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The cost of compliance is an essential variable to consider when administering a tax system. One recent study estimates that the yearly federal tax compliance burden in the US exceeds $431 billion dollars, and this cost does not include the potential greatest cost of all – changes in taxpayer behavior that reduces economic efficiency (Laffer, Winegarden, & Childs, 2011). One example of such behavior is the renunciation of US citizenship due to the impact of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) reporting requirements. Using this context, our study examines how FATCA compliance costs can affect taxpayer behavior in a manner that reduces economic efficiency. We collected responses from 197 experienced US taxpayers living in the US. Our study finds that when tax compliance costs are high, taxpayers may be more likely to renounce their citizenship to avoid FATCA reporting requirements. We further learn that tax compliance costs may increase the likelihood of citizenship renunciation even in the presence of a minimal US tax burden. Supplemental mediation analysis demonstrates that one's perceived fairness of compliance does not mediate the effect of high compliance costs on a taxpayer's renunciation decision; however, one's perceived fairness of compliance and fear of sanctions, collectively, partially explain the effect of tax burden on the renunciation decision. In addition, we find that ethics, the perceived probability of detection, and average income level affect the decision to renounce citizenship. Our findings suggest broader impacts of tax policy and provide a foundation for future research to further explore domestic and foreign tax compliance behaviors.

Prior tax compliance research has largely ignored low-income individual taxpayers, as they have historically been viewed as having an immaterial impact on Federal tax revenues. However, the earned income tax credit (EITC) program has altered the Federal tax revenue landscape in this regard. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigated the magnitude of EITC tax overpayments for tax year 1999 and concluded that between 27 and 31% of EITC filings were overstated, resulting in over-payments of between $8.5 and $9.9 billion (IRS, 2002). These excessive payments represented about 0.5% of total Federal revenues and 2.8% of the total tax gap. Thus, to the extent that low-income individual taxpayers intentionally under-report their incomes in order to receive higher EITC’s, the Federal budget is noticeably affected.

This study extends and complements extant tax research by examining the compliance intentions of low-income individual taxpayers. Relying on the theory of planned behavior, we examine the extent to which perceived tax equity (vertical, horizontal and exchange), normative expectations, and legal sanctions affect tax compliance intentions. Consistent with the hypotheses, the results indicate a significant positive relationship between compliance intentions and: (1) equity perceptions of the tax system; (2) normative expectations of compliance; and (3) penalty magnitude. Additionally, the findings suggest two-way interactions between penalty magnitude and exchange equity, and penalty magnitude and normative expectations. Research results reported herein hold important policy implications related to the Federal government’s efforts to reduce tax cheating and increase compliance among low-income individual taxpayers.

This chapter investigates the effects of the corporate sector on the effectiveness of selected tax compliance instruments in the context of large corporate taxpayers belonging to the finance, manufacturing, and service sectors. Applying multilevel logit models based on real tax office and survey data from Bangladesh, it is found that the filing compliance of large corporate taxpayers is influenced by penalty, tax audit, and taxpayer services, while reporting compliance is influenced by tax audit, criminal prosecution, and tax simplification. In the case of payment compliance, two coercive instruments – penalty and tax audit – have been found to be statistically significant. However, when sector characteristics are considered, the extent of the influence of these instruments, and, in some cases, their statistical significance changes. This suggests that the effectiveness of tax compliance instruments, among other things, largely depends on the sector affiliation of corporate taxpayers. Overall, this study establishes that corporate sector plays an important role in the effectiveness of tax compliance instruments, with the caveat that findings might be different if working definitions of the study variables were measured differently.

This study examines the determinants of enforced tax compliance behavior of Malaysian citizens where trust in tax authorities is assumed to be a mediator. Quota sampling method was used to select a sample of 340 participants to participate in a survey. A two-step structural equation modeling (SEM) process was adopted to test a framework comprising 13 hypotheses. Model fit was initially measured using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) while model specification was applied in the second stage to test the structural relationship. The mediating effects of trust in tax authorities were tested via Baron and Kenny (1986) approach, bootstrapping, and AMOS AxB estimand. The findings confirmed that trust in government, trust in tax administrator, power of Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, and awareness influence enforced compliance. However, tax morale and tax amoral behaviors do not influence enforced compliance. The findings suggest that citizens would fulfill their tax responsibilities if they believe that tax authorities are effective in tax administration. Trust in government fosters trust in the tax authorities. This study contributes to existing literature by confirming the factors that affect enforced tax compliance.

Most governments around the world rely heavily on tax revenue to fund not only their recurrent expenditure but also their long-term development goals. There is some evidence suggesting that tax evasion in Vietnam has, over the years, been on the rise in terms of number, scale and degree of sophistication. It may thus be beneficial to understand the extent to which various relevant psychological factors interact to influence the tax compliance of Vietnamese taxpayers. This chapter attempts to quantify the effects of taxpayer's emotion, trust and perception on their tax compliance in Vietnam. It adopts a positivist research framework, a quantitative research method and primary data collection. First, a simple, theoretical model in which emotion and trust affect tax compliance both directly and indirectly through perception as a mediating variable, is constructed. The Baron−Kenny method is then applied to the data collected from an e-survey to test various hypotheses derived from the devised theoretical model. The results show that taxpayer's perception positively and significantly influences tax compliance whereas emotion and trust exert significant and positive effects on tax compliance both directly and indirectly (via perception). The findings suggest that voluntary tax compliance in Vietnam can be improved through better tax administration services, more fiscal policy accountability and pro-active tax socialization.

The “slippery slope” framework assumes that trust and power are alternative approaches to attaining taxpayers’ compliance and for reducing tax evasion. This study aimed to investigate whether the impacts of power and trust dimensions previously found in developed countries also exist in developing countries, such as Indonesia. Data were collected through a researcher-administered questionnaire survey of 274 small business taxpayers and were then analyzed through stepwise linear regressions. The results show that trust significantly influences voluntary tax compliance, but neither trust nor power promotes enforced tax compliance. Ultimately, this study’s findings only partly support the assumptions of the “slippery slope” framework. This study also contributes to current global literature on the influence of trust and power in voluntary and enforced tax compliance in developing countries, especially in Asia.

In this study, we examine the role of temporal framing in the context of tax audit risk. Using construal-level theory, we propose that compared with an every-year frame (e.g., 1.5 million returns are audited every year), framing audit risk in an everyday frame (e.g., 4,000 returns are audited every day) will make audit risk seem more likely and thus increase taxpayer compliance. We test whether perceived fairness of the tax system, an individual difference variable related to tax compliance, moderates the effect of temporal framing on behavioral intentions. The results show that communicating risk in a day frame rather than a year frame increases compliance for taxpayers who perceive the tax system as unfair but not for taxpayers who perceive the tax system as fair. Increasing compliance among taxpayers who perceive the tax system as unfair is crucial, as they are less likely to be compliant. Thus, framing audit risk can assist in increasing taxpayer compliance.

This paper investigates how individuals determine their tax morale levels and tax compliance decisions. Using a questionnaire survey and a multivariate tests procedure, the paper revealed that tax evasion is morally acceptable in Jordan under some circumstances, indeed there could be an affirmative duty to evade taxes since the government is perceived to be highly corrupted. The findings also show that while the extent of the governmental corruption has a positive (negative) effect on tax non-compliance (tax morale), the efficient expenditure of governmental tax revenues has a negative (positive) impact on tax non-compliance (tax morale). The individuals’ tax non-compliance decisions are likewise positively affected by the tax rates and by the taxation system’s being perceived as unjust, but decline with the increase of audit rates and the subsequent penalty rates. The degree and effectiveness of these determinants are dependent on the individual’s level of risk aversion, financial constraints and the surrounding referent groups. The results also confirm that individual factors play a significant role in determining the level of tax morale. Overall, the tax morale level and the compliance decision of an individual are greatly influenced by gender, age, educational level, occupational status and religious background.

We experimentally investigate how the level of government (either federal or state) and whether funding is being allocated to enforcement or service efforts in a revenue agency affects trust in the agency, as well as support for the funding initiative. We find that the two independent variables interact, such that trust in the state agency is not affected by whether the proposed funding would be allocated to service or enforcement efforts. But, at the federal level (the Internal Revenue Service), trust in the agency is significantly higher when the proposed funding is to hire additional service employees as opposed to hiring additional enforcement employees. We also find that the level of government moderates the mediating effect of trust in the agency on the relation between the use of funds and support for the funding.