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This illustrative case discusses and evaluates Vodafone Group and its overseas expansion and diversification in global business. Vodafone is a UK‐based company that was established after a spin‐off from Racal Electronics Group in 1982. The primary objective of this case is to examine Vodafone’s changing focus and international expansion in the world wireless industry. The case intends to look at Vodafone’s future expansion, growth and global strategies within the concept of internationalization and competitive advantage issues.

Examines firm strategic positioning and industry dynamics in the wireless telecommunications industry, and the relationship between the two. The study tracks how a firm adjusts resources and capabilities over time to cope with the shifts affecting its industry. Offers insights on what factors drive collaboration of telecommunications firms across industrial borders. The study is based on data on the collaborative relationships of Vodafone Group Plc over a three‐year period. An examination of the motivation, resource contribution and partner industry of Vodafone’s collaborative relationships is provided, to illustrate the complexity of firm strategic responses to the processes shaping the industry. Investigates the key motives and resource needs that have driven Vodafone in its collaborative agreements, and how the company has repositioned itself for the changing environmental demands. Identifies and analyzes the relative importance of a set of collaborative motives in relation to partner industry and resources contributed to the relationships. Finally, the future direction of development of the wireless telecommunications industry is forecast.

The purpose is to map the corporate structure of Vodafone Group. Through this, the paper will demonstrate the complexity of the company and argue for improved data availability to facilitate a better understanding of the mobile industry.

The paper begins by briefly recounting some relevant literature before detailing the data sources used in the analysis of Vodafone Group. A structure of Vodafone Group, highlighting the use of holding companies, is then presented, after which a series of national case studies are detailed. The case studies are used to shed light on a series of topics that are subsequently discussed.

The paper highlights the organisational complexity of Vodafone Group. There are many more companies within the Vodafone Group than expected. These companies are held through a series of holding companies, some of which are located in tax havens.

Assembling the data highlighted how little information is readily available in the public domain regarding the structure of telecommunications companies.

There is a need for more data regarding the structure of mobile operators to be available in the public domain, so that a better appraisal of their actions by investors, regulators and governments can be made.

Understanding the structure of mobile operators should enable them to be better regulated and appropriately taxed.

No other paper has examined in detail the organisational structure of Vodafone Group.

Provides a detailed case study of the take‐over bid from Vodafone AirTouch for German conglomerate Mannessman, which was both audacious and massive. Addresses the question of whether a pure mobile play is indeed a sensible strategy for the new millennium, but concludes it is too early for a definite answer. Argues the bids most important consequence is that it has yet again forced re‐examination of Telco’s strategic possibilities.

As the repercussions of 3G licensing reverberate across the telecommunications industry, it has frequently been speculated that the European mobile communications industry is about to consolidate around a handful of players. However, many of these speculative comments fail to take into account either the scale of the players concerned or how they have acquired licences in the past. In this paper, we establish licence ownerships patterns, identifying in the process 13 multiple licence owners that collectively own 161 of the 225 second and third generation licences that have been offered to date across Europe. The multiple licence owners are then categorised by their scale and geographical focus, demonstrating in the process the considerable variation that occurs in both of these areas.

Spun off from Racal Radio Group in 1985, Vodafone Group has transformed itself in the last six years from a virtually unknown small UK‐based company into the world’s largest wireless and mobile‐phone operator. With 93 million subscribers in 29 countries, it ranks among the top ten global companies in market capitalization. Its main products and services include network business, distribution business, retail shops, data‐services business, short message service (SMS), multi‐media portal, third‐generation licences, cellular operations and satellite services.

Wireless communication, comprising telecommunication industry products and services which move voice, video, data, and graphics at the speed of the electron, is the back bone of the Internet. We have today a wireless world which two Chief ‘Ntrepreneur Officers (CNOs)‐American Sam Ginn (AirTouch) and Britisher Chris Gent (Vodafone)‐created by their Memory Management during the 16 years between Olympics in Los Angeles (1984) and Olympics in Sydney (2000).

The European Union (EU) has recently been significantly enlarged with the addition of ten countries. This was expected to induce telecommunications operators in the original EU15 to invest heavily in operators in the accession countries. This paper seeks to analyse the extent to which this has occurred in practice.

The pattern of licence ownership and subscriber numbers in the EU25 is set out for 30 June 2004. The market position of eight operators likely to have played a role in investing in accession countries is examined and the level of concentration in every market is calculated. A number of case studies of operators are generated and an overall conclusion reached as to whether accession has indeed evinced a strategic response, or is likely to do so during 2005.

The results show that there has been no uniform response by operators in the EU15 to the onset of accession, and rather less investment overall than had been anticipated. This is explained by a variety of factors such as lack of investments providing majority control, financial constraints and the desire to cluster investments.

This paper provides a timely analysis, eight months on from accession, of how it is likely to affect individual, important industrial sectors within the now EU25.