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Companies operating in the 1990s face an especially rigorous set of challenges. The toughest challenge is dealing with drastic changes in the business environment. The most successful companies of the 1990s are those that conduct ongoing self‐assessments against the changing environment.

Strategic restructuring is a beginning, not an end. In the race for continuous improvement, there is no finish line. To be productive, companies must continue to examine—and improve—their corporate vision and strategies, management systems and processes, structure, operations, and methods. Rather than simply making across‐the‐board cost cuts, much can be saved by changing the mind‐sets of the managers and the way that they work.

America's consumable goods (CG) manufacturers and retailers are undergoing a sea change, according to the results of a recent Louis Harris survey report. The report analyzed the impact of quick response (QR) and supply‐chain partnering issues on the industry; these systems employ technology that dramatically improves the flow of information and product between supplier and retailer. An important conclusion of the report was that a small group of CG manufacturing leaders has broken away and pulled far ahead of its peers in QR use and leverage. Considering the dramatic progress made by this group in a relatively short time, the issue is who will be next to quickly emerge and gain disproportionate benefits.

In the race for dominance in the world auto market, Japan recently introduced two new luxury cars. Although only a few thousand have reached the United States, some industry experts predict the advanced, fuel‐efficient, 160‐mile‐per‐hour cars will soon become the ultimate standard in automotive technology.

If the dramatic improvements promised by business process reengineering (BPR) or the incremental improvements pledged by total quality management (TQM) are ever to be realized, let alone sustained, a clear specific effective change strategy must form the basis of the overall implementation plan.

Before 1980, manufacturers operated in a relatively stable business environment. The bases of competition changed gradually. The physical aspects of the product (e.g., functionality and quality) dominated; delivery and customer service were largely set by standard business practices. The significant improvements that were made in manufacturing control through the application of technologies to factory floor scheduling can no longer provide a competitive weapon.

New technologies have yielded astounding increases in quality, productivity, and customer satisfaction. Companies in manufacturing, service, and information industries have all been reaping the benefits of improvements in these areas. In particular, corporate America is emerging from its initial experience with the following new technologies:

In recent years, organisations around the world have been seriously affected by a range of economic, political and social upheavals that have gathered momentum in most parts of the globe. The viability of the conventional (pyramidal) organisational structures is being challenged in conjunction with major shifts in the roles of mid and top managers. In many countries, the pace of the above socio‐economic events and uncertainties is happening at an unprecedented pace. Some markets are showing signs of potential gigantic expansions while others (historically prosperous) are on the verge of complete collapse (Dent, 1991). In responding to the socio‐economic challenges of the nineties, organisations (across the board) have resorted to dismantling the conventional pyramidal structure and adopting so‐called “leaner” structures (see Zeffane, 1992). The most common struggle has been to maintain market share in an economic environment increasingly characterised by excess labour supply (Bamber, 1990; Green & Macdonald, 1991). As organisations shifted their strategies from “mass production” to “post‐fordism” (see, for example Kern and Schumann, 1987), there has been a significant tendency to emphasise flexibility of both capital and labour in order to cater for the niche markets which are claimed to be rapidly emerging, world‐wide. This has resulted in massive organisational restructuring world‐wide.

Examines the debate over “Higher superstition” (Gross and Levitt, 1994). Puts forward the arguments in the book and the response to the book from members of the US science and technology studies community. Asserts that increases in technical control have been at the expense of social and individual control. Mentions “diversionary reframing” – changing the subject, possibly by diverting attention away from the subject matter to the person doing the criticizing. Explores public attitudes towards science and technology, quoting a number of layman approaches to the bafflement of science. Identifies the irony in Gross and Levitt’s arguments, particularly in developing the interface between science and technology. Recommends paying more attention to the social construction of beliefs.

The cardinal point to note here is that the development (and unfortunately the likely potential) of area policy is intimately related to the actual character of British social policy. Whilst area policy has been strongly influenced by Pigou's welfare economics, by the rise of scientific management in the delivery of social services (cf Jaques 1976; Whittington and Bellamy 1979), by the accompanying development of operational analyses and by the creation of social economics (see Pigou 1938; Sandford 1977), social policy continues to be enmeshed with the flavours of Benthamite utilitatianism and Social Darwinism (see, above all, the Beveridge Report 1942; Booth 1889; Rowntree 1922, 1946; Webb 1926). Consequently, for their entire history area policies have been coloured by the principles of a national minimum for the many and giving poorer areas a hand up, rather than a hand out. The preceived need to save money (C.S.E. State Apparatus and Expenditure Group 1979; Klein 1974) and the (supposed) ennobling effects of self help have been the twin marching orders for area policy for decades. Private industry is inadvertently called upon to plug the resulting gaps in public provision. The conjunction of a reluctant state and a meandering private sector has fashioned the decaying urban areas of today. Whilst a large degree of party politics and commitment has characterised the general debate over the removal of poverty (Holman 1973; MacGregor 1981), this has for the most part bypassed the ‘marginal’ poorer areas (cf Green forthcoming). Their inhabitants are not usually numerically significant enough to sway general, party policies (cf Boulding 1967) and the problems of most notably the inner cities has been underplayed.