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Motivated by the real-world practice of the thriving e-commerce, manufacturers are transcending traditional boundaries of merely producing and selling directly by implementing encroachment. Concurrently, supply chain (SC) members who overlook the corporate social responsibility (CSR) sharing will be left behind, which is closely linked to their profits. This paper aims to investigate a better way to share CSR under the scenarios of manufacturer encroachment and no-encroachment.

This paper constructs game-theoretic models in a SC consisting of a manufacturer (M) and a retailer (R), where the manufacturer can sell products by retailing, and may sell directly by implicating encroachment. The manufacturer and retailer jointly consider whether to share CSR and the proportion of it by taking consumer surplus into account. Furthermore, equilibriums for each model are derived using backward induction. Then, the authors analyse the impact of CSR sharing proportion and compare the equilibrium outcomes under different scenarios. Finally, the numerical analyses are presented to verify the results.

Several interesting results are found in this paper. First, the retailer shares more CSR can benefit SC members and social welfare when the manufacturer does not implement encroachment. However, the results may change which is decided by the unit cost of encroachment when the manufacturer does so. Second, the proportion of CSR shared by manufacturer and the unit cost of encroachment has an interactive impact on equilibrium outcomes. Finally, both manufacturer encroachment and SC members share CSR may be the best for the perspective of SC members and consumers.

Based on the analytical results, this paper provides novel managerial implications to assist manufacturer and retailer in determining the optimal strategies for CSR sharing and encroachment. Furthermore, the appropriate proportion of CSR shared by manufacturer and the unit cost of encroachment may let manufacturer, retailer and consumer surplus achieve a win-win-win situation.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to explore the strategy of CSR sharing under the scenarios of manufacturer encroachment and no-encroachment.

With the development of e-commerce and mobile payment, platform sales become unstoppable, and many manufacturers also encroach on online market by establishing direct selling channels. Channel conflict intensifies in online market and quality differentiation and is widely used in business practice as an effective way to alleviate such a competition. The authors study a retail platform's sales strategy and interactions with an upstream manufacturer's encroachment strategy in this paper. Unlike most online marketplace and encroachment research, product quality selection is also engaged in the present research to capture the motivation above.

The authors analyze a game-theoretical model that the platform as the first/second mover participates in strategic decision-making, and then jointly decides the product quality level with manufacturer.

The authors find that encroachment always profits the manufacturer and almost hurts the platform. Interestingly, the first-mover advantage can help the platform guide the manufacturer encroachment and promote a “win–win” situation when product quality level is relatively slight or obvious. Nevertheless, the second-mover advantage can help the platform alleviate the profit loss caused by encroachment when product quality level is moderate. Furthermore, suffered from encroachment loss, the platform can make a credible threat by sales termination to restrain manufacturer encroachment.

This paper innovatively explores the strategic interaction between manufacturer encroachment and quality differentiation in a platform supply chain, and further analyzes the first-mover advantage in this interaction, which fills the gaps of previous platform research and has great significances to enterprise production and operational decision in business practice.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate manufacturer encroachment and distributor encroachment in a three-echelon supply chain consisting of an upside manufacturer, an intermediate distributor and a downside retailer.

In this paper, the authors use the optimization theory to mathematize the proposed question and build a model. First, the authors consider sequential quantity decisions, where the encroacher decides on the direct selling quantity after determining the retailer's order quantity. Second, the authors relax this sequential decision process assumption by reconsidering a circumstance in which quantity decisions are decided simultaneously.

In contrast to previous studies, this study shows that in three-echelon supply chains, the upside firm is more likely to encroach compared with the downside firm. The “bright side” of encroachment exists for all players only when the encroachment cost is at a moderate level. However, in manufacturer encroachment under simultaneous quantity decisions, the “bright side” skips the distributor but benefits the retailer directly as the encroachment cost increases from zero to a certain level. The main reason lies in that the distributor loses its pricing power because the end-market has been disturbed by the simultaneous quantity decisions. A comparison of the results of sequential and simultaneous quantity decisions reveals the merit of simultaneous quantity decisions. The authors find that the intermediate role (the distributor in our model) in three-echelon supply chains may benefit more from simultaneous quantity decisions. That is, the distributor may achieve a better profit even in a market with intensified competition.

The findings of this paper contribute to the marketing science literature on encroachment. The majority of existing literature has focused on manufacturer encroachment in two-echelon supply chains. This paper innovatively investigates and compares manufacturer encroachment and distributor encroachment in a three-echelon supply chain.

Eco-innovation products, which means achieving more efficient and responsible use of resources and reducing the detrimental impact on the environment, can win a competitive advantage for the enterprises. But it is not easy to implement due to the high cost of eco-innovative technologies development, the uncertainty of market needs and return risk of investment. Many enterprises seek collaborations from their upstream suppliers to jointly carry out eco-innovation, such as Apple, IBM and Nike. A unique feature of collaboration is that efforts by one party enhance the marginal value of the other party's efforts. However, the collaboration will make the partner know the eco-innovation technology and prompt the partner to encroach the market to sell competitive products by herself. Motivated by this observation, this paper considers the optimal collaboration strategy on eco-innovation between upstream and downstream supply chain member and the optimal encroachment strategy of upstream supplier in a supply chain.

This paper models a supply chain wherein a supplier provides products or materials for her manufacturer and cooperates with her manufacturer in eco-innovation. Also, the supplier could encroach on the market to sell similar products by herself. Then this paper uses game theory and mathematical modeling to do relative analysis.

The analysis reveals several interesting insights. First, eco-innovation collaboration makes supplier encroachment no longer only rely on the encroachment cost. The delayed realized eco-innovation efficiency information also plays a vital role. Second, different from previous research, the authors find the manufacturer's preference for supplier encroachment depends on the uncertainty of eco-innovation efficiency and potential market demand. Third, both partial and full encroachment strategies of the supplier can effectively improve the eco-innovation level.

The paper is the first to take the interplay between collaboration and encroachment into account in a supply chain. The results caution enterprises and policymakers to take vertical collaboration and delayed realized information into account in the competitive supply chain before making any operational decisions. Furthermore, the authors propose that governmental intervention aimed at stimulating supplier encroachment in appropriate circumstances can contribute to the improved environmental performance of products.

This paper aims to identify the conditions under which encroachment is a viable strategy for a manufacturer to gain competitive advantage and achieve higher profitability in the presence of the store-brand.

This paper proposes game-theoretic models in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (him) and a retailer (her), in which he distributes his national brand through the retailer, and endogenously determines whether to establish a new direct sales channel to sell the national brand when the retailer introduces her store-brand.

Analytical results show that the bar for the manufacturer to encroach the end market in the presence of the store-brand is always higher than that for him to encroach in the absence of the store-brand. Although incurring channel competition, encroaching with the national brand in the presence of the retailer's store-brand can lead to either a win-lose or win-win result for the manufacturer and the retailer. Numerical studies claim that, higher brand substitution can push down the retailer's enthusiasm to introduce her new brand. Counterintuitively, when the retailer introduces her store-brand, higher brand substitution does not necessarily push up the manufacturer's enthusiasm to respond with national-brand encroachment. When consumer preferences for the two brands are heterogeneous, a higher consumer preference for the retailer's store-brand results in the retailer's higher enthusiasm to introduce her store-brand and the manufacturer's lower enthusiasm to encroach with his national brand.

This study can help researchers to better understand the retailer's store-brand introduction, manufacturer encroachment and their interaction theoretically, and further provide decision support for enterprises to choose brand and channel strategies in practice.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to investigate performance of both manufacturer-owned channel and traditional retail channel when the manufacturer encroaches upon the traditional channel in different forms (brick-and-mortar and online form) under different market structures (Stackelberg and Bertrand). To examine the effect of acceptance of the online channel and travel cost on profits of two channels.

The Hotelling model is employed to depict consumers ' channel choice behavior, where the consumer surplus captures travel cost, spatial distance and consumer heterogeneity in acceptance of the online channel. A game-theoretical framework is developed to determine the optimal encroachment form and market structure for both manufacturer-owned and traditional retail channels.

This paper finds that, in either form of encroachment, Stackelberg market structure always outperforms Bertrand market structure, and channel choice significantly relies on parameters, i.e. consumer acceptance of the online channel and travel cost. Moreover, a Pareto zone is proposed in which both channels consider the strategy that the manufacturer opens bricks-and-mortar channel under Stackelberg market structure as the optimal strategy.

The present work fills a theoretical and practical gap for a structured analysis of the channel performance when the manufacturer encroaches upon the incumbent retail channel in different forms and under different market structure.

The aim of this study is to examine the influence of consumer preferences for overseas green products and the implementation of blockchain technology on the performance of a supply chain, which comprises an overseas manufacturer and a domestic e-commerce platform. This research endeavors to identify the optimal pricing decisions and strategies for both the manufacturer and the platform in the context of the expanding e-commerce and globalization of the economy.

The authors propose and analyze four distinct models based on the selection of selling contracts by the manufacturer and the adoption strategy of blockchain by the platform, using game theory to obtain the optimal solutions for these models.

The authors show that consumer migration promotes the manufacturer's green inputs, while the expansion of green consumer proportion is not conducive to it. They also show that blockchain technology has the potential to effectively limit manufacturer cannibalization. Interestingly, the study reveals a cascading effect of advantage where the manufacturer's profit variation trend changes only with the integration of pricing power advantage and blockchain technology inputs. This effect suggests that the equilibrium strategy is achievable under the agency contract with blockchain adoption, while Pareto improvement can be obtained with blockchain technology under both selling contracts.

This research could be extended in several possible directions. First, future work could explore outsourcing strategies for overseas manufacturers. Second, more types of consumer heterogeneity and different risk preferences could be considered. Third, this study can be extended by further exploring the design of mechanisms under asymmetric demand information to make the model more realistic.

The authors examine the impact of market segmentation and consumer preferences on green supply chain decisions, and analyze supply chain members' strategic choices for selling contracts and blockchain adoptions. The research also sheds light on the theoretical underpinnings and practical applications of green supply chain development and blockchain applications.

Contract Manufacturers (CM, factory) can cultivate factory brand products by imitating Original Equipment Manufacturers' (OEM, brand owner) National Brand products, and compete with OEM through the online retailer, that is, factory encroachment. In practice, few consumers can identify the quality of those two products in the online market. Implementing blockchain technology (BTI) can help all consumers identify product quality but may change the operation decisions and incur implementation costs. This study aims to explore how will the BTI strategies affect participants' operation performance under the factory encroachment and delve into the decisions regarding NB product quality and CM encroachment.

This study constructs a three-level outsourcing supply chain comprising one contract manufacturer (CM, factory), one original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and one online retailer. By utilizing the Stackelberg game, the authors first compared the results between two strategic decisions of BTI and no-BTI by online retailers under the factory encroachment scenario. Then, the NB product quality decision and the CM's encroachment decision are also investigated.

BTI strategy can benefit all participants (triple win), which both occurs in exogenous and endogenous quality cases, and the triple win area will expand (shrink) as the BTI cost decreases (increases). In addition, the OEM will improve product quality to confront competition from the CM, and the OEM may not always benefit from the BTI, it depends on the maturity of the market. Interestingly, BTI could improve the consumer surplus when the proportion of novice consumers is low. Finally, this study also investigates the extended case that CM always encroaches into the market whether the online retailer choose BTI or not, which hurts OEM's profit and decreases the product quality.

This study sheds light on the strategic decisions of online retailers' BTI regarding supply chain members' profits, consumer surplus and social welfare under factory encroachment. It also demonstrates that the BTI strategy, under different quality decisions (endogenous and exogenous), can be more profitable for chain members and consumers.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an in-depth investigation of e-commerce strategy implementation in mature franchise organisations from both franchisor and franchisee perspectives.

This research employed a multiple case study method where the e-commerce strategies of two mature franchise organisations were investigated in depth. Franchising experts were interviewed to provide an additional dimension to this study.

This research found that e-commerce must be integrated with the overall business strategy for optimal franchise performance. Since all parties to the franchising relationship are affected by the introduction of e-commerce, both the franchisees’ and the franchisor’s interests must be considered when the strategy is being developed. In addition, the consumer’s perspective is central to how e-commerce is structured, and franchisees are best placed to know their customers’ needs because they are directly involved in operating their business and interfacing with customers.

A preliminary model for e-commerce structures in service and retail franchising has been developed that depends on the nature of the business, the distribution arrangements and the order fulfilment arrangements. The two main avenues in e-commerce structuring were centralisation and decentralisation.

This study contributes to knowledge through an in-depth investigation of the internal process of e-commerce implementation in franchise networks from both franchisor and franchisee perspectives.

This paper considers a supply chain with a manufacturer (she) selling through an online retail platform (he) and studies the channel structure choices of two firms when investing in advertising.

The authors assume that the platform provides the manufacturer with an agency and/or reselling channel; thus, there are three possible channel structures: agency channel, reselling channel and dual channel. By developing a game-theoretic model, the authors investigate the channel structure choices of two firms when advertising separately, simultaneously and cooperatively and analyze the optimal combination strategy of channel structure and advertising scheme for both firms.

When the advertising efforts of the two firms are independent of each other, the equilibrium results show that different advertising schemes lead to different channel choices. For the manufacturer, it is optimal to choose the dual channel structure and adopt the advertising scheme that both subsidizes platform advertising and advertises on her own. For the platform, this combination is also optimal at a high commission rate; otherwise, the advertising scheme in which both firms advertise simultaneously is optimal and he is better off switching from the dual channel structure to the reselling channel structure as interchannel substitution intensity increases. The above results still hold for complementary advertising efforts and asymmetric marginal advertising costs, while in the case of substitutable advertising efforts, one firm may ride on another firm's advertising efforts, leading to different strategic combinations.

This paper not only provides useful guidance for manufacturers and platforms in channel selection and advertising strategy, but also theoretically enriches the literature on manufacturer encroachment.