportunism and conflict) in a business-to-business (B2B) relationship, based on a seller perspective.

A descriptive research design was applied and data was collected from Norwegian companies from the database of LinkedIn’s Sales Navigator. Respondents (Sales or Marketing Managers/Directors or Key Account Managers) were asked to identify one main business customer with whom they had interacted in the past year. A total of 213 responses could be used for data analysis. In addition, the measurement and structural models were assessed.

Trust was established as a positive alter ego of opportunism and opportunism as a negative alter ego of trust. The commitment was also determined to be a positive alter ego of conflict, with conflict being a negative alter ego of commitment. Furthermore, it was proven that alter egos are not opposites, but facets of antecedents and postcedents in relation to a connector, satisfaction.

The tested model endorses the hypothesised relationships between trust, commitment, satisfaction, opportunism and conflict in Norwegian B2B relationships. Satisfaction is linked to its two antecedents and its outcomes and the hypothesised relationship between opportunism and conflict is also endorsed from a seller’s perspective in B2B relationships.

The findings can assist the B2B industry to understand how trust and commitment foster satisfaction, how satisfaction influences opportunism and conflict, and how opportunism relates to conflict in a seller-business relationship.

No previous study has focussed on relationship marketing in B2B relationships from a seller’s perspective to establish whether satisfaction functions as a connector between trust and commitment and opportunism and conflict.

Research shows how with the evolution of technologies, technological opportunism enables firms to effectively identify and exploit innovations and opportunities through strategic management practices, such as adopting an entrepreneurial orientation. The study’s purpose is to explain the nature of the relationship between technological opportunism and innovation performance, while accounting for any possible moderating effects of entrepreneurial orientation.

A cross-sectional design was used to collect primary data from targeted respondents (n = 347) in the South African banking sector. Initially, instrument validity and reliability is established and the hypotheses are tested using multiple regression analyses.

The findings support the hypotheses insofar higher levels of technological opportunism are positively associated with higher levels of innovation performance, which is moderated by entrepreneurial orientation in terms of innovativeness, risk-taking and proactiveness. Moreover, competitive hostility, as a control played a significant role in the moderation effect between technological opportunism and innovation performance.

Leaders need to appreciate the importance of an entrepreneurial organization in leveraging technological opportunities which is pivotal for emerging economies, rather than individual entrepreneurial activities, which are rarely scalable in African economies.

The study provides an original contribution by increasing the theoretical and empirical reach of research on entrepreneurial orientation and technological opportunism. Since the original scales have primarily been employed in developed economies, by verifying their psychometric properties, this now allows for further replication studies to take place in other similar emerging market contexts.

The focus is on how agencies can mitigate client opportunism in an agency-client relationship (ACR), particularly during the agency selection stage involving a pitch. This paper aims to empirically investigate the moderating effects of organizational mechanisms (particularly informational cues) and the agency’s past behavior on client opportunism. In a moderated moderation, this paper tests the effects of calculative commitment, informational cue and agency’s past behavior on the main effect.

The research is in the context of ACR involving a pitch at the agency selection stage. A mixed-method approach is used. In depth interviews with senior level executives were used to design the experimental vignettes. The main study uses experimental vignettes in a survey.

The study finds the prevalence of client opportunism during the pitch. The study reveals a significant relationship between information asymmetry and client opportunism. The findings of the study support the effectiveness of organizational mechanisms in mitigating client opportunism. The findings indicate that a proactive approach such as using informational cues mitigates client opportunism as it signals to the client that the agency cares for its intellectual property. Clients also take a cue from agencies past behavior. Third-party complaints and voice complaint deters client opportunism. Moderated moderation reveals that the client’s calculative commitment impacts client opportunism.

The study is novel in empirically examining client opportunism during the agency selection stage involving a pitch. The study re-emphasizes that information asymmetry is the primary reason for client opportunism in ACR at the agency selection stage. The role of organizational mechanism and agency response in mitigating client opportunism is a welcome addition. Moderated moderation effects involving calculative commitment is a novel addition.