Search results

The financial policies of the modern world corporations and their investment decisions are generally considered as interrelated because the agency problems, associated with the debt level and its maturity structure, give rise to incentives for overinvestment or underinvestment. The present study empirically investigates the linkage between debt maturity structure and firm investment in a financially constrained environment, using Pakistan as a case study, to determine how the institutional environment in which firms operate affect these decisions and their linkage.

The empirical analysis is carried in a panel data setting using panel regression models as the baseline methods. Moreover, generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimators are used, coupled with the instrumental variables approach, for robustness and improving the efficiency and consistency of estimates.

Results suggest that firms rely more on short financing in Pakistan. Thus, given the capital structure which is characterized by higher proportion of short-term financing, the higher level of leverage is less likely to cause underinvestment problem. However, the underinvestment problem do persists in the firms that have higher portion of long-term debt. These findings imply that the debt-overhang problem may persist even in the financially constrained environments where attractive investment opportunities are limited, and long-term financing is difficult to acquire.

This study contributes to the literature by revealing how corporate investment and financing decisions and their linkage is influenced by the institutional environment of the less developed countries which is characterized by underdeveloped financial markets, inefficient legal system and weak investor protection system.

This paper focuses on the potential advantages of strategic investment models in examining firm investment behavior. Strategic investment models are derived from rigorous modeling techniques grounded on formal analytical models, and they have been widely applied in corporate finance and economics to examine the problem of firm underinvestment. In this paper, we present an overview of strategic investment models, including empirical applications that highlight their methodological strengths. We conclude that the empirical application of such investment models in the context of strategic management research presents research opportunities in many new directions.

This study aims to investigate how the presence of female CEOs (FCEOs) affects investment efficiency in emerging economy, where female participation in business activities is limited.

This paper investigates the impact of CEO gender on investment efficiency by using investment efficiency measures proposed by Biddle et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2013).

The findings suggest that FCEOs are associated with high level of investment efficiency. FCEOs improve corporate governance, streamline management and reduce inefficient investment decisions. In addition, FCEOs focus more on curbing underinvestment than overinvestment when making investment decisions. Furthermore, high financial reporting quality (FRQ) strengthens the effect of FCEOs on investment efficiency. The results suggest that FCEOs do not ameliorate the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises.

This study enhances our understanding of the effects of FCEOs on corporate investment decisions in a male-dominated society. Efficient use of resources is vital from corporate and societal perspectives. Emerging economies are characterized by the unstable political and economic environment and low participation of females in decision-making. Hence, these economies require efficient utilization of resources. This study also sheds light on the role of FCEOs in curtailing underinvestment in emerging economies. It proves that FRQ is important in emerging economies because it strengthens the governance role of FCEOs.

Our aim is to analyze the type of lender and the debt maturity of Chilean firms as a function of their ownership structure and their growth opportunities. We perform the empirical analysis using an unbalanced panel data of 169 firms from 1990 to 2001. Our results show that Chilean firms with growth opportunities, ownership concentration, and a need for external funds issue short‐term bank debt to finance their new investments. This financing source is an efficient mechanism in Chile to alleviate agency and asymmetric information problems. The Chilean institutional environment influences firms’ decisions on banking debt.

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether bank debt‐maturity decisions are conditioned by growth opportunities, the firms’ ownership structure, or the institutional environment.

The empirical analysis is undertaken using an unbalanced panel data of Chilean and Spanish firms.

The results indicate that when banks are not allowed to become stockholders, managers use bank debt‐maturity as a corporate governance mechanism. When banks can participate in the ownership of the firms that they finance, short‐term bank debt can serve as a substitute for a governance mechanism.

The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of how differences in financial development among countries modify financial decisions by firms.

Both the academic literature and practitioners have long noted the need for an equity investment mechanism for worker-controlled firms that alleviates investor anxieties without undermining internal workplace democracy. The purpose of this paper is to outline one such possible mechanism.

The proposal locks together the interests of workers and external investors, via non-voting shares with dividends set by a pre-agreed value-added sharing formula. Each worker is paid a base wage, with the average across the firm being a pre-defined multiple of the national minimum wage. Any additional surplus is split into a number of equal “slices”, with each share receiving one slice as its dividend, and the average worker receiving a pre-agreed number of slices as a bonus.

Workers have an incentive to maximise their own incomes, and in so doing, will also automatically maximise the dividends received by investors, obviating the need for the shares to have normal voting rights. Working on this principle of aligned interests, the authors also discuss reinvestment, worker ownership of non-voting shares and possibilities for a secondary share market. The authors show how this proposal will be a significant step in aligning the interests of investors with owner-workers in a democratic, negotiated way that shares both risk and returns, thus making worker-controlled firms more attractive to equity investment.

In light of the recognised problem of underinvestment in worker-controlled firms and the risk of their degeneration, this paper will interest both academics and practitioners in employee ownership, co-operatives and various forms of workplace democracy.

Owing to the importance of the investment behavior in China, the purpose of this paper is to find the influence of executive network and government governance on investment efficiency.

The paper use China’s listed companies as sample to make an investment efficiency determinant model.

In this article, the authors find that larger executive network and higher government governance will lead to more corporate investment efficient. Furthermore, the informal institution – executive network, is not only an effective way to alleviate financing constraints, but also can solve underinvestment problem. While the improvement of local government governance can provide institutional protection, it will also be more conducive to restrain overinvestment behavior.

The authors have not explored conduction path. Especially, the authors have not examined whether information spillover effect or the release of resources constraints in executive network plays a more important role to ease investment insufficient.

Under the Chinese circumstance, relationship governance can not only promote companies to improve investment efficiency, but also provide an important guarantee for sustained macroeconomic growth.

This paper aims to demonstrate how financial leverage impacts firm investment and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on the level of information asymmetry as well as growth.

The paper relies on data from 2,403 Indian firms during the period 1995-2014, generating a total of 19,544 firm-year observations. Analysis is conducted by using various panel econometric techniques.

Drawing insights from agency theories, the paper uncovers that financial leverage is negatively and significantly related to firm investment. It is also observed that the impact of financial leverage on firm investment is significant for high information asymmetric firms. Finally, the paper shows that the relationship between leverage and firm investment is significant for low-growth firms. However, no significant relationship is found between leverage and investment for high-growth firms.

This paper provides fresh evidence on the leverage–investment nexus and, to the authors’ knowledge, it the first paper to examine the extent to which this leverage–investment relationship is driven by the level of information asymmetry.

This paper aims to investigate whether managerial overconfidence has an impact on investment inefficiency beyond its influence on the use of internal financing or whether internal financing behaves as a full intermediary.

The study employed three dependent variables, namely business investment scale, overinvestment and underinvestment, and analyzed data from 282 firms across five different industries listed in 11 Middle East/North Africa (MENA) countries between 2013 and 2019 using regression analysis via least square dummy variable (LSDV).

The findings indicate that while internal financing can provide funding for investment opportunities and address capital shortages, it may also result in overinvestment, particularly in companies led by overconfident managers.

Stakeholders, including shareholders and board of directors, should pay attention to the chief executive officer (CEO)'s behavioral aspects such as overconfidence in decision-making while undertaking new investment projects. Additionally, regulators and policymakers in emerging markets like MENA should re-evaluate the corporate governance framework, devise a corporate governance index and promote boardroom gender diversity as it can significantly reduce risk.

This study adds to the limited research on the impact of managerial overconfidence on investment efficiency in the MENA region. By focusing on this region, which has unique economic, political and social characteristics, the study provides new insights into the role of behavioral biases in investment decision-making in emerging markets.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of financial reporting quality (FRQ) on dividend policy. This paper also examines the moderating role of corporate liquidity on the FRQ–dividend policy relationship.

The sample of this paper contains 113 non-financial companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2019 (1,675 firm-year observations). The authors use OLS regressions to test the hypotheses.

The authors find a positive relationship between FRQ and dividend policy. They also find that the positive effect of FRQ on dividend policy is not strengthened by the presence of corporate liquidity.

The findings of this study offer implications for stakeholders, including investors and others in Saudi Arabia and other developing countries with comparable business environments. This is because of the significant impact of the dividend policy on a company’s value, as it is a crucial decision that involves distributing substantial amounts of money to shareholders on a regular basis and interacts with other critical decisions within the company. Therefore, the dividend policy has a crucial role in determining the company’s value, which is reflected in its stock prices.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study in Saudi Arabia that provides new empirical evidence on the impact of FRQ on dividend policy and the moderating role of corporate liquidity on this relationship.