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Motivated by the real-world practice that the boom of the online selling induces a higher product return as well, selecting which online channel mode indicates who takes ownership over the product and thus bears the loss of the product return. This paper aims to seek the optimal online channel modes for the two members in a platform supply chain in the presence of product returns.

This study aims to develop a platform supply chain that consists of one platform company and one supplier. Along with an offline distribution channel, the supplier can choose two alternative online selling modes (i.e. the reselling and agency modes) to sell its product through the online marketplace. This paper applies Stackelberg game to derive the equilibrium with different business scenarios and selects the optimal online channel modes for two parties, respectively. Moreover, this paper extends to a different supply chain with a reverse channel leadership and a different product return policy for testing the robustness.

Several interesting and important results are derived in this paper. Firstly, it is found that the relative pricing are largely relied on the costs of two channels. Secondly, the platform supply chain may benefit from a pure channel rather than the dual-channel when this channel enjoys a relatively low cost and/or a sufficiently high consumer preference. Then, the platform and the supplier act contradictorily when selecting their optimal online channel modes. To be specific, the platform motivates to choose the online reselling mode when both the commission rate and the slotting fee are relatively low, whereas the supplier is likely to select the online agency mode under this circumstance. Finally, a win-win situation in regards to the optimal online channel mode for two parties is achievable with numerical experiments.

Based on the analytical studies, the results derived in the authors’ work can provide managerial insights to assist the supplier and the platform company in determining the operational decision and selecting the optimal online channel mode to deal with consumer returns. In addition, appropriate commission rate along with slotting fee will make both parties achieve a win-win situation in determining their optimal online channel mode.

To the authors’ best knowledge, this paper makes the first move to determine the optimal online channel mode in the content of consumer returns and study how it is affected by different product return policies.

In most economies, there are rules from the market regulators or government to sell at an equal wholesale price (EWP). But when one upstream channel is facing a negative demand disruption and another positive, EWP can create extra pressure on the disadvantageous supply chain partner, which faces negative disruption. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of EWP and the scope of the discriminatory wholesale price (DWP) during disruptions.

For the study, the authors used a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, online retailer (OR) and traditional brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer. Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the upstream and downstream channel partners, and the horizontal Nash game to analyse the interaction within downstream channel partners. For modelling asymmetric disruption, the authors took instances from the lock-down and post-lock-down periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, where consumers flow from BM retailer to OR store.

By analysing the disruption period, the authors found that this asymmetric disruption is detrimental to the BM channel, favourable to OR and has no impact on the manufacturer. But with DWP, the authors found that the profit of the BM channel and manufacturer can be increased during disruption. Though the profit of the OR decreased, it was found to be higher than in the pre-disruption period. Under DWP, the consumer surplus increased during disruption, making it favourable for the customers also. Thus, DWP can aid in creating a win-win strategy for all the supply chain partners during asymmetric disruption. Later as an extension to the study, the authors analysed the impact of the consumer transfer factor and found that it plays a crucial role in the optimal decisions of the channel partner during DWP.

Very scant literature analyses the intersection of DWP and disruptions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time uses DWP as a tool to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruptions. The study findings will assist the government, market regulators and manufacturers in revamping the wholesale pricing policies and strategies to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruption.

Different external supply scenarios faced by the retailers will affect their choice of strategy when supply is disrupted and becomes far less than demand, urgently. This study focuses on analyzing both demand and supply side response strategies to meet customer demand and reduce the impact of the shortage during supply disruptions.

According to the quantity of products that the external market can provide, the external supply scenarios were divided into sufficient-type external supply and learning-type external supply. A two-echelon perishable goods supply chain was analyzed, and three kinds of contingency strategy models for downstream retailers were investigated. First, in the sufficient external supply scenario, the optimal price and transshipment quantity to maximize retailer's profits is discussed. Second, in the scenario of learning-type external supply, this study analyzes the optimal decision in three mechanisms of the hybrid strategy and their application: price priority mechanism, quantity priority mechanism and price–quantity balance mechanism. Furthermore, the influence of penalty cost and supply on the priority orders of different mechanisms was studied.

Results show that comparing the two pure strategies (pricing strategy and transshipment strategy)it was noted that the hybrid strategy produces the best results in sufficient-type external supply scenario. In the learning-type external supply scenario, a numerical study has shown the existence of three areas in case of penalty cost and supplier's capacity, and each areas has different priority orders of the three mechanisms. Under the situation of learning external supply, the retailer's optimal strategy is affected by parameters such as penalty cost and supply volume.

The main innovation of the work lies in the following: First; the external supply situation was divided into sufficiency type and learning type, which improves the external situation faced by retailers after the outbreak of emergencies, helps retailers understand the external situation, conforms to the actual situation and has certain practical application value. Second; in the context of learning external supply, there are three coping strategies for retailers, including: Price priority mechanism, Quantity priority mechanism and Pricing and transshipment balance mechanism. This will help retailers make strategic choices, make more scientific management decisions and improve the supply chain emergency management theory. Third; the demand side response was managed through the change of external supply during supply side recovery period and supply disruption. The proposed model enables managing and analyzing supply disruption efficiently and effectively via handling uncertainty by considering all aspects of decision-making process. The proposed model can be applied in various fields such as vegetable and fruit, fresh food, etc.

The paper attempts to discuss the impact of reference price effect on pricing decisions.

With the growth of the Internet and e-commerce, more and more customers purchase products in through online channels and choose products by comparing different prices and services, and the reference price effect has an impact on pricing decisions. To investigate the impact of consumers' reference price effect on the dual-channel supply chain, the authors establish a basic model consisting of a single dominant manufacturer and a single downstream retailer, and analyze the optional decisions under different situations and discuss the influence of reference price effect. Finally, a number case verifies the validity and rationality of the proposed model.

The results show that (1) the reference price effect has varying effects on the price, channel demand and income of manufacturers and retailers in the channel depending on the role of customers' channel preferences. (2) The manufacturer's online channel demand and profits always increase with the reference pricing effect, whereas the retailer's offline demand and profits always decline. (3) When the proportion of consumers preferring offline is higher, the manufacturer's network price and wholesale price increase with the reference price effect, while the retailer's retail price decreases with the reference price effect; when the proportion of consumers preferring offline is lower, the opposite is true, and the centralized decision results are consistent with the decentralized decision results.

This paper can clarify the impact of consumer reference price effects on the operation of dual-channel supply chains, and help inform pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers in dual-channel supply chains.

The proposed approach can well analyze the impact of consumer reference price effect and give channel their optional decisions.

This paper explores how the manufacturer’s strategic choice (acquisition or investment) impacts product quality in a supply chain comprising two complementary suppliers and a common manufacturer.

The manufacturer faces six strategic choices to improve product quality: acquiring or investing in the high-capable supplier, the low-capable supplier, or both. As the Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer determines which strategy is adopted, while suppliers are separately responsible for components’ quality and wholesale prices. The authors use game theory and calculate the model with Mathematica.

The authors develop analytical models to analyze how acquisition costs, investment proportions, component importance and quality improvement coefficients influence decision-makers. The results show that the highest quality may not benefit the manufacturer. Investing in or acquiring a low-capable supplier is better than a high-capable supplier under certain conditions. If the gaps between two suppliers’ quality improvement coefficients and the importance of two components are dramatic, the manufacturer should choose an investment strategy.

This study contributes to the complementary supply chain management by comparing two kinds of strategies-acquisition and investment, with a high-capable supplier and a low-capable supplier.

This paper aims to identify the conditions under which encroachment is a viable strategy for a manufacturer to gain competitive advantage and achieve higher profitability in the presence of the store-brand.

This paper proposes game-theoretic models in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (him) and a retailer (her), in which he distributes his national brand through the retailer, and endogenously determines whether to establish a new direct sales channel to sell the national brand when the retailer introduces her store-brand.

Analytical results show that the bar for the manufacturer to encroach the end market in the presence of the store-brand is always higher than that for him to encroach in the absence of the store-brand. Although incurring channel competition, encroaching with the national brand in the presence of the retailer's store-brand can lead to either a win-lose or win-win result for the manufacturer and the retailer. Numerical studies claim that, higher brand substitution can push down the retailer's enthusiasm to introduce her new brand. Counterintuitively, when the retailer introduces her store-brand, higher brand substitution does not necessarily push up the manufacturer's enthusiasm to respond with national-brand encroachment. When consumer preferences for the two brands are heterogeneous, a higher consumer preference for the retailer's store-brand results in the retailer's higher enthusiasm to introduce her store-brand and the manufacturer's lower enthusiasm to encroach with his national brand.

This study can help researchers to better understand the retailer's store-brand introduction, manufacturer encroachment and their interaction theoretically, and further provide decision support for enterprises to choose brand and channel strategies in practice.

The expansion of bike-sharing enterprises has led to a series of social problems, and due to the high breakage rate and high recycling cost of bike sharing, enterprises are reluctant to maintain them. Therefore, government regulation does play a leading role in maintaining bike sharing. This study’s purpose is to investigate how the government should regulate the bike-sharing enterprises that maintain bicycles.

Firstly, the authors assume that there is only one bike-sharing enterprise and establish a game model that the government regulates the enterprise. Furthermore, the authors extend the model to the case that there are two competing enterprises in the market. Finally, through numerical analysis, the influence of various factors on the government strategy and revenue is analyzed.

The authors find that the regulatory probability of two enterprises are regulated by the government is larger than that of one enterprise. When two bike-sharing enterprises compete without government regulation, both will choose the non-self-discipline strategy, thus falling into the Prisoner's Dilemma. If the government regulates them, then both enterprises will choose the self-discipline strategy. Finally, through numerical analysis, it is found that the self-discipline behavior of bike-sharing enterprises is related to the government regulatory probability, the cost of self-discipline, the probability of being reported and the penalties. Interestingly, the cost of government regulation will not affect the regulation probability of government.

This research provides a theoretical reference for the government to make the regulation strategies of bike sharing and achieve the sustainable development of bike sharing.

This research provides a theoretical reference for the government to make the regulation strategies of bike sharing and achieve the sustainable development of bike sharing.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

This survey explores the application of real options theory to the field of health economics. The integration of options theory offers a valuable framework to address these challenges, providing insights into healthcare investments, policy analysis and patient care pathways.

This research employs the real options theory, a financial concept, to delve into health economics challenges. Through a systematic approach, three distinct models rooted in this theory are crafted and analyzed. Firstly, the study examines the value of investing in emerging health technology, factoring in future advantages, associated costs and unpredictability. The second model is patient-centric, evaluating the choice between immediate treatment switch and waiting for more clarity, while also weighing the associated risks. Lastly, the research assesses pandemic-related government policies, emphasizing the importance of delaying decisions in the face of uncertainties, thereby promoting data-driven policymaking.

Three different real options models are presented in this study to illustrate their applicability and value in aiding decision-makers. (1) The first evaluates investments in new technology, analyzing future benefits, discount rates and benefit volatility to determine investment value. (2) In the second model, a patient has the option of switching treatments now or waiting for more information before optimally switching treatments. However, waiting has its risks, such as disease progression. By modeling the potential benefits and risks of both options, and factoring in the time value, this model aids doctors and patients in making informed decisions based on a quantified assessment of potential outcomes. (3) The third model concerns pandemic policy: governments can end or prolong lockdowns. While awaiting more data on the virus might lead to economic and societal strain, the model emphasizes the economic value of deferring decisions under uncertainty.

This research provides a quantified perspective on various decisions in healthcare, from investments in new technology to treatment choices for patients to government decisions regarding pandemics. By applying real options theory, stakeholders can make more evidence-driven decisions.

Decisions about patient care pathways and pandemic policies have direct societal implications. For instance, choices regarding the prolongation or ending of lockdowns can lead to economic and societal strain.

The originality of this study lies in its application of real options theory, a concept from finance, to the realm of health economics, offering novel insights and analytical tools for decision-makers in the healthcare sector.

The rapidly growing e-commerce industry with its special characteristics brings new challenges to the optimization of the supply chain and inventory management. This study aims to investigate the inventory-related optimization of an e-marketplace official store that works on a business-to-customer system when cashback promotion is used to attract more customers. Also, it proposes a new inventory model to maximize the e-commerce profit by optimizing the cashback amount and delivery period.

The proposed model assumes that customer demand is a function of price and delivery time and that price is affected by the cashback amount. The e-commerce operator has a profit-sharing contract with an e-payment company that facilitates the payment. E-commerce also builds collaboration under a cost-sharing contract with a supplier to ensure product delivery. A mathematical model is developed and the related theories are investigated. A numerical example illustrates the validity of the model and a sensitivity analysis is carried out to give useful insights.

A new inventory model for an e-market system has been introduced which shows the impact of a cashback promotion on the e-commerce business. This study shows that managers can optimize the cashback amount and its delivery time to get the maximum profit. In certain cases, the manager may set a high cashback amount (e.g. 100%) to attract customers to place more orders.

This study presents a new inventory model for today’s fast-growing e-commerce business; therefore, the results contribute to the understanding of promotion program practices and inventory management and provide insights to develop efficient e-commerce managerial decisions.