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This study uses county-level property tax data to assess alternative theories for government interaction in setting tax rates. Tests of the two theories, tax competition and yardstick competition, incorporate data for both mobile and immobile property. Using spatial econometrics, results show a statistically significant, positive effect of neighbor rates on local rates for mobile property, consistent with both forms of competition. However, similar statistically significant positive effects for immobile property are consistent only with yardstick competition. The results have implications for decision making in the competitive environment government authorities face.

Offshore financial centres are coming under increasing pressure from both the OECD and the European Union. They are seen by many bureaucrats and politicians in OECD countries as facilitating criminal activities such as laundering drug money as well as tax evasion and tax avoidance by residents of high‐tax welfare states. While there are good reasons for nation states to cooperate to suppress criminal activity, this is not true in relation to tax competition. The notion that by engaging in ‘harmful’ tax competition, offshore financial centres are damaging the legitimate interests of OECD nations has no sound foundation in economic theory. Competition in tax matters is beneficial and world welfare enhancing. Governments of offshore financial centres serve their own and the world's interests by providing zero or low tax environments for global business and investment and they are right to insist that treaties on criminal matters should not be used to enforce other countries' tax claims.

This research addresses the question of whether market competition influences a firm's implicit tax burden. Implicit taxes are defined as the pretax rate of return disadvantage earned on an investment that is taxed preferentially. The Scholes and Wolfson (1992) model predicts that implicit taxes will fully offset any benefit from preferential tax treatment leading to no benefit from lower explicit taxes; however, their theory assumes perfect market competition. This chapter relaxes the assumption of perfect market competition and finds that firms in industries with lower competition bear lower implicit taxes and firms in industries with higher competition bear higher implicit taxes. These findings are consistent with monopoly and oligopoly behavior predictions where firms in less competitive industries have greater price setting power and can retain more of their tax savings while market forces in competitive industries force companies to pass along any savings to customers (Mason, 1939). Furthermore, these findings answer the call in the literature for more research on determinants of cross-sectional variation in implicit taxes (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001).

The purpose of this paper is to test the economic theory that product market competition should enhance firm performance in the US corporate tax management setting. It identifies one mechanism through which corporate management can improve firm performance. The paper also identifies business conditions that may facility or impede effective corporate tax management.

The paper tests the relationship between product market competition and corporate tax efficiency using large archival data. The primary data source is COMPUSTAT, which contains annual and quarterly accounting data for US public firms. Other data sources include accounting comparability data generously shared by Professor Vedi.

The paper finds that firms in competitive industries are more efficient in managing taxes. Specifically, the paper documents that firms in competitive industries exhibit lower effective tax rates than their non-competitive counterparts. Furthermore, the paper finds that the positive link between competition and the efficiency of tax management is much stronger for firms with lower cash flow volatility and for firms with fewer industry investment opportunities. The lack of financial statement comparability may weaken this link.

Tax laws vary greatly from country to country. Readers should interpret the results within the US tax environments.

Results in this paper have implications for multinational corporations that are interested in investing and doing business in the USA.

This paper sheds light on how competition influences firm performance through efficient tax management, a specific mechanism through which competition improves firm performance. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study provides the first documentation of how product market competition affects tax planning for US publicly traded companies.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of government regulation on economic value creation through the lens of Resource-Advantage Theory. This study intends to shed more light on how industry-government relationships affect the entrepreneurial activities that drive economic growth.

The authors use a test of joint significance (MacKinnon et al., 2002) in a generalized linear model to examine how competition mediates the relationship between government regulation and jobs and wages. The research context is the US brewing industry for the year 2012.

High excise taxes and certain sales restrictions negatively impact competition, which ultimately affects economic value creation. State regulators may effectively balance the need to bring in tax revenues on the one hand and promote healthy competition on the other by turning to small business tax credits and exemptions. The results of a post hoc analysis indicate excise taxes have the most pronounced effect at the manufacturing level of the supply chain as opposed to the wholesale and retail levels.

The predictive validity of this study suggests that Resource-Advantage Theory is a useful and appropriate framework for understanding how industry–government relations impact the competitive processes that lead to economic value creation. From a practical standpoint, the study also has several implications for public policy, which are detailed in the latter stages of the paper.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how a country's competitive tax policy influences its inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the Asia–Pacific region, even when given particular constraints (e.g., population, public governance, skilled labor, and so on) exist.

The paper uses the system GMM estimation approach to test the hypothesis. Data on FDI, corporate income tax, and various confounding factors were drawn from Ernst and Young's worldwide corporate tax guide, the World Bank, and other sources to create a panel of 28 economies over the period 2000–2016.

The present research confirms the negative association between corporate income tax (CIT) and FDI inflows. The effects of other confounding factors on FDI net inflows are also supported (e.g., connectivity, GDP per capita, population, skilled labor, and trade openness). Our results support the argument that foreign investments may be more sensitive to CIT. Therefore, CIT is an effective indicator to observe international tax competition.

The present research uses rich data on statutory CIT and other economic and public governance factors to investigate the relationship between tax competition and FDI inflows in the Asia–Pacific region. The findings add important supplements to the nuanced understanding of the political-economic dynamics in this region, especially when cut-throat tax competition, trade tensions, and stagnant economic growth have been key challenges for global economies.

High‐taxing European treasuries face grave problems as they try to finance redistributive welfare states having low birth rates and declining labour tax bases in an age of globalising investment. Their problem is not much different to the problem faced by the Roman Emperors (though Constantine humanely disclaimed the previous use of the scourge and the rack and contented himself with incarceration of insolvent taxpayers). In those days wealth was buried as gold in the grounds of the villa; in our day it may be buried in overseas parent or subsidiary companies. The reality remains that capital and business income can be made less visible to the tax collector than landed property. The solution of the late Roman Empire was to visit corporal punishment on the taxpayer. The solution now being urged by the OECD in Paris is that small or developing countries with offshore financial centres be pressed into service as subsidiary tax enforcers to boost OECD coffers. The OECD approach is multifarious, involving the criminalisation of tax avoidance and the elimination of various forms of tax competition from these centres in all geographically mobile service industries, including financial, but also distribution services, shipping, service industries and company headquartering. The OECD initiative is already drafting similar action on competition in e‐commerce, with manufacturing industry having been flagged in the 1998 OECD report.

This study aims to explore the underlying patterns in tax innovation. Prior studies of local sales taxes still leave a gap in the literature and render the results inconclusive because the studies cover either state level or localities within a single state for a short period. To cover the gap, we assemble a dataset of counties in all states for FY1970-2006 but focus on 12 states not threatened by intra-jurisdictional competition. Our empirical analyses yield evidence that a county adopts local sales tax for political and economic rationale rather than fiscal condition. Accordingly, regional diffusion has positive effects on local sales tax adoption in a county. These findings contribute substantively to sales tax literature while confirming policy diffusion.

The purpose of this paper is to unveil the true background of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and to suggest crucial indexes for bringing a movement into a future ceiling causing a struggle of the international tax system.

This paper looks into the historical context of this project before and after Starbucks’ scandal, comparing to other contexts of the international tax system. Also, this paper partially reviews BEPS from a legal perspective.

The key factors for building momentum of reform of international taxation are a country having a government willing to embrace the cause of reform, unfairness felt toward entities using tax avoidance schemes which other comparable entities could not be use, grass-roots pressure for the reform, effective places to negotiate cooperation among major countries for the reform, solid cooperation among many countries in the world to implement standards and rhetoric of slogan with less opposition.

The momentum of the reform of international taxation was analyzed before. But the BEPS Project has involved some unique events as compared with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s project on harmful tax practices, such as initiation of NGOs and boycott by consumers. Additionally, this paper will discuss insights, which the former research did not do.