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The purpose of this paper is to unveil the true background of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and to suggest crucial indexes for bringing a movement into a future ceiling causing a struggle of the international tax system.

This paper looks into the historical context of this project before and after Starbucks’ scandal, comparing to other contexts of the international tax system. Also, this paper partially reviews BEPS from a legal perspective.

The key factors for building momentum of reform of international taxation are a country having a government willing to embrace the cause of reform, unfairness felt toward entities using tax avoidance schemes which other comparable entities could not be use, grass-roots pressure for the reform, effective places to negotiate cooperation among major countries for the reform, solid cooperation among many countries in the world to implement standards and rhetoric of slogan with less opposition.

The momentum of the reform of international taxation was analyzed before. But the BEPS Project has involved some unique events as compared with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s project on harmful tax practices, such as initiation of NGOs and boycott by consumers. Additionally, this paper will discuss insights, which the former research did not do.

This paper considers supranational initiatives ‐ particularly those emanating from the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development, the Financial Action Task Force and the Financial Stability Forum ‐ proposing changes in the regulation of offshore financial centres. The implications of the withdrawal of US support for elements of the initiative are reviewed. The underlying rationales for change are considered, as are the probable and appropriate response for the stakeholders in the offshore centres, including governments, financial institutions and clients.

Offshore financial centres are coming under increasing pressure from both the OECD and the European Union. They are seen by many bureaucrats and politicians in OECD countries as facilitating criminal activities such as laundering drug money as well as tax evasion and tax avoidance by residents of high‐tax welfare states. While there are good reasons for nation states to cooperate to suppress criminal activity, this is not true in relation to tax competition. The notion that by engaging in ‘harmful’ tax competition, offshore financial centres are damaging the legitimate interests of OECD nations has no sound foundation in economic theory. Competition in tax matters is beneficial and world welfare enhancing. Governments of offshore financial centres serve their own and the world's interests by providing zero or low tax environments for global business and investment and they are right to insist that treaties on criminal matters should not be used to enforce other countries' tax claims.

Offshore financial centres (OFCs) have again come under the spotlight. They have been accused of aiding terrorists by laundering their financial resources, allowing the funding of terrorism to go undetected. Their role as tax havens have also been highlighted in the collapse of Enron, a company that used OFCs to avoid paying millions of dollars in US tax. In response many OFCs have agreed to freeze terrorists’ assets, tighten money laundering legislation, provide a more open tax system and share information. There are, however, some OFCs that are resisting the mounting pressure to conform to international standards. These will become targets once more in June, 2002, when the Financial Action Task Force starts the process of identifying jurisdictions that ‘lack appropriate measures to combat terrorist financing’.

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the various means available to US authorities for obtaining foreign evidence and other types of international assistance in money laundering cases. The means analysed here include mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and similar processes; multilateral treaties; tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) and tax treaties (for a narrow range of money laundering offences); court‐sponsored procedures for taking foreign depositions, including letters rogatory; the use of unilateral compulsory measures, such as subpoenas, for obtaining foreign evidence, and the use of FinCEN and Interpol resources. The initiatives of the G7, the Financial Action Task Force and the OECD regarding international cooperation in money laundering matters are also briefly treated.

Offshore finance, the provision of financial services to non‐residents, includes the traditional bank activities of the borrowing and lending of money together with other services such as fund management, insurance, trust business, tax planning and international business corporations (IBCs). Defining offshore financial centres is more problematic, since practically all financial centres provide some offshore financial facilities. A recent IMF background paper gives a good working definition of an OFC:

The Caribbean has been the focus of a lot of attention over the last year with respect to money laundering. This paper will firstly examine the main international initiatives affecting money laundering in the Caribbean countries. In the second part of the paper there will be a review of the regional efforts that have been taken by Caribbean countries to address the problem of money laundering.

Tax evasion and money laundering have become important sources of illicit financial flows in developing countries. Foreign capital flows used by shell corporates are generally with no real economic activities but motivated by harmful tax practices, thereby inducing loss of revenue for developing countries. Despite the coercive actions, such as backlisting of noncooperative jurisdictions to anti-money laundering and countering terrorism financing standards, illicit financial activities are still eroding the tax base in developing countries. The purpose of the paper is to assess the blacklisting effectiveness as a coercive policy against illicit financial activities.

This paper applies a propensity score matching strategy to a sample of 118 developing jurisdictions from 2009 to 2017 to evaluate changes in illicit financial activities following the blacklisting.

The results show that rather than altering illicit inflows in blacklisted countries, financial restrictions have produced the inverse, causing a boomerang effect on financial crime activities. The illicit share of capital inflows increases on average by 6 percentage points and 0.7% of GDP following the blacklisting. These results are robust to alternative matching methods and to the hidden bias problem.

Most of the previous research analyzed the link between blacklisting and fiscal revenues. However, here, the study analyzes whether blacklisting makes countries more cooperative in terms of fighting illicit financial flows.

High‐taxing European treasuries face grave problems as they try to finance redistributive welfare states having low birth rates and declining labour tax bases in an age of globalising investment. Their problem is not much different to the problem faced by the Roman Emperors (though Constantine humanely disclaimed the previous use of the scourge and the rack and contented himself with incarceration of insolvent taxpayers). In those days wealth was buried as gold in the grounds of the villa; in our day it may be buried in overseas parent or subsidiary companies. The reality remains that capital and business income can be made less visible to the tax collector than landed property. The solution of the late Roman Empire was to visit corporal punishment on the taxpayer. The solution now being urged by the OECD in Paris is that small or developing countries with offshore financial centres be pressed into service as subsidiary tax enforcers to boost OECD coffers. The OECD approach is multifarious, involving the criminalisation of tax avoidance and the elimination of various forms of tax competition from these centres in all geographically mobile service industries, including financial, but also distribution services, shipping, service industries and company headquartering. The OECD initiative is already drafting similar action on competition in e‐commerce, with manufacturing industry having been flagged in the 1998 OECD report.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the emerging discourse on corporate taxation from a corporate social responsibility perspective to develop a consensual definition of corporate tax responsibility (CTR) and to identify a set of indicators that firms should publicly communicate to their stakeholders as an accountability mechanism.

Data were obtained from semi-structured interviews with representatives of stakeholders closely related to taxation: tax authorities, companies, NGOs, tax advisors and academics. Based on a discourse analysis approach, data were coded and analyzed using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software.

CTR is defined as the set of tax-related practices and policies that allow companies to pay a fair share of taxes as a function of the generated value in each jurisdiction in which they operate and to then publicly disclose them. Disclosure should cover disaggregated quantitative data and information on practices and policies.

Despite the wealth of research on sustainability reporting and increasing public awareness of tax aggressiveness and disclosure, academic research has not explored tax-responsible reporting. Moreover, no consensual definition of CTR has been formulated, and no indicators to properly account for responsible taxation have been identified. This paper contributes to filling these gaps by providing rich interview evidence regarding the nature of the emerging discourse on CTR reporting and a set of material indicators for CTR disclosure. This paper encourages researchers to foster the development of social accountability by engaging in future empirical studies of CTR.