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1 – 10 of 304Weiting Huang, Jia He and GuiJun Zhang
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the main determinants of consideration in China's non-tradable shares reform. The primary objective is to dig into the institutional…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the main determinants of consideration in China's non-tradable shares reform. The primary objective is to dig into the institutional factors that affect consideration in China's non-tradable shares reform.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors examine a sample of 846 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have finished the non-tradable shares reform during 2005-2009. Using the multiple liner regression, the authors discuss the important factors which affect consideration.
Findings
The authors find that ownership reconstruction form and capital occupation are very important determinants of consideration. The main factor which affects controlling shareholders’ capital occupation is the form of ownership reconstruction. Capital occupation of incompletely ownership reconstructed companies is more serious than those of complete ownership reconstructed companies. Furthermore, companies of incomplete ownership reconstruction and higher capital occupation paid higher consideration as a compensation for the expropriation of tradable shareholders’ benefit during the shares split period.
Originality/value
This study provides not only a deeper understanding of the reform of non-tradable shares but also an important empirical reference for reform of SOEs in China.
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The purpose of this paper is to provide an updated and critical assessment of the share reforms relevant to Chinese A‐share issuers listed in the two mainland markets of Shanghai…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide an updated and critical assessment of the share reforms relevant to Chinese A‐share issuers listed in the two mainland markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen. The reform programme first began in 2005 and has now spread widely across issuers in the two markets. It is therefore timely to assess how effective the reforms have been as well as gauging the ongoing effects of the transformation (of non‐tradable scrip into tradable form) on A‐share prices.
Design/methodology/approach
The “Split Share Structure” reform programme represents a major policy initiative in China and potentially opens‐the‐door to large‐scale state‐share disposals. The evidence to date however suggests that the Chinese authorities are primarily concerned with the reconfiguration of the array of share types that presently exist into a more comprehendible, streamlined form. The various checks and balances imposed on controlling shareholders engaged in the transformation of their shares from non‐tradable to tradable form suggest that eventual re‐designation of the holdings into an unfettered tradable type will not necessarily translate to the state's acquiescence in the disposal of such shares. On the contrary, state holdings in the most strategic of assets are likely to be retained more or less intact. Insights are developed by focusing on examples involving major A‐share issuers. In particular, a case study of the Sinopec reform proposal of August/September 2006 is set out to help illuminate the principal features of the reform package. Critical examination of the empirical literature relating to the A‐share price effects of the share reform programme also features.
Findings
There is little evidence to date of significant stock disposals amongst the largest and most strategic of China's issuers. However, for a number of A‐listed issuers, parts of the lock‐up moratoria have already expired or are set to do so in the very near future. Given the precipitous fall in A‐share prices (in Shanghai and Shenzhen) since late 2007, largely wrought by the enveloping global credit‐crunch, the Chinese authorities have an even more compelling case than hitherto to assiduously dampen fears of large‐scale state‐share disposals. Notwithstanding this, at least a small part of the drop in A‐share values during 2008 derives from the building risk‐premium on this issue.
Research limitations/implications
As the trading moratoria on re‐designated shares still applies in most cases, at least in respect of the majority of domestic stock holdings, a clearer picture will not emerge until 2009‐2011 when all such moratoria would have lapsed.
Originality/value
The discussions in this paper help to bring into focus a highly topical issue within the context of the Chinese equity market.
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Proper empirical tests of the effect of blockholders’ monitoring incentives on corporate governance are scant in the literature because the relationship between ownership…
Abstract
Purpose
Proper empirical tests of the effect of blockholders’ monitoring incentives on corporate governance are scant in the literature because the relationship between ownership structure and enforcement of corporate governance mechanisms is bidirectional. This study aims to address the endogeneity issue by examining the effect of blockholding on executive turnover–performance sensitivity, using the split-share-structure (SSS) reform in China as an exogenous shock to blockholders’ monitoring incentives.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses a logit model for estimating the change in executive turnover–performance sensitivity around the SSS reform. Sub-sample analysis is conducted to examine whether the impact of SSS reform on the turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger for firms with more contestable blockholders who might consider stock liquidity, risk sharing and diversification in their monitoring/trading decisions.
Findings
Top executive turnover, defined as CEO or board chair turnover, becomes less sensitive to firm operating performance after the reform, mainly for firms with contestable blockholders prior to the reform. Stock liquidity and blockholders’ demand for diversification can explain the impact of contestable blockholding. Moreover, blockholding is sensitive to firm operating performance after the reform but not before it.
Originality/value
With few exceptions, most studies in the blockholding literature focus on the effect of blockholder monitoring on firm value. Examining an exogenous shock to blockholding, this paper provides a set of new evidence for the impact of blockholding on executive turnover–performance sensitivity. The results call for more evidence of the impact of blockholding on executive turnover from other markets.
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Xu_Dong Ji, Kamran Ahmed and Wei Lu
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005.
Design/methodology/approach
This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression.
Findings
This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality.
Research limitations/implications
Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country.
Practical implications
The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China.
Originality/value
This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.
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Ying Zhang, Jane Andrew and Kathy Rudkin
This paper aims to explore the implementation of fair value accounting (FVA) in China as part of a global process of neoliberalisation and financialisation of political and…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to explore the implementation of fair value accounting (FVA) in China as part of a global process of neoliberalisation and financialisation of political and economic systems. It establishes that FVA forms part of the technical architecture of neoliberalism.
Design/methodology/approach
In considering the processes of neoliberalisation in China, this paper uses a qualitative approach to explore some of the impacts the adoption of FVA has had on Chinese capital markets.
Findings
It is shown that the practice of FVA is imbued with assumptions about the state and the market that have little bearing on the realities of Chinese capital markets. Rather than advancing the public interest, as neoliberal theories claim, this accounting change has failed to transform political and economic power. Instead, it has provided another opportunity to reposition powerful political and economic elites both inside and outside China. This paper argues that the process has reconfigured capital markets in the image of those in advanced capitalist economies, but is devoid of the regulatory and socio‐political apparatus to rationalise its relevance and reliability in the Chinese context.
Originality/value
By positioning the research in broader literature of neoliberalism, this paper offers an alternative framing of the purpose of adopting FVA and, more broadly, the globalisation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
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Sun Guangguo, Sun Ruiqi and Li Hezun
The existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the…
Abstract
Purpose
The existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the increasing importance of controlling shareholders, it remains disputable whether they are playing the “tunneling” roles or the “governance” roles. Therefore, more research is needed on what roles controlling shareholders are playing and how they play their roles. Previous empirical studies document a common phenomenon that directors play dual roles both on the board and in the top management team. Because of information asymmetry, the board of directors may not be able to perform its supervisory and strategic decision-making functions. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether controlling shareholders participate in firm management by appointing the executive directors and examine the economic consequences of controlling shareholder involvement.
Design/methodology/approach
In the empirical tests, the authors use the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment. Using the data from Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2015 and difference-in-differences analysis, the authors examine the impact of the split share structure reform on the executive directors of controlling shareholders and the governance effect of controlling shareholders’ appointing executive directors to the management.
Findings
The authors find that controlling shareholders get involved in firm management by appointing executive directors to strengthen the supervision and incentives of managers. The authors also find that firms exhibit a lower level of earnings management and enhance and higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling shareholders appoint executive directors to the top management team.
Originality/value
As the natural experiment of the split share structure reform enables us to mitigate endogeneity, the authors investigate the channels through, which controlling shareholders get involved in firm management from the unique perspective of executive director appointment. The study expands the literature on corporate governance and board functions. The findings provide new insights to the effect of controlling shareholder governance and casts light on a new way for controlling shareholders of Chinese firms to participate in firm management – by appointing executive directors.
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Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog and Sunny Li Sun
We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as…
Abstract
Purpose
We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.
Methodology/approach
We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.
Findings
Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.
Research limitations/implications
Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.
Practical implications
As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).
Social implications
As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.
Originality/value
Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.
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Aysun Ficici, Bo Fan, C. Bülent Aybar and Lingling Wang
This paper attempts to explore the interrelationships between the split-share structure reform and privatization processes in light of the interplay between the listing…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper attempts to explore the interrelationships between the split-share structure reform and privatization processes in light of the interplay between the listing announcements of the non-traditional shares of the Chinese firms within the steel industry and market reaction to these listed shares, as well as to analyze the value gained by the firms due to the privatization processes.
Methodology/approach
The paper examines market reaction to the listing announcements of non-traditional shares as traditional shares by employing event-study methodology. To determine the success of privatization process and value creation to the firm, the paper utilizes multivariate analysis.
Findings
The exogenous factors emphasized in a topographical order, explicitly profitability, efficiency, and leverage, are related to the privatization processes and split-share structure reform that impact the market. The study supports that market reacts positively to the listing announcements of non-traditional shares. Being listed improves value to the firm.
Research limitations/implications
The limitation of this study is the lack of data on country, industry, and firm factors; and this study merely relates to one specific industry and one country.
Originality/value
The paper fills a gap in the literature by articulating the impact of privatization and split-share structure reform on both market reaction and firm value. It focuses on the impact of a dynamic process rather than the impact of a static constituent on market reaction and firm value, as the previous studies have been concentrating on. The research shows that there is an accelerated privatization process of state-owned firms in Chinese steel industry and their integration in capital markets.
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China has hitherto followed the US model of corporate governance, but recent crises suggest that that might not be the model to follow. This paper aims to consider that…
Abstract
Purpose
China has hitherto followed the US model of corporate governance, but recent crises suggest that that might not be the model to follow. This paper aims to consider that proposition.
Design/methodology/approach
This is a comparative study of US and Chinese systems of corporate governance.
Findings
Corporate governance is an alien concept for China. The establishment of the China company law system came later than western nations' corporate law system. Since 1992, China has made substantial progress in several areas of corporate governance. It is well known that for nearly a hundred years the American‐style corporate governance mechanism has been the model of the countries in the world. And China also follows the example of American corporate governance. Against the background of the global financial crisis, it is time to reflect upon the model of corporate governance in China.
Originality/value
The paper invites reflection on existing paths towards good corporate governance in China.
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Mian Du, Siyan Chen and Huan Shao
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm value of the listed companies in China. Does the better corporate…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm value of the listed companies in China. Does the better corporate governance lead to the higher firm value? Or does the higher firm value make it easy to choose a better governance mechanism? Or they affect each other? In other words, this paper tries to answer whether the corporate governance mechanism is only decided by institutional arrangement, or by market choice according to firm value or performance or by the interaction of institutional arrangement and market choice? It tries to answer whether institutional arrangement maximizes the firm value, or an invisible hand pushes them to arrive at its maximum.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper establishes an analytic framework of simultaneous equations based on causality, which includes five endogenous variables: ownership of larger shareholders, managerial ownership, director compensation, debt financing and firm value. It adopts 1,644 data samples from 274 Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2007- 2012 after the non-tradable shares reform. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of single equation, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation of simultaneous equations are respectively done to show the differences of these three kinds of estimations.
Findings
The empirical results show that differences exist among OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation. Finally, 3SLS estimation should be adopted because the OLS and 2SLS estimation are biased. There are endogenous relationships between corporate governance mechanism and firm value. Through the 3SLS estimation, it is found that first, ownership concentration and firm value affect each other positively. Second, managerial ownership and firm value affect each other positively; third, director compensation and firm value affect each other negatively, while director compensation and firm performance affect each other positively. Finally, debt financing level and firm value are negatively related to each other.
Practical implications
It means that ownership of large shareholders, managerial ownership, director compensation and debt financing in the Chinese listed companies are found to have a root in the interaction between institutional arrangement and market choice. It is also found that adverse selection occurs when creditors loan to the listed companies. Managerial compensation is positively related to accounting profit, but it is negatively related to firm value because managers increase profit due by earning management. This could only increase the accounting profits and obtain huge cash compensation, but not increase firm value and even harm the interests of shareholders.
Originality/value
This paper not only shows the difference between OLS and 2SLS estimation but also compares the estimation of 2SLS and 3SLS in terms of empirical methods. It gives answers to the following questions: whether the relationship is one-way causality or bilateral causality between ownership concentration, managerial ownership, director compensation and firm value; whether governance mechanism affects firm value by institutional arrangement, or market drives both of them to strike a balance by an invisible hand. In other words, does it make them arrive at equilibrium through the competitive selection process when shareholders, directors, managers and creditors attempt to maximize themselves of their interests?
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