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Income inequality rose in Germany since the 1970s. To quantify the impact of different socio-economic trends on inequality, the author constructs counterfactual distributions of net household income with rich German data from the Microcensus in 1976 and 2011. The procedure allows to study the effect of marital sorting in education and includes indirect effects such as the influence of education on employment. When comparing the income distribution in West Germany for 1976 and 2011, the author finds that the prevalence of singlehood accounts to a large extent for the observed increase in inequality. The inequality increase is also associated with a change of employment among males and single females. When comparing West and East Germany in 2011, the author finds that the stronger labour market attachment of East German married females combined with the high East German unemployment produces even more income inequality than the West German employment structure. Moreover, the smaller household size boosts inequality in East Germany, whereas education works against it. In both comparisons, the author finds no significant impact of positive assortative mating in education or ageing.

In this chapter, we evaluate the employment effects of job-creation schemes (JCS) on the participating individuals in Germany. JCS are a major element of active labour market policy in Germany and are targeted at long-term unemployed and other hard-to-place individuals. Access to very informative administrative data of the Federal Employment Agency justifies the application of a matching estimator and allows us to account for individual (group-specific) and regional effect heterogeneity. We extend previous studies for Germany in four directions. First, we are able to evaluate the effects on regular (unsubsidised) employment. Second, we observe the outcomes of participants and non-participants for nearly three years after the programme starts and can therefore analyse medium-term effects. Third, we test the sensitivity of the results with respect to various decisions that have to be made during implementation of the matching estimator. Finally, we check if a possible occurrence of a specific form of ‘unobserved heterogeneity’ distorts our interpretation. The overall results are rather discouraging, since the employment effects are negative or insignificant for most of the analysed groups. One exception are long-term unemployed individuals who benefit from participation at the end of our observation period. Hence, one policy implication is to address the programmes to this problem group more closely.

Economic mobility means different things to different people, but four major classes of mobility measures have been identified in the literature: positional, directional, mobility as an equaliser of long-term earnings, and earnings risk (or flux). We illustrate some advantages of a multifaceted approach by comparing German and American earnings mobility using multiple indices from each of the four major classes for three panels of 10-year intervals. We anticipate and confirm that due to extensive differences in the German and American labour markets and in other social institutions that influence labour market outcomes, each country dominates in one facet of mobility but not in the others. Thus, a multifaceted approach contributes to a better understanding of the strengths and weakness of the two systems.

In recent years, Asian countries have experienced rising rates of premarital cohabitation, mirroring a similar trend that could be observed in many European countries several decades ago. As international differences in these trends are often attributed to institutional and societal differences, this study explores how China’s and Germany’s welfare and cultural regimes relate to national differences in the timing and prevalence of premarital cohabitation and direct marriage.

On the basis of two post-hoc harmonized surveys (pairfam for Germany; CFPS for China), descriptive analyses and logistic regressions were conducted. A higher standardization of partnership trajectories during the transition to adulthood was observed in China; this being probably related to China’s collectivist and Germany’s individualistic culture. While urban–rural differences prevail in China, and are attributable to China’s hukou system, East and West Germans differ considerably in this regard, a finding which can be traced back to regional differences in historical legacy. Discrepancies in economic modernization explain why the likelihood of experiencing these events differs for individuals in the Eastern and Western Chinese provinces.

Besides these differences, the two national contexts resemble each other in the prevalence of educational hypergamy, as well as in greater rates of cohabitation prior to first marriage, in contrast to direct marriage, seen among wealthier individuals and those with higher education. For the first time, the effects of cultural and institutional differences on the transition to adulthood were compared between a collectivistic vs. individualistic cultural regime and a productivist vs. corporatist conservative welfare regime, enabling researchers to draw conclusions about the link between cultural and welfare regime types and partnership patterns.

Generation Z in Germany – born after 1995 – follows in many ways similar trends to be seen in other countries. Contrary to Generation Y, it is less career-focussed, less keen on financial rewards and less willing to work flexible in a competitive world with total work–life blending. They look for structure, security and feeling good. What is different: Germany is one of the few countries in the world in which Generation Z in many cases can live up to their dreams. Germany has a prospering economy, a stable society and still a good educational system. Most important, for young people, it has an unemployment rate of virtually zero per cent. Therefore, companies definitely must engage in the war for talents and provide Generation Z with a fitting employer value proposition: Generation Z looks for meaningful and exciting work but seeks also meaning and excitement in private lives. In particular, they demand a clear separation of their private lives from their job. All this stands in contrast to the ambitions of the industrial sector in Germany promoting a more Generation Y-type environment with flexibility, agility and work–life blending. This conflict is not dealt with in an open way, since politics and media stand on the side of the large companies. Still, the power of Generation Z is not to be underestimated. Therefore, the chapter leaves it for the future to find out whether the Generation Z or other forces will win.

Over the last two to three decades, European welfare states have witnessed fundamental changes in both family and labour market structures with many more women being in the paid labour market. While this was seen to address previous problems linked to women’s disadvantage, it has also been argued to give rise to new risk and social inequalities, including falling fertility rates and increasing childlessness. Research has identified the lack of affordable childcare as a key factor in childlessness leading to a strong EU focus on early childhood education and care. Since 2000, the EU has played a more proactive role in policies and initiatives aimed to address decreasing fertility rates with greater pressure for convergence among member states. However, there has continued to be a large degree of variation between countries. This chapter thus examines the case of Germany which has one of the highest levels of childlessness in Europe. It focuses on the intersection between childlessness and childcare provision in Germany and analyses the existing childcare arrangements with a view to understand how they influence childlessness. Particular attention is given to the role of the German government as the main actor in the process to explore ideology-related explanations of German policy-makers which led to contradictory policies. Relying on an extensive review of the related literature and policy documents, together with the personal interviews with policy-makers, academics and women’s organisations, this chapter concludes that the relatively conservative outlook of the German government which prioritises the motherhood and caregiver role, and the dominance of the corporate welfare system, has limited developments to improve access to childcare resulting in ‘a culture of childlessness’ in Germany (Kreyenfeld & Konietzka, 2017).

This chapter summarizes existing empirical literature on German gazelles and draws on a large new sample of high-growth firms for a description of the regional and sectoral distribution of gazelles in Germany. In addition, the regional distribution of gazelles is juxtaposed with the occurrence of regional cluster initiatives. In sum, our results are in line with major former findings. We find gazelles in all sectors and many regions with some specificities for young and urban gazelles. We do not find significantly more gazelles in regions, though, which pursue a targeted cluster policy. Finally and consequently, we call for more granular studies on types and characteristics of gazelles in the future.

The authors seek to better understand the relationships between science production, national wealth, inequality, and human development around the globe.

The chapter uses econometric models, including Granger causality, to test alternate hypotheses about whether more economic wealth is related to more science or if more science leads to more wealth.

The immediate result of our models is that a country’s wealth contributes to the conditions necessary for productive science. While large countries produce many research articles in the STEM+ fields more or less irrespective of their per capita GDP, with countries like the Soviet Union, China, or India being important contributors to world science, the most productive countries were the richer ones. GDP per capita values are important predictors for higher numbers of STEM+ research articles adjusted for population size. Nevertheless, human development and income equality also have a positive relationship with science productivity. While the effect of income equality is less strong, it has importantly and steadily increased over the last 50 years.

This chapter is among the first to show that countries with similar levels of human development that are more equal in income distribution are more productive in science, while countries of similar wealth that are more equal in income distribution are not necessarily more productive in science.