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The cost of compliance is an essential variable to consider when administering a tax system. One recent study estimates that the yearly federal tax compliance burden in the US exceeds $431 billion dollars, and this cost does not include the potential greatest cost of all – changes in taxpayer behavior that reduces economic efficiency (Laffer, Winegarden, & Childs, 2011). One example of such behavior is the renunciation of US citizenship due to the impact of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) reporting requirements. Using this context, our study examines how FATCA compliance costs can affect taxpayer behavior in a manner that reduces economic efficiency. We collected responses from 197 experienced US taxpayers living in the US. Our study finds that when tax compliance costs are high, taxpayers may be more likely to renounce their citizenship to avoid FATCA reporting requirements. We further learn that tax compliance costs may increase the likelihood of citizenship renunciation even in the presence of a minimal US tax burden. Supplemental mediation analysis demonstrates that one's perceived fairness of compliance does not mediate the effect of high compliance costs on a taxpayer's renunciation decision; however, one's perceived fairness of compliance and fear of sanctions, collectively, partially explain the effect of tax burden on the renunciation decision. In addition, we find that ethics, the perceived probability of detection, and average income level affect the decision to renounce citizenship. Our findings suggest broader impacts of tax policy and provide a foundation for future research to further explore domestic and foreign tax compliance behaviors.

This paper examines the corporate income tax compliance costs and their determinants by analyzing survey and financial statements data from firms operating in Greece. We find that corporate tax compliance costs are of considerable size and vary with several firm-specific characteristics, including the firm’s size, its age, the sector in which it operates, its location, and its legal form. The paper intends to raise awareness regarding the impact of tax compliance costs, especially for countries, such as Greece, that were significantly affected by the economic and financial crisis.

This chapter investigates the effects of the corporate sector on the effectiveness of selected tax compliance instruments in the context of large corporate taxpayers belonging to the finance, manufacturing, and service sectors. Applying multilevel logit models based on real tax office and survey data from Bangladesh, it is found that the filing compliance of large corporate taxpayers is influenced by penalty, tax audit, and taxpayer services, while reporting compliance is influenced by tax audit, criminal prosecution, and tax simplification. In the case of payment compliance, two coercive instruments – penalty and tax audit – have been found to be statistically significant. However, when sector characteristics are considered, the extent of the influence of these instruments, and, in some cases, their statistical significance changes. This suggests that the effectiveness of tax compliance instruments, among other things, largely depends on the sector affiliation of corporate taxpayers. Overall, this study establishes that corporate sector plays an important role in the effectiveness of tax compliance instruments, with the caveat that findings might be different if working definitions of the study variables were measured differently.

Consumption taxes are an integral part of government revenue in countries around the world and are often subject to consumer evasion. The rapid rise of electronic commerce has exacerbated this problem as cross-border selling over the internet has enabled foreign businesses to sell and avoid collection and remittance of tax on their sales.

In this paper, we search for the solution to this problem through the analysis of three tax collection models: vendor, financial institution, and internet service provider (ISP). In addition, we examine administrative tools that enable more effective collection as well as inducements for taxpayers or collection agents to carry out their responsibility.

We conclude that the ISP collection model is not feasible at this time. On the other hand, we find that the vendor model, when supplemented with appropriate administrative tools and inducements, and the financial institution model, both represent viable options for policymakers to consider.

Most governments around the world rely heavily on tax revenue to fund not only their recurrent expenditure but also their long-term development goals. There is some evidence suggesting that tax evasion in Vietnam has, over the years, been on the rise in terms of number, scale and degree of sophistication. It may thus be beneficial to understand the extent to which various relevant psychological factors interact to influence the tax compliance of Vietnamese taxpayers. This chapter attempts to quantify the effects of taxpayer's emotion, trust and perception on their tax compliance in Vietnam. It adopts a positivist research framework, a quantitative research method and primary data collection. First, a simple, theoretical model in which emotion and trust affect tax compliance both directly and indirectly through perception as a mediating variable, is constructed. The Baron−Kenny method is then applied to the data collected from an e-survey to test various hypotheses derived from the devised theoretical model. The results show that taxpayer's perception positively and significantly influences tax compliance whereas emotion and trust exert significant and positive effects on tax compliance both directly and indirectly (via perception). The findings suggest that voluntary tax compliance in Vietnam can be improved through better tax administration services, more fiscal policy accountability and pro-active tax socialization.

This paper investigates how individuals determine their tax morale levels and tax compliance decisions. Using a questionnaire survey and a multivariate tests procedure, the paper revealed that tax evasion is morally acceptable in Jordan under some circumstances, indeed there could be an affirmative duty to evade taxes since the government is perceived to be highly corrupted. The findings also show that while the extent of the governmental corruption has a positive (negative) effect on tax non-compliance (tax morale), the efficient expenditure of governmental tax revenues has a negative (positive) impact on tax non-compliance (tax morale). The individuals’ tax non-compliance decisions are likewise positively affected by the tax rates and by the taxation system’s being perceived as unjust, but decline with the increase of audit rates and the subsequent penalty rates. The degree and effectiveness of these determinants are dependent on the individual’s level of risk aversion, financial constraints and the surrounding referent groups. The results also confirm that individual factors play a significant role in determining the level of tax morale. Overall, the tax morale level and the compliance decision of an individual are greatly influenced by gender, age, educational level, occupational status and religious background.

The “slippery slope” framework assumes that trust and power are alternative approaches to attaining taxpayers’ compliance and for reducing tax evasion. This study aimed to investigate whether the impacts of power and trust dimensions previously found in developed countries also exist in developing countries, such as Indonesia. Data were collected through a researcher-administered questionnaire survey of 274 small business taxpayers and were then analyzed through stepwise linear regressions. The results show that trust significantly influences voluntary tax compliance, but neither trust nor power promotes enforced tax compliance. Ultimately, this study’s findings only partly support the assumptions of the “slippery slope” framework. This study also contributes to current global literature on the influence of trust and power in voluntary and enforced tax compliance in developing countries, especially in Asia.