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The Ural Mountain region is a remarkably beautiful landscape of forests and lakes. Here is the continental divide between Europe and Asia. One of the rivers originating here to eventually feed feeding the Artic Sea is the Techa river. But the verdant greenery that characterizes the region does not disclose the hidden dangers of plutonium and other radioactive materials either downstream or downwind of the Mayak Nuclear Complex. Major areas of the Techa river corridor and downwind areas were permanently evacuated after radioactive releases from the Mayak Nuclear Complex from the 1950s through the 1970s. Although acute and chronic water releases encompass this period, the so-called Kyshtim 57 accident, an air release from Mayak in 1957, was the word's worst nuclear accident until surpassed by Chernobyl (see Mironova et al. and Kutepova and Tsepilova, this volume). But what of the inhabitants who remain? In this chapter, we explore some of the psycho-social impacts of living in contaminated areas, drawing primarily upon interviews with residents of the region. In doing this, we give voice to their perspective and views on each other and life in this contaminated region.¹

Quality assurance (QA) with regard to structures, systems and components is also an important task during the design and operational phase of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste. The first step is to evaluate the technical design on the basis of a comprehensive safety assessment. The results of this evaluation can then be used in order to classify structures, systems and components into different QA areas. Type and volume of the necessary documentation depend on the relevance of the structures, systems and components to safety. Describes the application of this general procedure including design changes and maintenance aspects during operation, for the planned Konrad waste repository in Germany.

Japan's decision to release nuclear wastewater into the Pacific Ocean in 2023 has sparked strong opposition at home and abroad. In this study, Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) method is adopted to analyze the conflict problem, and reasonable equilibrium solutions are given to solve the conflict event.

In this study, GMCR is adopted to solve the conflict problem. First, identify the key decision-makers (DMs) on the issue of nuclear effluent and the relevant options they might adopt. Second, the options of each DM are arranged and combined to form a set of feasible states. Thirdly, the graph model is constructed according to the change of DM's options, and the relative preference of each DM is determined. Finally, the conflict problem is solved according to the definition of GMCR equilibrium.

Discharging nuclear wastewater into the ocean is not the right choice to solve the problem. Developing more space to store nuclear wastewater is more conducive to the protection of the ocean environment.

It is undesirable for the Japanese government to unilaterally discharge nuclear wastewater into the ocean. Objectively assessing the radioactivity of nuclear wastewater and the cooperation of relevant stakeholders can better solve this conflict.

The problem arising from Japan's releasing plan is complicated because of a lack of information and the existence of multiple stakeholders, while GMCR can help us with a better view of the current circumstance in the conflict.

This paper aims to investigate the major causes of the nuclear power plant (NPP) disasters since 1950, elucidates the commonalities between them and recommends strategies to minimize the risk of NPP disasters.

This paper analyzes facts from five case studies: Chernobyl disaster, USSR 1986; Fukushima Daiichi disaster, Japan 2011; Three Mile Island incident, USA 1979; Chalk River Accident, Canada 1952; and SL-1 Accident, USA 1961. A qualitative approach is adopted to compare and contrast the major reasons that led to the accidents, and consequent social and technological impacts of the disasters on environment, society, economy and nuclear industry are analyzed.

Although each of the nuclear accidents is unique in terms of its occurrence and impacts, this research study found some common causes behind the accidents. Faulty system design, equipment failure, inadequate safety and warning systems, violation of safety regulations, lack of training of the nuclear operators and ignorance from the operators and regulators side were found to be the major common causes behind the accidents.

This paper recommends some of the nuclear disaster risk reduction strategies in terms of “lessons learned from the past accidents”. The findings of the research paper would serve as an information tool for the nuclear professionals for informed decision-making and planning for proper preventive measures well in advance so that the mistakes which led to the occurrence of accidents in the past are not repeated in the future.

An environmental radioactivity monitoring programme has been established around the Tuwaitha nuclear site, Baghdad, Iraq, to ensure the safety of the public living around the site and to prove that the nuclear facilities operate within the limits set by competent Iraqi Authorities and international environmental protection standards. Exposure rate measurements were carried out with portable monitors. Gamma spectrometric analysis of environmental samples (soil, vegetables, fruits, and water) was carried out to ensure that radionuclides expected to be released from the site are not concentrated in the environment. The results of the monitoring programme indicated that the average exposure rate was similar to that of the background radiation in Iraq. Furthermore, some environmental samples contained very low‐activity concentrations of Cs‐137.

The radiological consequences on the population of a borax accident in 1994 in the Tammuz 2 nuclear reactor have been postulated. Dose equivalents resulting from the atmospheric release of radionuclides during the accident have been estimated for distances ranging from the exclusion zone to 100km from the reactor. Gamma submersion, beta submersion doses from the plume, inhalation doses and surface exposure doses have been estimated for various exposure times. Dose equivalents estimated for the site boundary for an exposure time of 24 hours were 1.42 − 10mSv. Accordingly, it seemed that the consequences of the accident on the population living around Tuwaitha site could only take the form of stochastic radiation, such as the induction of cancers, and heredity.

Emergency situations may differ in many ways but they share some common characteristics, such as the sudden onset and the need to transparently evaluate various usually conflicting objectives. In nuclear power generation, however, emergency situations constitute a special challenge. The focus of this paper is to highlight the role of multi‐criteria decision analysis (MCDA) in nuclear emergency and recovery management on the basis of a hypothetical case study.

Multi‐attribute value theory as one field of research within MCDA is introduced. Special emphasis is placed on the modelling of the decision makers' preferences which is a crucial part in any multi‐criteria analysis. A central aim is to facilitate the preference elicitation in group decision processes.

The management of emergency situations in nuclear power generation necessitates the consideration of technical, economic, environmental, socio‐psychological and political aspects. Furthermore, various stakeholder and expert groups with diverse background knowledge and different views, responsibilities and interests are involved in such a decision‐making process. MCDA can help to take into account various incommensurable aspects and the subjective preferences of the decision makers and thus contribute to transparency and traceability of decision‐making processes. Since the preference parameters are inherently afflicted with uncertainties, thorough sensitivity analyses are important to visualise the impact of the uncertainties in an understandable way.

A new approach to sensitivity analysis is proposed, allowing one to comprehensibly visualise and communicate the impact of the uncertainties associated with the subjective preference parameters on the results of the decision analysis.

This study aims to illustrate the special liability regime applying to a nuclear operator for damage caused to individuals, property and natural resources, after the United Arab Emirates (UAE) implemented the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963 through Federal Law No. 4 of 2012. This paper contrasts this special regime with the default regime of civil liability set out in the UAE Civil Code. The comparison helps clarify the legal nature of nuclear operator liability, the extent of protection it affords to the parties injured in a nuclear incident, the conditions under which it obtains, as well as the different damage headings it allows.

This paper is a desk-based legal research.

The main novelties enshrined in the special liability regime for nuclear facility operators are the adoption of an objective approach (strict liability) and the introduction of exceptions different from those contemplated in the default regime spelled out in the UAE Civil Code, thereby affording greater protection to victims of nuclear leakages.

This paper is a first in-depth commentary of UAE Federal Law No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Considering the UAE’s dualistic approach to the implementation of international obligations, and the present lack of reliable alternative avenues towards compensation beyond private operator liability, the overview provided here will be of value to regional and international practitioners – including from neighbouring countries to the UAE (Oman, Qatar, Bahrain) – that are not currently signatories to any convention on nuclear liability.

The post-Cold War period allowed the U.S. nuclear legacy of ecocide to be declassified and made public. The policy of nuclear secrecy, evident in Russia (see Mironova et al., this volume), was not merely an eastern practice. Western nuclear releases were kept equally under wraps. In England, for example, the Windscale disaster was not fully disclosed until 1987.¹ Likewise, releases from the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, in Washington State, and other U.S. nuclear sites were kept undercover until the same period. The irony was that Americans learned of many of the nuclear skeletons in their closet around the time that Russians learned of theirs (see Mironova et al., this volume). It would appear that glasnost was contagious.

In the cold war era, perhaps there were no greater heroes of the Soviet Union than the as many as 700,000 firefighters, workers, and military personnel who fought the blazing fires at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor that burned out of control for months until smothered by a makeshift concrete structure, called the “sarcophagus” built to contain radioactive releases. Whether this sarcophagus will last as long as the Egyptian monuments, its name evokes has been a matter of grave continuing concern. And it is doubtful that its symbolism as a lasting evidence of 20th century life will be equally appreciated through the ages. But in April 26, 1986, northern Europe had been placed in dire peril by the catastrophic accident in the number 4 reactor at Chernobyl. Smoke pouring from the fires lofted high in the sky to carry radioactive contaminants eventually across the Northern Hemisphere. Some 100 million curies of radiation were released within 10 days of the initial explosion, comprising the word's worst civilian radiation release (Lawrence Livermore, 1999). And, the reactor threatened to unleash a nuclear explosion that would have dwarfed the effects of what already was the world's worst nuclear accident. The situation demanded extreme sacrifice (see also Zykova, this volume).