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The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the major international audit firms reach collusive agreements in Spain, in order to exercise market power and impose higher prices than those of competitors. According to the traditional theory of oligopoly, the ability to achieve these agreements is dependent primarily on the high level of market concentration, so that multiple studies have analysed the relationship between concentration and prices. However, the concentration has serious limitations to infer collusion and therefore the exercise of market power (Dedman and Lennox, 2009).

Based on an alternative current of the theory of industrial organisation, the authors use measures of industrial mobility as a measure of collusion or rivalry of firms in oligopolistic markets.

The results reveal that international audit firms do not reach collusive agreements to limit competition between them.

According to the empirical evidence obtained, the measures taken by the regulatory bodies to avoid market concentration would not be necessary or efficient and they would have significant costs for the audit market (GAO, 2003, 2008; FRC, 2009; European Commission, 2010; Competition Commission, 2013).

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to introduce mobility measures to explain market collusion and the exercise of market power in the audit market.

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si las Grandes Firmas Internacionales de auditoría alcanzan acuerdos colusivos en España con la finalidad de ejercer poder de mercado e imponer precios superiores a los de los competidores. Según la teoría tradicional del oligopolio, la capacidad para alcanzar estos acuerdos se hace depender fundamentalmente del alto nivel de concentración del mercado, por lo que múltiples estudios han analizado la relación entre concentración y precios. Sin embargo, la concentración presenta serias limitaciones para inferir la colusión y, por tanto, el ejercicio del poder de mercado (Dedman y Lennox, 2009).

Basándonos en una corriente alternativa de la teoría de la organización industrial, utilizamos medidas de movilidad industrial como medida de la colusión o rivalidad de las empresas en mercados oligopolistas.

Nuestros resultados revelan que las firmas internacionales de auditoría no alcanzan acuerdos colusivos para limitar la competencia entre ellas.

Según la evidencia empírica que obtenemos, las medidas adoptadas por los organismos reguladores con la finalidad de desconcentrar el mercado, las cuales presentan importantes costes para el mercado de auditoría, no resultarían ni necesarias ni eficientes (GAO, 2003, 2008; FRC, 2009; Comisión Europea, 2010; Competition Commission, 2013).

Hasta donde conocemos, éste es el primer estudio que introduce medidas de movilidad del mercado para explicar la colusión y el ejercicio del poder de mercado en el mercado de auditoría.

The purpose of this document is to show the effects of globalization on the workers of the electronics cluster in the state of Jalisco. It begins with the assumption that the globalization has impacted the interests of the workers in their working conditions and created the precarization of workers. The text is divided in three sections: the first section presents the characteristics of the electronics cluster; the second section outlines a profile of the workers of this industry, and the last one presents the results of the precarization of work.

The study aimed to determine how reputational risk affects the stocks prices of companies listed on the Lima Stock Exchange.

The study follows a documentary research with a quantitative approach. Companies from different sectors listed on the Lima Stock Exchange were taken as a sample.

The incidence between the reputational risk and the stock price of the companies listed on the stock market, as well as the impact on profitability indicators and income level were demonstrated. Additionally, it was determined that the cost of capital has a greater impact if the entity is financed from the issuance of bonds rather than by subsidiaries.

Companies that presented well-known events in Peru and those that caused damage to their corporate reputations were studied. Likewise, information from sources such as Monitor Empresarial de Reputación Corporativa, Peruvian Securities Market Regulator’s office and Lima Stock Exchange was documented in order to analyze the variations in financial indicators during the indicated events. Financial models such as CAPM and GORDON-SHAPIRO were also used.