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“Economics is a Serious Subject.” Edwin Cannan.

This paper exposes, analyses, and challenges the revanchism (Smith, 1996) exhibited by ruling elites in austerity Britain. After recapitulating the concept of revanchism in its original form, and discussing some critiques and extensions, it scrutinizes the emergence of revanchist political economy in Britain, with particular reference to the UK housing crisis. In order to explain how revanchism has become so ingrained in British society, the paper analyses the production of ignorance via the activation of class and place stigma, where free market think tanks play a crucial role in deflecting attention away from the causes of housing crisis. It is argued that the production of ignorance carves an economic and political path for gentrification on a scale never before seen in the United Kingdom, where speculation, rentier capitalist extraction, and the global circulation of capital in urban land markets is resulting in staggering fortunes for those expropriating socially created use values.

Praxeology is defined by Rothbard (1962, p. 64) as “The formal implication of the fact that men use means to attain various chosen ends.” While men use means to attain ends in areas other than economics (e.g., war, voting), the dismal science is the only deeply elaborated subdivision of praxeology. Rothbard (1962, p. 63) defines praxeological economics in contrast withpsychology [and]…the philosophy of ethics. Since all these [three] disciplines deal with the subjective decisions of individual human minds, many observers have believed that they are fundamentally identical. This is not the case at all. Psychology and ethics deal with the content of human ends; they ask, why does the man choose such and such ends, or what ends should man value? Praxeology and economics deal with any given ends and with the formal implications of the fact that men have ends and employ means to attain them.¹

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the evolution in the provision of public services’ delivery, with a specific focus on housing policies. New practices are being implemented, thanks to the cooperation of the public sector, private, and nonprofit actors. Rather than just providing assistance to households with income levels falling below specific thresholds, social housing addresses the broader and more complex areas of vulnerability that affect several categories, such as single parents, young students and professionals, and temporarily unemployed people. Co-production also comes into the picture, since many social housing projects require that beneficiaries contribute to the implementation of the project itself, for example by managing the buildings and common areas or by creating communities.

The chapter will start from considerations on the emergence of new housing needs. It will then review the literature on the concept of co-production of public services and provide a definition of social housing. Then, examples of social housing will be analyzed based on specific criteria derived from the literature and the theoretical framework. The methodology is qualitative and based on descriptive case analysis.

The chapter analyzes the evolution of public housing policies by taking into account the social and economic changes that have determined greater and more complex areas for public intervention, adopting a twofold approach of partnership and collaboration between the three sectors, and of co-production of public services by directly engaging the users.

This paper addresses the interaction relationship between debt financing and ownership structure towards firms’ value in Malaysia. Two issues are addressed in this study. The study examines whether managers and controlling large shareholders pursue rent-seeking objective through excessive leverage in a firm. Second, the paper examines whether financial restraint policy is effective in enhancing corporate governance. The sample of the study covers a small economy – Malaysia where rent-seeking opportunities prevail. A total 256 manufacturing firms are examined. The hypotheses are set to examine whether rent seeking prevails in firms with high intangible asset and less competitive industries. The findings show that first, financial restraint policy is only effective when managerial equity interest is relatively low. Managers with a higher equity interest hinder the positive effects driven by financial restraint policy. Second, at a higher threshold of equity interest, the use of excessive leverage by managers leads to a lower firm value, confirming the presence of rent-seeking motive. The presence of the largest shareholder as directors also follows the same conjecture despite at a lower magnitude. Both findings could not be refuted in less competitive industries. Other findings from this paper conclude that a high industrial concentration industry increases firms’ value in this economy. Financial institutions can also exert corporate governance on firms in less competitive industries. It is, however, the agency problem mitigates the positive effects brought forth by financial rent in this emerging economy.

Mises (1949[1963], p. 692) explains that market-failure justifications for state actions, such as economic regulation “ascribe to the state not only the best intentions but also omniscience.” He then points out that neither assumption is valid: government is not benevolent since both, those who are employed by the state and those who demand state actions, have subjective self-interests, and it is not all knowing since knowledge is widely dispersed and the cost of coordination is infinitely high, particularly without market profits and prices as coordinating mechanisms. Furthermore, Mises suggests that dropping either assumption undermines the conclusions that state intervention is necessarily desirable even if some sort of market failure is actually identified. Austrian economists in the Mises tradition have tended to focus on the knowledge problem in their challenges to regulation, however. Many Austrians obviously recognize the interest problem, of course, but they often assume it away in order to illustrate that government interference with markets is not desirable even if it is well intended. In contrast, public-choice analysis tends to focus on the interest problem as source of government failure, although some public-choice analysts also obviously recognize the knowledge problem. Indeed, this difference in perspective is so pronounced that Ikeda (1997, p. 240) explicitly distinguishes between Public Choice and Austrian political economy by suggesting that the Austrian approach assumes benevolence on the part of government officials, while the public-choice approach assume narrow interests.¹ Ikeda (1997, p. 150) also suggests that the separation of these two approaches is justified because “Austrian political economy and public choice are each capable of standing on their own [so] public-theorists…find it optimal simply to continue to pursue their research along the line of either the former or the latter approaches.” The following presentation questions this assertion. Instead, both assumptions should be dropped, and the resulting integrated Austrian-public-choice model should be expanded to include assumptions about the relationships between regulations, property rights security, and both market and political behavior.²

Transaction costs, responsive housing supply, rent controls, tenant protection, and access to credit affect residential mobility – these different parts of housing policy are included in what has been defined as housing regimes, which embrace regulations, laws, norms, and ideology as well as economic factors. In this chapter, we investigate how these regimes change by using institutional theories of path dependence. We use Sweden as an example and study three Swedish housing market reforms during the past decades that may have affected residential mobility, each related to one of the main institutional pillars of housing provision: tenure legislation, taxation, and finance. More precisely, we study the development of the rental regulation since the late 1960s, the tax reform in 1991, and the new reforms on mortgages since 2010. What caused these reforms? What were the main mechanisms behind them, and why did they occur at the time they did? We argue, besides affecting residential mobility, these reforms have the common feature of including interesting elements of path dependence and forming critical junctures that have led the development on to a new path. Institutions of tenure legislation, housing finance, and taxation are often claimed to have effects on residential mobility. Although they are seldom designed with the explicit aim of supporting (or counteracting) residential mobility, they may sometimes do so as more or less unintended consequences.

The position of these Irish agitators is illogical and untenable; the remedy they propose is no remedy at all – nevertheless they are talking about the tenure of land and the right to land; and thus a question of worldwide importance is coming to the front.³

In recent years, alliances have become even more popular than mergers and acquisitions. Alliance formation has led to the emergence of interconnected firms, which are embedded in alliance networks. This paper offers a theory of network resources to evaluate the competitive advantage of interconnected firms. It distinguishes shared resources from non-shared resources, identifies various types of rent, and illustrates how firm-, relation-, and partner-specific factors determine the contribution of network resources to the rents that interconnected firms extract from their alliance networks. This paper revisits traditional assumptions of the resource-based view and suggests that the nature of relationships may matter more than the nature of resources in creating and sustaining the competitive advantage of interconnected firms.