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In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.

My study examines the pay-for-performance relationship surrounding executive compensation in higher education. There has been much criticism of the rising levels of university presidential pay, particularly in the public sector, citing it is pay without performance. Public colleges and universities are funded by taxpayers; therefore, their expenditures are even more heavily scrutinized than private institutions. Many feel that university executives are overpaid and are not delivering a return in the form of enhanced institutional performance to their investors, the public. Growing student debt only adds intensity to the outcry against heightened compensation. Proponents of the increasing pay levels contend that the ever-changing role of the university president and competition in the marketplace for talent warrants such compensation. Using data obtained from The Chronicle of Higher Education and Integrated Postsecondary Education System websites, I find a highly significant and positive relationship between compensation for executives at four-year public institutions and both the levels of university endowment and enrollment. These results support the pay-for-performance debate. In contrast, results for other performance measures, scholarships and graduation rates, do not support the debate. My study contributes to the literature examining pay-for-performance in higher education with an empirical analysis examining the institutional determinants of executive compensation for public colleges and universities.

This paper is an investigation of the pay-for-performance link in executive compensation. In particular, we document main issues in the pay–performance debate and explain practical issues in setting pay as well as data issues including how pay is disclosed and how that has changed over time. We also provide a summary of the state of CEO pay levels and pay mix in 2009 using a sample of over 2,000 companies and describe main data sources for researchers. We also investigate what we believe to be at the root of fundamental confusion in the literature across disciplines – methodological issues. In exploring methodological issues, we focus on empirical specifications, causality, fixed-effects, first-differencing, and instrumental variable issues. We then discuss two important but not yet well-explored areas, international issues, and compensation in non-profits. We conclude by examining a series of research areas where further work can be done, within and across disciplines.

This chapter examines the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to market-adjusted returns and changes in earnings for high-tech (HT) firms vis-à-vis firms (NHT) in other industries. Consistent with the hypotheses, this chapter uncovers the following evidence: First, the sensitivity of executive bonus compensation to market-adjusted returns is weaker and more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms (a control group), which implies that the problem of ex post settling up, documented in Leone et al. (2006), may be far less serious in HT firms than in NHT firms. Second, the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to earnings changes is generally more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms, which is consistent with the view that HT firms engage in more conservative financial reporting than NHT firms. Third, the sensitivity of executive equity-based compensation to market-adjusted returns is significantly negative for HT firms compared to NHT firms when bad earnings news is announced. The results imply that HT firms, with a strong motive to attract and retain their highly talented executives, judiciously use both short-term and long-term incentive compensation schemes by compensating for a reduction of short-term incentive pay with an increase in long-term incentive pay. The issue of executive compensation has been a longstanding one in the United States and Canada, and the issue of executive compensation-performance sensitivity for HT firms is also relevant in this era of the information technology (IT) revolution, especially when prior research has shown that HT firms differ from NHT firms in their market-valuation process.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the structure of both CEO and non-CEO executive compensation affects the overall risk of a firm. The author focuses on the interplay between CEO and non-CEO executive compensation structure.

The author uses a hand-collected pension-database that employs both OLS and two-stage least squares regressions to determine the effects of inside debt on default risk using the distance-to-default framework. The database consists of 8,965 executive-year data points from 272 firms.

This paper accomplishes three major objectives: first, the author presents a significant extension of Sundaram and Yermack (2007) by including non-CEO executives; the author demonstrates how the differences in inside debt between CEO and non-CEO executives are directly related to firm risk; and that funding these pensions via a Rabbi Trust eliminates most of the risk-shifting effects. Firms with the lowest compensation leverage gap between CEO and non-CEO executives were most likely to observe the agency costs associated with high executive leverage. When compensation leverage structures were substantially different, or the pension was pre-funded, these effects are neutralized.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, the first paper addresses the effects of Rabbi Trusts on risk-shifting behavior between both CEOs and non-CEO executives. Further, the author extends Sundaram and Yermack (2007) using a hand-collected database six times larger than the original paper. By focusing on the “leverage gap” between CEOs and non-CEO executives, the author presents unique evidence that underlines the risk dynamics between CEOs and their boards.

The relationship between the clarity of proxy statement presentation of executive compensation, the level of compensation and firm performance was examined Consistent with the argument that firms attempt to avoid potential threats to legitimacy, clarity of presentation and the level of executive compensation were negatively related. There was no relation between firm performance and presentation clarity. Management stock ownership was not related to clarity of presentation.

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether socially responsible firms recognize the potential conflicts that come with higher levels of executive compensation, and thus limit executive pay relative to what is being paid in other firms. In the process, the relationships between executive compensation and financial performance, and corporate social performance and financial performance are examined to determine whether potential compensation and social performance links are coming at the expense of company financial performance.

The empirical data for this research were obtained from a stratified sample of Fortune 1000 companies pulled from across more than 15 industries. Multiple regression analysis is utilized to test three hypotheses.

In line with the hypotheses, results indicate that companies identified as good corporate social performers do in fact have lower levels of executive compensation and there is some support found for a positive relationship between social and financial performance.

The results provide support for the view that firms concerned about social responsibility can put restrictions on executive compensation and still achieve good financial performance, and make a case that executive compensation should in fact be a concern of all socially responsible firms.

There are few studies that examine the direct link between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility. This study addresses this gap in the literature and adds to the discussion as to whether socially responsible firms might seek to better balance compensation across the firm and emphasize that profit, both individual and corporate, must be earned within a system that is fair and balanced for all.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the effects of influence and reciprocity as the elements in the determination of executive compensation.

A purposive sample was drawn, which comprised of 13 respondents chosen for their expertise relating to the determination of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A semi-structured interview guide was used as the data-gathering instrument. A thematic analysis technique was used for data analysis.

The findings in this study identified three themes resorting under influence as crucial in the process of determining executive compensation, namely an executive’s social capital, intellectual capital and social comparison. Two major themes emerged under reciprocity, namely the pay-performance relationship and role complexity. Finally, the political-symbolic role emerged as the main theme that described the relationship between influence and reciprocity.

The findings provide a more detailed description of the process involved in determining executive compensation in SOEs.

There has been limited if any, empirical study on the process involved in setting executive compensation. The limited focus has always been on accounting measures. Incorporating the socio-psychological view attempts to provide a more comprehensive and conclusive explanation of the process of determining executive pay in theory and practice.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the reasons for the differences of executives' compensation across industries from the managerial discretion perspective.

Based on the data from 37 manufacturing industries from 2002 to 2007 in China, managerial discretion for each industry is calculated regarding to the conception raised by Hambrick and Finkelstein which is further clustered into three groups. Then, regression model is used to testify the relation between managerial discretion and executives' compensation.

The executives' compensation is positively related to managerial discretion that is determined by the industrial environment. In the faster growing or higher competing industries, the executives tend to have more managerial discretion, thus they will be better paid due to the extensive latitude of their decision making.

To a certain extent, managerial discretion can be taken to measure the uncertainty or marginal productivity of the executives' work. From the industrial perspective, there are actually some factors far beyond the control of executives but influencing their pay.

When designing the compensation system for the executives, the industrial factors surely should be taken into consideration, to work out a fair and competitive incentive plan.

The paper proves a very important point in the issue of the decisive factors for executives' compensation. Managerial discretion raises the uncertainty and complexity to executives' work, thus it determines the compensation.

This paper aims to examine the impact of executive compensation on firm risk-taking behavior, measured by the volatility of stock price returns. Specifically, this analysis explores three hypotheses. First, the impact of short-term and long-term executive compensation packages on firm risk is analyzed to assess whether the packages incentivize risk-taking behavior. Second, the authors test how these compensation and risk relationships were impacted by the financial crisis. Third, they expand the analysis to see if the relationship varies across different industries.

The econometric approach used to examine the executive compensation and firm risk relationship takes the form of two different panel model specifications. The first model is a pooled model using the panel data of executive compensation, the firm-level control variables and volatility of stock market returns. The second model highlights the differences in the relationship between executive compensation and riskiness of firm behavior across industries.

The authors find a significant and robust relationship, showing that during the post-financial crisis period firms tended to use long-term compensation shares to reduce firm risk. They also find that the relationship between various compensation components and firm risk varies across industries. Specifically, the bonus share of compensation negatively impacted firm risk in the financial services industry, while it positively impacted risk in the transportation, communication, gas, electric and services sectors. Additionally, long-term compensation share exhibits an inverse relationship with firm risk in the financial services, manufacturing and trade industries.

The conclusions of this paper suggest that there is indeed a relationship between executive compensation and firm risk across industries. There was a notable change in the relationship however between firm risk and long-term compensation following the financial crisis, where firms used long-term compensation to reduce firm riskiness. In other words, the financial crisis changed the nature of this relationship across S&P 1500 firms. The last key finding is that there exist differences in risk and compensation relationships across industries, and these differences across industries are highlighted across both bonus share and long-term incentive share variables. This is the first study to explore this relationship across industries.