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The extant literature recognizes that trade credit is influenced by the power imbalance between buyers and suppliers but most studies focus on either buyer power or supplier power. The purpose of this study is to investigate how buyer power and supplier power interact and jointly influence trade credit. Moreover, this study examines the moderating effects of political ties in an emerging economy context.

A research framework was developed by combining resource dependence theory and institutional theory to investigate the interactive effects of market power (i.e. market share and supplier concentration) and non-market power (i.e. political ties) on trade credit. The proposed hypotheses were empirically tested by a fixed effects model using secondary data from 2,433 listed firms in China.

The results show that a buyer firm's market share promotes trade credit but this effect is weakened by supplier concentration. Moreover, the buyer's political ties enhance the impact of market share on trade credit and attenuate the negative moderating effect of supplier concentration.

This study contributes to the trade credit and supply chain power literature by identifying the interactive effects of market share, supplier concentration and political ties in trade credit. It advances our understanding of how trade credit is jointly determined by a variety of factors in emerging economies.

This paper aims to examine the effect of product market competition on firms’ unethical behavior (FUB) in the Chinese insurance industry and to further explore the boundary conditions of the main effects. On the basis of China’s commercial foundation, the study constructs a conceptual framework of FUB by drawing from the perspective of horizontal competition.

Data were collected from 52 property insurance firms at the branch level observed over the six-year period, 2011-2016. Within this framework, market power and market concentration were used to describe product market competition at firm and industry levels, respectively. The moderating effect of market munificence was analyzed to reveal the theoretical boundaries of the main effect. By drawing upon cost–benefit analysis and social network theory, the study used negative binomial model and Poisson model to quantitatively examine the relationship.

The relationship between product market competition and FUB is curvilinear. Especially at the firm level, market power exhibits a U-shape relationship with FUB; at the industry level, market concentration exhibits a U-shape relationship with FUB. In addition, market munificence positively moderates the impact of firm’s market power on FUB, whereas, market munificence negatively moderates the impact of industrial market concentration on FUB.

This paper explored a new type of unethical behavior that concerns consumers or the third party by emphasizing horizontal competitive contexts; it also provides a better understanding of the FUB–financial performance relationship from the perspective of competition. The moderating effects suggest that when the cause of FUB is different (market power vs market concentration), firms may make opposite ethical choice. However, the sample is from a single industry; it will be fruitful to further verify these findings in other industries such as the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the definition of FUB is confined to explicit forms such as participation or collusion but there is no way to measure the implicit forms of FUB.

First, the governance of FUB should not only focus on the firms themselves, but also take into account the industrial market structure. Second, proper use of governance measures for FUB can increase firms’ benefits from “compliance with the law”, enticing firms to decrease FUB. The third, firms with weak market positions, facing fierce competition, should not be involved in FUB for short-term benefit; indeed, a low-cost strategy can be adopted as the dominant competitive strategy. While, in cases of highly concentrated market structure, firms should strive to avoid involvement in FUB through collusion with other rivals.

As it is a very common phenomenon that firms in competitive relationships may adopt FUB toward third parties or consumers, this trend has become a hot topic in the economic and social development in China. The study’s conclusions reveal that a more proactive and ambitious ethical decision is desirable for all kinds of firms; moreover, firms should make a rational choice between “short-term interest” and “long-term survival”. When firms identify the compliance of business ethics as an opportunity to differentiate themselves and perceive the benefits of decreasing FUB as outweighing the costs, the level of FUB will be inhibited, and social welfare will increase.

The primary contribution of this research resides in identifying product market competition as a previously unexplored predictor of FUB, thus revealing the dark side of product market competition. In addition, nonlinear relationships between product market competition and FUB indicate that situations of competition exert an important influence on FUB both at the firm and industry level. This paper’s conclusion provides a more meticulous theoretical explanation for FUB. This research demonstrates that the traditional ethical framework is not sufficient to explain FUB in a horizontal competitive context. Indeed, resource constraints and competitive pressures should also be considered.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the major international audit firms reach collusive agreements in Spain, in order to exercise market power and impose higher prices than those of competitors. According to the traditional theory of oligopoly, the ability to achieve these agreements is dependent primarily on the high level of market concentration, so that multiple studies have analysed the relationship between concentration and prices. However, the concentration has serious limitations to infer collusion and therefore the exercise of market power (Dedman and Lennox, 2009).

Based on an alternative current of the theory of industrial organisation, the authors use measures of industrial mobility as a measure of collusion or rivalry of firms in oligopolistic markets.

The results reveal that international audit firms do not reach collusive agreements to limit competition between them.

According to the empirical evidence obtained, the measures taken by the regulatory bodies to avoid market concentration would not be necessary or efficient and they would have significant costs for the audit market (GAO, 2003, 2008; FRC, 2009; European Commission, 2010; Competition Commission, 2013).

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to introduce mobility measures to explain market collusion and the exercise of market power in the audit market.

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si las Grandes Firmas Internacionales de auditoría alcanzan acuerdos colusivos en España con la finalidad de ejercer poder de mercado e imponer precios superiores a los de los competidores. Según la teoría tradicional del oligopolio, la capacidad para alcanzar estos acuerdos se hace depender fundamentalmente del alto nivel de concentración del mercado, por lo que múltiples estudios han analizado la relación entre concentración y precios. Sin embargo, la concentración presenta serias limitaciones para inferir la colusión y, por tanto, el ejercicio del poder de mercado (Dedman y Lennox, 2009).

Basándonos en una corriente alternativa de la teoría de la organización industrial, utilizamos medidas de movilidad industrial como medida de la colusión o rivalidad de las empresas en mercados oligopolistas.

Nuestros resultados revelan que las firmas internacionales de auditoría no alcanzan acuerdos colusivos para limitar la competencia entre ellas.

Según la evidencia empírica que obtenemos, las medidas adoptadas por los organismos reguladores con la finalidad de desconcentrar el mercado, las cuales presentan importantes costes para el mercado de auditoría, no resultarían ni necesarias ni eficientes (GAO, 2003, 2008; FRC, 2009; Comisión Europea, 2010; Competition Commission, 2013).

Hasta donde conocemos, éste es el primer estudio que introduce medidas de movilidad del mercado para explicar la colusión y el ejercicio del poder de mercado en el mercado de auditoría.

This study aims to examine how changes in power disparity shape in-groups and upper-level management conflict are associated with intragroup relationship and task conflict variations. It also examines how workplace conflicts relate to focal employees’ perceptions of coworker support.

Data were collected from 3,343 respondents for nine years, comprising measurements taken on six occasions in 47 departments and stores of a Canadian retailer. The relationships between, within and across levels were tested using multilevel structural equation modeling.

The results showed that higher levels of power concentration vested by a few members or a single person are associated wih higher levels of intragroup conflict than usual. Furthermore, higher levels of task and relationship conflicts at upper management levels are associated with higher-than-usual task and relationship conflicts between nonhierarchical employees. Additionally, a higher-than-usual intragroup task conflict level was associated with lower-than-usual coworker support, supporting the proposed multilevel dynamic model.

An important limitation of this study is that all variables are self-reported despite using the six-wave repeated measurements, thereby increasing the possibility of inflating some observed relationships. Future research should examine the emergence of a larger spectrum of power dispersion configurations and their role on process conflict.

Retail managers should legitimize why a high-power concentration occurs when the equal distribution of power is not possible and find ways to minimize the trickle-down effects of conflicts at upper levels on their subordinates.

This study examines the effect of variability on power configurations and conflict in upper management ranks on conflict dynamic. The findings show that a high-power concentration elicits increasing conflicts, and that there is no empirical evidence that intragroup conflict is associated with positive outcomes.

This study aims to investigate the impact of family ownership on cooperative research and development (R&D). Drawing on the ability and willingness paradox framework in family business research, the authors suggest that family ownership influences cooperative R&D via two opposing mechanisms: power concentration and wealth concentration. It also deepens the current understanding of the boundary conditions of informal institutions for the impact of family ownership on cooperative R&D by investigating the moderating role of political ties.

The authors analyze a panel of 610 Chinese manufacturing family firms and 2,127 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2017. Fixed effects regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses, with the two-stage Heckman model to address sample selection bias.

The research findings indicate that family ownership has an inverted U-shaped relationship with cooperative R&D and political ties moderate the relationship in such a way that the inverted U-shaped relationship will be steeper in firms with more political ties than in firms with fewer political ties.

Family ownership influences firms’ cooperative R&D through the positive effect of power concentration and the negative effect of wealth concentration. Family owners should, therefore, take advantage of concentrated power, for instance, by adapting quickly and committing sufficient resources to cooperative R&D opportunities, while controlling path-dependent relationship development caused by concentrated family wealth. The effect of political ties on the relationship between family ownership and cooperative R&D is found to be a double-edged sword.

This study extends the ability and willingness paradox framework and provides novel insights into cooperative R&D in family businesses by integrating power concentration and wealth concentration associated with family ownership. Moreover, this study provides a contingency perspective and introduces the moderating role of political ties in shaping cooperative R&D in family firms.

The purpose of this paper is to present another historical case that supports the theory that power equality – and not power inequality – reduces international tension and makes the world more peaceful.

The paper refers to two mathematical models that back this theory and focuses on the case of the American and Soviet military expenditures during the last 25 years of the superpowers' rivalry. Both datasets are adjusted for inflation and expressed in constant US dollars. The 25‐year interval is divided into two main subintervals into the basis of data characteristics, and four regression lines are determined.

The regression lines of the US and USSR military expenditures corresponding to the first‐time interval intersect in 1971, when the main decisions regarding the SALT Treaty were made. The same lines for the second interval intersect in 1989, when the Cold War ended. The USA decided to escalate the Vietnam War during the period in which their military expenditures were significantly higher than the Soviet ones. Similarly, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan when its military expenditures were considerably bigger than the American ones. Subsequently, it is possible to affirm that the 1976‐1991 US‐USSR arms race is another important empirical case that supports the theory asserting that power equalization reduces international tension.

By using three simple statistical techniques – adjustment for inflation, determination of the relevant regression lines, and calculation of intersection points – the paper shows that two sets of highly significant empirical data reinforce the theory that power equalization reduces international tension.

This paper aims to examine the effects of financial freedom and competition on bank profitability.

The study uses system generalized method of moments and data from 139 banks across 11 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 2006-2012.

The results of the study show that higher market power (less competition) is positively related to bank profitability, but operating efficiency is a more important determinant of profitability than market power. Also, both financial freedom and economic freedom show a positive impact on bank profits. The authors find evidence that banks with higher market power operating in countries with higher freedom for banking activities are more profitable than their counterparts in countries with greater restrictions on banking activities.

The results have shown that allowing banks greater freedom to operate would enhance their performance, without necessarily damaging the economy, as operating efficiency appears to be a more important reason for the observed profitability than market power.

This study provides insight on the ambiguous relationship between competition and bank profitability by considering the moderating effect of financial freedom which has not been taken into account in previous studies.

The study aims to analyze the changes in banking market structure and their impact on the bank efficiency.

This study uses a one-stage stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to compare the impact of the market structure and the GFC on the economic efficiency of the major banks in both countries.

A significant negative impact of the GFC is observed on bank efficiency. Overall, Canadian banks posted better efficiency scores than their American counterparts. Additionally, cost-efficient banks are found to be more resilient to crises and more profit-efficient in the post-GFC period. The authors found that market power had a positive impact on the cost and profit efficiency of banks. Higher levels of equity, market power and concentration helped banks be more cost-efficient.

Only large banks are selected for study although it represents the majority stake of both banking sectors.

Banking regulators should include more measures to assess the banking market structure and performance.

As per the best knowledge of the authors, it is the first study to assess the change in banking market structure and efficiency of the US and Canadian banking sectors in the post-GFC period.