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This paper exposes, analyses, and challenges the revanchism (Smith, 1996) exhibited by ruling elites in austerity Britain. After recapitulating the concept of revanchism in its original form, and discussing some critiques and extensions, it scrutinizes the emergence of revanchist political economy in Britain, with particular reference to the UK housing crisis. In order to explain how revanchism has become so ingrained in British society, the paper analyses the production of ignorance via the activation of class and place stigma, where free market think tanks play a crucial role in deflecting attention away from the causes of housing crisis. It is argued that the production of ignorance carves an economic and political path for gentrification on a scale never before seen in the United Kingdom, where speculation, rentier capitalist extraction, and the global circulation of capital in urban land markets is resulting in staggering fortunes for those expropriating socially created use values.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse and reflect on the changing relations of class and power in rural England, with a particular focus on housing.

The paper reviews the evidence concerning the changing ownership of housing and land in English rural areas, and the problems relating to this.

The paper finds that, in spite of huge social changes over the course of the 20th century, relations of class and power in rural England have retained the same basic form, based on landownership. The countryside continues to be dominated by landowners, who now include large numbers of nouveaux riches, while the landless (and carless) find it increasingly difficult to access housing, employment and basic services and amenities in rural areas. Landowner dominance is maintained not only by the rule of private property and property markets, but also by a state planning system that is heavily biased towards landowning classes and against the poor.

The paper recognises that the situation varies from one rural area to another, so that solutions to the rural housing problem need, so far as possible, to be locally negotiated. However, for reasons of space, the paper does not go into detail on this issue, apart from a few references to the situation in Lincolnshire.

The paper is original in the way it shows how “old” and “new” gentry, in spite of their differences in terms of “productivism” and “post‐productivism”, have shared class interests and values based on landownership rights. It is also the first to argue that rural gentrification is a form of revanchism – a thesis that has previously been applied only to urban areas. Data that have been previously argued to show the superiority of rural areas, e.g. fewer homeless, higher incomes, etc. can now be explained as effects of revanchism.

It matters who leads. Answering the research question will help to achieve early recognition of revanchist leadership and its harmful effects and help to determine why it emerges and how it works and spreads. This article is to encourage further study of its widening presence and of the remedies.

Through two contemporary case studies, this article seeks a better understanding of “revanchist leadership” and identify its distinct and permanent properties (DNA) and the way it works (modus operandi). Thus, it will simultaneously demonstrate that revanchist leadership is not a uniquely historic but a recurring and contemporary phenomenon. Based on an analysis of both public leadership theory and leadership practice, the authors conceive of leadership as a multi-faceted concept, made of the following four components. First is leadership as a person, i.e. the personal characteristics, traits, style and skills of the individual leader. Second is leadership as the position, i.e. the work of leading people, with a focus on the formal role and responsibilities. Third is leadership as a process, i.e. the work of enabling leadership, with a focus on coordinating, facilitating and directing internal and external parties. And fourth is leadership as embodiment of a common purpose, i.e. the work of leadership serving the greater good, both as an individual and the collective. In addition to this so called “4-P model” (Hopman and van den Berg, 2015; Grint, 2010) of public leadership, it is important that in order to understand leadership, the psychological, political, institutional, historical and geographical contexts determine to a large extent the impact of leadership, but the authors assume that – ultimately – there remains an element of personal choice of options and opportunities available [1]. To answer the research question, the authors follow a case-based approach. The descriptions and analyses of the cases are not only based on literature but also informed by personal experience in diplomatic work in the area's mentioned. It is important to focus not only on the persons of the leaders but also on their followers, as well as the political, institutional and international context. As part of this analysis, (ab)use of institutions and the leading political-historical narratives that underpin revanchist policies are taken into account [2].

The case-based analysis shows a similarity of the two cases, although the two cases developed largely independently, with a time difference of about 20 years and under quite different historic and geographic conditions. This support the research hypothesis that revanchist leadership might be considered a distinct style of political leadership, with specific defining elements, a so called “DNA” and modus operandi of its own that emerges and grows gradually, when enabling historical and mass psychological contexts are present. The presence of such an enabling context might also serve as a warning indicator of risks (the analogy of a recurring political virus is tempting). The work of Kellerman on “bad leadership”, Lipman Blumen on “toxic leadership,” provides a useful conceptual framework to better understand, analyze and recognize revanchist leadership in two empirical cases. In part IV, the authors describe defining elements (a so-called “DNA”) of revanchist leadership and the risk of revanchist leadership to spread like a “political virus”. The authors conclude with the recommendation that revanchist leadership and its defining feature (“DNA”) be further researched, in order to be better able to recognize revanchist leadership at an early stage and to facilitate a structured assessment of the extent, this type of leadership is present today and by implication represent a threat to peace and security of other nations. This is relevant as the current times are characterized by uncertainty, heightened anxiety and increased tensions among nations as well as at times frightened populations, which form a fertile ground for the growth of revanchist leadership, as history teaches us.

The authors conclude with the recommendation that revanchist leadership and its defining feature (“DNA”) be further researched, in order to be better able to recognize revanchist leadership at an early stage and to facilitate a structured assessment of the extent, this type of leadership is present today and by implication represent a threat to peace and security of other nations. As a counterpoint the concept of “Partnership in Leadership” is introduced, as a remedial approach that deserves further attention.

It first demonstrates that this specific type of leadership, although unethical and harmful, can be effective in the short term from the point of view of the revanchist leader's intent, despite high human costs. Second – paradoxical as it may sound – the primary drive of the revanchist leader is not external (the object of the revanche) but internal (the determination to obtain and maintain internal power at all costs). Both factors make this style an attractive option for other public leaders, in a context of increased uncertainty.

Better understanding should help to remedy the threat posed by revanchist leadership to international peace and security. The authors will briefly discuss the – important but incomplete – countermeasures of the international community in the two cases. As a counterpoint the concept of “Partnership in Leadership” is introduced, as a remedial approach that deserves further attention.

It first demonstrates that this specific type of leadership, although unethical and harmful, can be effective in the short term from the point of view of the revanchist leader's intent, despite high human costs. Second – paradoxical as it may sound – the primary drive of the revanchist leader is not external (the object of the revanche) but internal (the determination to obtain and maintain internal power at all costs). Both factors make this style an attractive option for other public leaders, in a context of increased uncertainty. The instrumentalization of uncertainty described in the two cases in this stud, may serve as a warning of the existence of dangers of revanchist leadership today. The uncertainty born out of accelerating globalization, job and income insecurity and destabilizing demographic trends, the challenges of a multicultural society, has incentivized some public leaders in Europe and elsewhere to fan the flames of anxiety to justify autocratic and revanchist leadership styles, ignore agreed international rules and norms and prioritize geopolitical competition over cooperation. They set the sights of the nation on a glorious and powerful past as compass for the future. Several add to that revanchist claims of spheres of influence in neighboring countries. Better understanding should help to remedy the threat posed by revanchist leadership to international peace and security. The authors will briefly discuss the – important but incomplete – countermeasures of the international community in the two cases. As a counterpoint the concept of “Partnership in Leadership” is introduced, as a remedial approach that deserves further attention.

This study explores the simultaneous transitions in Palestine/Israel and South Africa at the end of the 20th century through an analysis of the shifting geography of Johannesburg and Jerusalem. After analyzing the relationship between political, economic and spatial restructuring, I examine the walled enclosures that mark the landscapes of post-apartheid Johannesburg and post-Oslo Jerusalem. I conclude by arguing that these walled enclosures reveal several interconnected aspects of the relationship between neo-liberal restructuring and the militarization of urban space. They also exemplify different configurations of sovereignty under conditions of neo-liberalism and empire.

This chapter offers a theoretical appraisal of our contemporary hyper-regulated urban spaces situated against a backdrop of deindustrialisation, the shift to consumer economies and the rise of the creative city paradigm. While existing work has characterised urban space as dead and asocial spaces bereft of life. This chapter opts to think our city centres as ‘Zombie Cities’: cities which have been eviscerated the social but are forced to wear the exterior signs of life through the injection of economically productive but artificial modes of culture and creativity. This sets the stage for explaining why parkour is inconsistently included and excluded from urban space, and how it attains spatio-economically contingent legitimacy and inclusion into urban space that problematises existing theoretical perspectives around a revanchist urbanism.

The purpose of this paper is to question the extent to which Sub-Saharan African cities are progressing towards promoting pro-poor economies through pro-poor tourism (PPT). It specifically examines how African cities are resilient towards attaining sustainable urban tourism destinations in light of high urbanization.

The methodological framework is interpretive in nature and qualitative in an operational form. It uses meta-synthesis to evaluate the causal relationships observed within Sub-Saharan African pro-poor economies to enhance PPT approaches, using Accra, Ghana, Johannesburg, South Africa, and Harare, Zimbabwe, as case studies.

Tourism development in Sub-Saharan Africa has been dominantly underpinned by neoliberal development strategies which threaten the sustainability of tourism in African cities.

The study is limited to three Sub-Saharan African countries. Further studies may need to be done in other developing countries.

It argues for good governance through sustainability institutionalization which strengthens the regulative mechanisms, processes and organizational culture. Inclusive tourism approaches that are resilient-centered have the potential to promote urban tourism in Sub-Saharan African cities. These findings contribute to the building of strong and inclusive Institutions for Sustainable Development in the Sub-Saharan African cities to alleviate poverty.

These findings contribute to the building of strong and inclusive institutions for sustainable development in the Sub-Saharan African cities to alleviate poverty.

The “poor” are always within the communities, and it takes a community to minimise the impact of poverty among the populace. The study is conducted at a pertinent time when most African government’s development policies are pro-poor driven. Though African cities provide opportunities of growth, they are regarded as centres of high inequality.

This paper serves as an introduction to Risking Capitalism. To this end, I discuss the key questions, aims, and themes driving this collective project. Although the contributions differ in their use of political economy and political ecological with regard to housing, poverty, and climate change, they share a similar concern of interrogating the material, institutional, and discursive features of the production, representation, and governance of risk – a phenomenon that the World Bank views as loss and opportunity. In particular, they chart the relationship between risk, contemporary capitalism and its neoliberal modes of governance. After establishing the objectives of Risking Capitalism, I provide a general context from which to understand the significance and meaning of global risk management (GRM) with reference to the shared policy experiments of the World Economic Forum and World Bank. Mirroring the contributions in this volume, I start from the premise that risk is a social relation. This allows me to argue that GRM represents a new mode of neoliberal governance emergent from the structural violence produced by the expansion of credit-led capitalism. In the final section, I lay out the structure of the volume.

Today’s China has striven to exclude street vendors through political campaigns such as “National Sanitary City” and “National Civilized City.” Such campaigns pursue modernity and beautiful urban spaces by deeming street vendors to be disorderly, unsanitary, and obsolete. Taking a single Chinese city as a case study, this research analyzes why and how local bureaucratic apparatuses apply rapidly-changing and ambiguous political treatment to street vendors. This research also examines street vendors’ struggles and coping strategies with these ever-changing politics.

The data for this study were obtained during a total of ten months of fieldwork, beginning in 2013 and ending in 2016. In-depth interviews were conducted with fifty-one street vendors and six government officials; additionally, the researcher consulted newspaper reports, archives, and relevant official publications.

First, regarding the governance of street vendors, the local administration has shifted their stance between two distinct patterns – suppression and tolerance – depending on the timing of certain political campaigns. Second, the corruption and laziness of government officials has provided niches for the revival of street vending after campaigns are over, though with limitations. Third, street vendors in China tend to be passive recipients of government suppression, unable to forge effective resistance because of a lack of strong leadership and general organization.

This research will add to the general understanding of the government-vendor relationship by revealing the complexity, uncertainty, and flexibility inherent in interactions between these two groups.

A climate of austerity has gripped the politico-economic philosophy of many nation states across Europe and beyond as governments seek to rebalance budget deficits. This presents unique challenges for those engaged in purposeful acts aiming to regenerate communities of places – the regeneration managers.

England provides an interesting case study to examine some of the prime challenges facing regeneration managers by focusing on the ideologies that have informed successive UK governments’ policy responses and spatial strategies. The main body of research, including interviews, was carried out between 2010 and 2012, and was subsequently updated in early 2013.

Tracing an apparent transmutation of urban regeneration policy, the chapter helps to unmask a spatially unjust neoliberal toolkit, albeit pierced by some socially motivated actually existing regeneration initiatives. The transmutation of regeneration that has taken place is often concealed by de facto austerity measures and austerity politics.

The programme of interviews remains ongoing, as the research continues to track the shifting contours of state-led regeneration policy. Analysis is therefore provisional and explorative, with more detailed research reports and publications subject to follow.

The chapter explores emerging new agendas and sets out to identify some of the primary challenges that regeneration managers must face.

‘Regeneration’ as a state-led policy objective and political concern has been virtually expunged from the Coalition lexicon. The present policy preference is to target public resources in ‘value-added’ schemes that favour private oriented objectives in a highly unbalanced way.

The curtailment of broader regeneration debates has framed discussions limited to the depth of cuts, the speed of implementation and the spatial distribution of such measures. The result is that regeneration, understood as a capitalist policy instrument intended to respond to and assuage the outcomes produced by capitalist frameworks, is no more.