Search results
1 – 10 of over 1000Introduction:Shareholder activism comprises a range of activities by public companies’ shareholders who desire some change in the corporation and intervene in the…
Abstract
Introduction:Shareholder activism comprises a range of activities by public companies’ shareholders who desire some change in the corporation and intervene in the management’s decisions. The goals of activists are various. They may seek to change the company’s strategy, financial structure, management, or board in general. More specifically they may seek to change the capital allocation strategy (stock buybacks, dividends, or company’s acquisitions policies), the board composition, the company’s executive compensation plans, or the company’s certain functions (risk management, audit).
Purpose:The purpose of this literature review research study is to explore the concept of shareholder activism. According to a point of view, these activist actions stimulate better corporate governance practice in the companies and ultimately lead to an increase in the company’s stock price in the short term. The others claim that activism increases the company’s share price volatility in the long term. In the near future, the impact of shareholder activism will continue to rise and the ways how the companies respond to it is gaining importance. This study sheds light on the types of shareholder activism, when they are likely to approach a company and which tactics they most likely use.
Methodology:Considering the rapid expansion of shareholder activism concept in the world the author makes a review of literature on shareholder activism. The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the characteristics of shareholder activism are introduced. Second, the theoretical background of this concept is given in detail. Third, the types of shareholder activism are discussed. Finally, the conclusion comprises a summary of shareholder activism.
Findings:The study finds out that shareholder activism has started to have a significant influence on corporate governance policy that a firm adopts in recent years. Shareholder activism increases levels of shareholder engagement in firm decisions and fosters a long-term corporate governance culture. As institutional investors get a higher portion from global equity investments, their role in shareholder activism will increase. There are opinions suggesting that investor activism will lead to better corporate governance practices in firms, leading to an increase in firm share prices in the short term. The shareholder activism phenomenon seems to be on the agenda of all companies in the near future.
Details
Keywords
Souha Siala Bouaziz, Ines Ben Amar Fakhfakh and Anis Jarboui
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance of French companies.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance of French companies.
Design/methodology/approach
This study used 385 firm-year observations drawn from a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2008 to 2012. Data was collected from annual reports of sample companies. To measure earnings management, this study used the model of Raman and Shahrur (2008). The relationship between shareholder activism, earnings management and market performance using the panel data regression model was empirically examined.
Findings
The results prove that shareholder activism, as indicated by shareholder proposals, has no impact on market performance. However, the existence of shareholder activism affects the market performance positively. In fact, a minimum of proposals proves that shareholder activism plays an appropriate and effective role in creating value. Thus, several activists would resort to “a private activism” which could be the best and the least expensive form. This form of activism is called “behind the scenes.” Findings also show that earnings management has a negative impact on market performance. As a matter of fact, these findings allow to conclude that the firm performance decreases whenever managers undertake to earnings management. Also, earnings management behavior is mainly opportunistic. Finally, the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management has no impact on market performance. This result reveals that shareholder activism proves to be an ineffective mechanism that does not alter the accounting choices, particularly in relation to earnings management. This result shows the inability of active shareholders to define and implement strategies across their proposals, namely, “the lack of monitoring competence.”
Research limitations/implications
It is important in future research to evaluate the impact of behind the scenes interventions on corporate governance. Also, this paper gives a larger dimension to the effect of shareholder activism on the market performance in the specific context of earnings management, thus justifying the need to expand this study using other methodologies to deepen and better understand this relationship in this context.
Practical implications
The paper's evidence contributes to an understanding of corporate governance. The finding of this study will help in monitoring and controlling fraudulent earnings management practices that effect on market performance. Further, this study is important to investors, academics and policymakers, as it demonstrates that governance reforms that encourage firms to adopt better governance practices that reduce the likelihood of earnings management.
Originality/value
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper pioneers in focusing on the impact of the shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance because previous studies put more emphasis on pair-wise relations (Shareholder activism-earnings management, earnings management-market performance and shareholder activism-market performance). This study provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on market performance.
Details
Keywords
Ambareen Beebeejaun and Jushveer Koobloll
“Shareholder activism works when shareholders understand something about the characteristics of the business that the board doesn’t”. As complex the term shareholder…
Abstract
Purpose
“Shareholder activism works when shareholders understand something about the characteristics of the business that the board doesn’t”. As complex the term shareholder activism may seem, it demonstrates a very simple phenomenon of how shareholder take control of a situation to turn it in their favor. The whole world has taken an activism “twist” where every person has a word to say. The same characteristic of the society is showcased in this paper where engagement of shareholder is questioned whether it helps to promote effective corporate governance. Given the fact that Mauritius has a rather low shareholder activism framework, this research aims to depict the international picture of the issue at different levels to reach a consensus with the local market. It was a major challenge as very little research has been conducted to accurately contrast shareholder activism with corporate governance. However, the international standards aim at giving a clear picture of how the shareholder activism actually functions.
Design/methodology/approach
The research has adopted a black letter approach by analyzing relevant laws and legislations governing corporate governance matters in Mauritius and the USA, Malaysia, France and South Africa. Thereafter, a comparative analysis was made between Mauritius laws and the aforementioned countries. Recommendations were then put forward on the subject matter which is shareholder activism.
Findings
Research has shown development in corporate governance alongside the increase in shareholder activism. However, these research studies fail to prove that the development is because of shareholder activism itself. In fact, it could be because of increase in corporate intellects, removal of trade barriers, sustainable corporate practices and many such changes that have affected the corporate market somehow. Hence, it is difficult to conclude, with certainty, that the driver of good corporate governance is, in particular, the phenomenon of shareholder activism. Nevertheless, many result of shareholder activism has demonstrated a rather positive impact on the ongoing of the corporate dealings and on a personal note, it can be said that shareholder activism is a domain where much research and development should be effected as it represents a promising improvement in the way corporations are governed.
Originality/value
The concept of shareholder activism is quite new to the Mauritius legislation. There has not been research done on whether shareholder activism, particularly, is the reason for corporate success or failure. In this light, this paper aims to analyze shareholder activism practices in other countries and puts forward recommendation in the Mauritius context which may be of use to stakeholders concerned.
Details
Keywords
Chinyere Uche, Emmanuel Adegbite and Michael John Jones
The purpose of this paper is to investigate institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. It addresses the paucity of empirical research on institutional shareholder…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. It addresses the paucity of empirical research on institutional shareholder activism in sub-Saharan Africa.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses agency theory to understand the institutional shareholder approach to shareholder activism in Nigeria. The data are collected through qualitative interviews with expert representatives from financial institutions.
Findings
The findings indicate evidence of low-level shareholder activism in Nigeria. The study provides empirical insight into the reasons why institutional shareholders might adopt an active or passive approach to shareholder activism. The findings suggest the pension structure involving two types of pension institutions affects the ability to engage in shareholder activism.
Research limitations/implications
The research study advances our understanding of the status quo of institutional shareholder activism in an African context such as Nigeria.
Practical implications
The paper makes a practical contribution by highlighting that regulators need to consider how the financial market conditions and characteristics affect effective promotion of better governance practices and performance through shareholder activism.
Originality/value
This study draws attention to the implication for shareholder activism of complexities associated with an institutional arrangement where two types of financial institutions are expected to operate and manage the private pension funds in a country.
Details
Keywords
Carine Girard and Stephen Gates
This paper aims to demonstrate that state shareholders are confronted with contradictory logics leading to institutional contradictions that activist shareholders can…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to demonstrate that state shareholders are confronted with contradictory logics leading to institutional contradictions that activist shareholders can exploit. The competing logics of the state as shareholder and their impact on corporate governance and shareholder activism offer fertile grounds for research advances in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs).
Design/methodology/approach
Through an extensive literature review of state ownership, institutional contradictions and shareholder activism, this paper analyzes two case studies involving the French State as shareholder.
Findings
In the French context, these two cases illustrate how institutional contradictions result in opportunities for shareholder activism. By focusing on the institutional contradictions of the state shareholder, this investigation suggests a need for experimental research to observe how shareholder activists adapt to each institutional change in CMEs. This experimentation can help policymakers to avoid creating additional conditions that shareholder activists can exploit.
Research limitations/implications
This focuses only on France and its state shareholdings. To generalize results, studies of other CMEs and state shareholders are needed.
Practical implications
Policymakers should consider all legislative proposals for their potential to deviate from corporate governance practice by experimenting with them in a laboratory setting. Shareholder activists can compare state shareholders’ actions against the state’s legislation to emphasize institutional contradictions that counter minority shareholders’ rights.
Originality/value
This research is the first to analyze how the state as shareholder can exploit its competing logics to resist against shareholder activism and support management or to become itself a shareholder activist.
Details
Keywords
The purpose of this paper is to examine the propensity of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) for shareholder activism and their potential impact on corporate governance.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the propensity of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) for shareholder activism and their potential impact on corporate governance.
Design/methodology/approach
The study highlights the relationships between SWFs and corporate governance and also applies eight antecedents/determinants of institutional activism to analyze whether SWFs have a predisposition for shareholder activism.
Findings
The study only finds two instances of SWF activism. Additionally, it finds that despite their mostly passive investments, SWFs possess a natural tendency toward shareholder activism. Some are more likely to engage in activism than others, however. SWFs with a higher proportion of their assets invested in equities, those with portfolios fully or partially constructed to emulate the broader financial markets through indexing, and those that depend less on external fund managers are the likeliest candidates for activism. The study also finds that the regulatory environment can curb the natural SWF inclination for activist behavior.
Research limitations/implications
Due to the lack of transparency within the SWF universe, this study largely depends on the limited data available for sovereign wealth funds.
Practical implications
Given the growing importance of SWFs, managers, directors, and policymakers must assess SWF activism, its influence on corporate governance, and its implications for public policy deliberations.
Originality/value
This project, to the best of the author's knowledge, is the first study that applies tested financial models to SWFs in order to determine if they have inherent activist tendencies.
Details
Keywords
Rashid Ameer and Siti Sakinah Azizan
This chapter investigates the short-run and long-run economic implications of the shareholder activism in family-controlled firms in Malaysia.
Abstract
Purpose
This chapter investigates the short-run and long-run economic implications of the shareholder activism in family-controlled firms in Malaysia.
Design/methodology/approach
In order to investigate the impact of MSWG activism on RPT, we collected related party transactions data (sales and purchases) and inter-segment sales from the annual reports of the firms. We use standard event study methodology to calculate abnormal returns for the sample and control firms.
Findings
We do not find significant effect on the share performance in the short-run after MSWG engagement with the targeted firms. However in the long-run, our results show significant improvement in the MSWG targeted family-controlled firms’ performance compared to non-targeted family firms. We also examine the changes in the level of related party transactions. We do not find significant changes in the level of such sales and purchase transactions except for inter-segment sales.
Research limitations/implications
We argue that market is not strong form efficient because market did not react to the MSWG engagement with the management of these companies. We propose that future research should focus on the investors perception of the MSWG involvement so that a clear picture of its significance can be observable to other firms in the market.
Practical implications
Even though the activism practices are still less aggressive in Malaysia than those found in the developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, however our results show that shareholder activism led by MSWG have impact on the family-owned firms performance in the long-run.
Originality/value
We argue that it is the first study to examine MSWG engagements with the family-controlled firms in Malaysia.
Details
Keywords
Feng Zhang, Lei Zhu and Liqun Wei
Whether shareholders’ involvement in management benefits the organization’s performance remains inconclusive. The purpose of this study is to reconcile the conflicting…
Abstract
Purpose
Whether shareholders’ involvement in management benefits the organization’s performance remains inconclusive. The purpose of this study is to reconcile the conflicting results by exploring whether and under which contexts shareholder involvement may impact firm innovation performance.
Design/methodology/approach
This study attempts to combine previous theoretical views (reactance and agency theories) to examine a curvilinear effect of shareholder involvement on firm innovation performance based on governance related to cost-benefit analysis. Drawing on data from 174 Chinese manufacturing firms, the hierarchical regressions were used to test the hypotheses.
Findings
The study finds that shareholder involvement has a U-shaped relationship with firm innovation performance. Moreover, ownership incentive strengthens the U-shaped relationship, while monitoring weakens it.
Originality/value
Examination of the U-shaped main effect of shareholder involvement and these contingent factors further explains the mixed empirical results concerning the link between shareholder activism and firm-level performance.
Details
Keywords
Siti Sakinah Azizan and Rashid Ameer
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of shareholder activism led by the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) on the performance of…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of shareholder activism led by the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) on the performance of family‐controlled firms in Malaysia from 2005 to 2009.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper uses event study methodology to calculate abnormal returns for the sample and control firms.
Findings
The paper finds significant positive cumulative abnormal returns of at least 0.5 percent for the targeted family firms, during the event window of [−1, 0] and [0, +1], as a result of MSWG engagement. There is a significant positive cumulative abnormal return of 1 percent for the firms where family control is less than the threshold level of 33 percent. It is interesting to note that MSWG engagements do not have consistent positive impact on the abnormal returns over the years. There are significant differences between the performance of MSWG targeted family‐controlled firms and non‐targeted family‐controlled firms after one year of MSWG intervention.
Research limitations/implications
The results show that MSWG‐led shareholder activism does have an effect on the share returns of the family‐controlled firms. These results imply that family‐controlled firms agree with the MSWG on those matters that improve the bottom‐line results.
Originality/value
The authors argue that this is the first study to examine MSWG engagements with family‐controlled firms in Malaysia.
Details
Keywords
The purpose of this paper is to examine social issue proxy filings by shareholders of US corporations in a period commonly referred to as the “shareholder spring” to…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine social issue proxy filings by shareholders of US corporations in a period commonly referred to as the “shareholder spring” to understand who the filers are, what issues are typically the focus of the filings, what the dominant strategy is of various filers and the success rate of proxy-based shareholder social activism.
Design/methodology/approach
Using the shareholder-filed proxy as the unit of analysis, the study parsed the data from 410 proxies to gain insight into the process of shareholder social activism.
Findings
Religious groups, in contrast to large pension and mutual funds, use a small shareholding approach to form coalitions with other stakeholders to gain voting support. Proxies that call for disclosure elicit greater support than those that demand a change in a company’s business practices. If the goal of shareholder social activism is to keep the proxy issue alive from one shareholder meeting to the next, then non-individual proxy filers can be considered successful.
Research limitations/implications
While the study only considered proxies for 250 of the Fortune 500 companies, there is evidence that social activism can succeed if a coalition strategy is used and the shareholder’s motives appear to be legitimately altruistic.
Practical implications
It is important for corporate managers to consider the prevailing shareholder sentiment on social issues because such sentiments largely echo general societal concerns.
Social implications
While the debate is still unsettled on the shareholder versus the stakeholder argument, there is a high level of scrutiny on how a company operates in the larger societal context.
Originality/value
Propelled by the Dodd–Frank law and the shareholder spring movement, certain types of shareholders (primarily religious groups) are quite adept at eliciting support for social issues because of both their legitimacy and by the strategy that they follow.
Details