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1 – 10 of over 2000Ayishat Omar, Alex P. Tang and Yu Cong
The purpose of this study is to investigate how compensation committee structure or characteristic impacts say on pay (SOP) voting dissent and the impact of SOP dissent on chief…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to investigate how compensation committee structure or characteristic impacts say on pay (SOP) voting dissent and the impact of SOP dissent on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use corporate governance and SOP data to test the relationships amongst variables. Additional analysis is performed using one-to-one propensity-score matched samples.
Findings
The authors find that firm-years with at least a female member present on the compensation committee are associated with lower SOP dissent. The authors find mixed results of the impact of SOP dissent on CEO turnover.
Practical implications
This paper suggests that diversity on the compensation committee, particularly the presence of at least a female member on the committee, serves as an important determinant of SOP voting outcome in the USA. The paper provides policymakers and practitioners with insights into factors influencing SOP voting outcomes and implications of SOP dissent for firms.
Originality/value
The findings of this paper contribute to the corporate governance literature by enhancing the understanding of the role of the compensation committee as it relates to SOP dissent and effect of SOP dissent on CEO turnover.
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In this chapter, we assess shareholder voting behaviour in our sample of seven European Member States. We consider the AGM’s agenda, shareholder proposals, rejected voting items…
Abstract
In this chapter, we assess shareholder voting behaviour in our sample of seven European Member States. We consider the AGM’s agenda, shareholder proposals, rejected voting items and dissent rates. Our research shows, inter alia, that certain voting items receive higher dissent rates than others. These are, for instance, director elections and say-on-pay resolutions. Other voting items, such as the approval of the annual accounts, are merely a formality.
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This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).
Design/methodology/approach
Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.
Findings
The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.
Research limitations/implications
The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.
Practical implications
As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.
Originality/value
This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.
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Ferdy Putra and Doddy Setiawan
This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.
Design/methodology/approach
This study provides a comprehensive literature review of theoretical and empirical studies published in reputable international journals indexed by Scopus.
Findings
The literature review reveals several aspects of the nomination and remuneration committee. These aspects have been classified into the definition of the nomination and remuneration committee, dimensions of the nomination and remuneration committee, measurement and research review results, reasons for conflict empirical findings, company dynamics and research on moderators, as well as recommending future research.
Research limitations/implications
Our literature review shows that nomination and remuneration committees play a role in improving board performance and company performance, reducing agency conflicts and improving corporate governance to provide implications for companies, regulators and investors and pave the way for future research.
Originality/value
This paper identifies issues related to nomination and remuneration committees, their theoretical and practical implications and avenues for future research.
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Jörn Obermann, Patrick Velte, Jannik Gerwanski and Othar Kordsachia
Although principal–agent theory has gained a prominent place in research, its negative image of self-serving managers is frequently criticized. Thus, the purpose of this paper is…
Abstract
Purpose
Although principal–agent theory has gained a prominent place in research, its negative image of self-serving managers is frequently criticized. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine how existing theories of agency and stewardship can be combined by using behavioral characteristics.
Design/methodology/approach
This study reviewed articles on the behavior of agents and stewards from the domains of finance, economics, management, corporate governance and organizational research. Additional theoretical and meta-analytical empirical literature from the fields of psychology and sociology was used to account for general patterns of human behavior.
Findings
The results indicate that goal congruency and the perception of fairness can serve as moderators distinguishing agency theory and stewardship theory. Goal congruency can be achieved by stipulating psychological ownership. The perception of distributive and procedural fairness is demonstrated by two major corporate governance mechanisms: performance-based compensation and board monitoring. The results are summarized in six hypotheses that allow a situational, customized corporate governance. These hypotheses can be tested in future research.
Originality/value
Prior work either focused on the merits of principal-agent theory or advocates the utilization of positive management theories, such as stewardship theory. However, little work has been done on bridging the gap between both constructs and develop a more extensive view of management theory.
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Jörn Obermann and Patrick Velte
This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers…
Abstract
This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.
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In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still…
Abstract
In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.
J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler, Gabriel Lozano-Reina and Gregorio Sánchez-Marín
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of managerial discretion on the effectiveness of say on pay (SOP) as a governance mechanism. This goal covers an important…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of managerial discretion on the effectiveness of say on pay (SOP) as a governance mechanism. This goal covers an important gap since the issue of how effective SOP is in promoting more aligned compensation has proved somewhat controversial.
Design/methodology/approach
This empirical research opted for a panel methodology for the period 2003–2017, using a sample of large UK listed-companies (specifically, 3,445 firm-year observations). Data were obtained from several sources (Manifest Ltd, BoardEx, Worldscope, Factset Ownership and DataStream).
Findings
Results show that managerial discretion plays an important role in the effectiveness of SOP as a mechanism for increasing aligned CEO compensation. While individual discretion (latitude of objectives) exerts a negative effect, contextual discretion (latitude of action) increases SOP effectiveness. The global effect of managerial discretion is positive when there is high level of both individual and contextual discretion.
Originality/value
This empirical study provides evidence concerning an emerging topic in the literature regarding the impact of SOP as a shareholder activism mechanism of corporate governance on executive compensation. By taking managerial discretion into consideration as a relevant moderating factor, it also offers a better explanation of SOP effectiveness as a governance mechanism.
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The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act…
Abstract
The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides: