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This study analyzes supplier development investment decisions under a triadic setting (two buyers and a common supplier). In a triadic setting, the supplier development investment decision of one buyer can have a spillover effect of the benefits on other buyer. Therefore, it is utmost important for the investing buyer to understand the impact of benefit spillover on other competing buyers'. Therefore, one of the purposes of this study to analyze the supplier development investment decision of buyers under two scenarios. First, under cooperative development structure where both buyers jointly invest in supplier and share equal benefits. Second, non-cooperative investment structure where both buyers individually invest in supplier development and share unequal benefits.

In order to assess the impact of supplier development investment decisions on the profitability of buyers and the common supplier, the authors used game-theoretic approach. The authors design a Stackelberg leader-follower game where the supplier acts as Stackelberg leader and buyers follow the supplier's pricing decision to maximize their profit level. Additionally, both buyers decide either to cooperate or non-cooperate while investing in supplier development.

The results show that the cooperative investment is always an optimal strategy for buyers and supplier. Interestingly, the efficient buyer's share of investment level is lower under non-cooperative investment structure and he is better-off due to its capability of taking advantage from the other buyer's investment. However, the inefficient buyer, on the other hand, is worse-off under non-cooperative investment. Furthermore, comparative analysis between the two shows that initially, the buyer who extracts more profit because of the other buyers' development investment tends to prefer the non-cooperative development investment set up. However, after a certain point, the same buyer is better-off under cooperative development investment through cooperation, and sharing equal benefit of the supplier's development, as the supplier in turn, starts charging a higher wholesale price under non-cooperative investment case.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, extant literature on supplier development has mostly focused on. One supplier-one buyer; thus, the learning spillover effect has almost been unexplored. In real-life, different buyers often purchase from the shared supplier. Therefore, it is important to analyze the spillover of supplier development benefits due to investment of one buyer on other buyer and deriving the condition under which buyers would be incentivized to invest jointly or individually.

The policy choices of Eurasian states whether to form a coalition along with the “Eurasia Initiative” can be explained by the cooperative game theory. While the each bilateral relationship before making a binding agreement seems to be a non-cooperative game, the coalitions with many other states through a binding agreement of Mega-FTA would be a cooperative game. Despite the lack of numerical data, this study at least tries to show the possibility of applying the game theory to analyze the “Eurasia Initiative” and it’s the impacts of Mega-FTAs on this ambition. While the Eurasia Initiative necessarily involves some economic projects requiring enough investment promotion, Korea can strategically set up the policies linked with the development of Mega-FTAs. To utilize the investment promotive effect of Mega-FTAs, Korea has to assure that the core of the cooperation game would be the grand coalition of a Mega-FTA. If it continues to search for the best policies to maximize the superadditivity of this cooperative game, Korea will finally be able to achieve the co-promotion of Mega-FTAs and the Eurasia Initiative.

This study was steered to establish how buyer–supplier collaboration's commitment attributes serve as an antecedent for procurement performance in large manufacturing entities in Tanzania.

A parallel, concurrent, mixed method was used in the study. Quantitatively, 52 firms were surveyed from Temeke Municipality, Tanzania, using questionnaire that specified 1 procurement manager and 1 store manager from those firms, totaling a sample size of 104 respondents. Qualitatively, expressive opinions to supplement the numeric data were gathered from supply chain managers using the saturation principle. Explanatory design analyzed the existing cause–effect relationship, and the null hypotheses were tested using binary logistic regression at p values < 0.05 and ExpB > 1.

Fidelity and enthusiasm to suggest improvements to suppliers and the duration of the collaboration antecede the procurement performance of the manufacturing firms in Tanzania, while devotion to invest resources and initiatives on joint problem solving have no significant impact.

The causality between buyer–supplier collaboration and procurement performance has been revealed. Since there might be third party logistics in collaborations, future research should center on their moderating effect.

A framework has been developed for liberating procurement performance in the context of large manufacturing firms in Tanzania.

Based on Transaction Cost Economics and Resource Dependency Theories, the study revealed the root cause of procurement performance in the context of Tanzanian manufacturing firms, while also considering commitment to buyer–supplier collaboration as a prerequisit for the commendable target.

This study aims to investigate the most effective approach for governments and enterprises to combat desertification by considering the governance cycle. The focus is on understanding how the government can incentivize enterprises to actively engage in desertification combat efforts.

Both the government and the enterprise are treated as rational entities, making strategic choices for joint participation in combating desertification. Recognizing the dynamic nature of the desertification combat area, differential game models are employed to identify the optimal mode for combating desertification.

The findings underscore the significant influence of the governance cycle duration on the selection of desertification combat modes for government and enterprise. A cooperative mode is best suited to a short governance cycle, while an ecological subsidy mode is optimal for a longer cycle. Enhancing governance technology and shortening the governance cycle are conducive to combating desertification. Reducing taxes alone may not be an effective control strategy; rather, the government can better motivate enterprises by adopting tax rate policies aligned with the chosen governance mode.

This research contributes by elucidating the impact mechanism of the government cycle’s length on the desertification combat process. The results may offer valuable insights for governments in formulating strategies to encourage corporate participation in combating desertification and provide theoretical support for selecting optimal desertification combat modes.

This study aims to improve our understanding of side selling in farmer cooperatives. Cooperative member side selling, in which farmers divert produce from cooperatives to competitors, threatens coffee cooperatives. This is a problem in Burundi, where many households earn income from coffee and cooperatives serve a collective action function.

Using data from a survey of Burundian coffee farmers, we assess the determinants of two types of cooperative member side-selling behavior: selling to both cooperative and non-cooperative buyers and selling solely to non-cooperative buyers.

Farmers who sell to both cooperative and non-cooperative buyers are more likely to be male household heads, be more invested in coffee and have larger farms than non-side sellers, among other characteristics. Farmers who only sell to non-cooperative buyers are poorer and less invested in coffee than non-side sellers.

Additional research is needed to better understand why side-selling behavior differs between groups and to better understand how household head gender influences side selling. In addition, this study lacks qualitative data supporting quantitative findings. Future research should include qualitative methods to better understand motivations for side-selling behavior.

The study provides important information on what influences cooperative member side selling and focuses on specific types of side-selling behavior that have been largely overlooked. The study focuses on the role of household head gender in side selling, which is important, given the centrality of women to African agriculture.

This paper aims to examine the role of outside peacekeepers in a bilateral conflict.

The authors build upon a trade theoretic framework by incorporating disruptions due to war, which could affect directly the return to investment, both domestic and foreign, and by introducing explicitly peacekeeping forces into the model. Two countries are engaged in a war, with the purpose of capturing capital. A third country plays a dual role: it is the source of investments in the warring countries, and it deploys soldiers on ground for peacekeeping purposes. The authors consider the cases where the levels of foreign investments are exogenous and when they are endogenously determined by free mobility conditions. In the worst case, they find that foreign investment reduces conflict. In the case of endogenous foreign investments, they examine the effect of multilateral agreements where the two warring countries reduce their number of soldiers and the third increases the number of peacekeepers.

The authors find that the reform benefits all three countries and increases the level of foreign investments. They consider the cases of exogenous and endogenous foreign direct investment (FDI). In the first case, the authors examine the effect of an exogenous increase in FDI on the war equilibrium and find that it reduces the employment of soldiers in the warring countries and increases the size of the peacekeeping force. They also find that the first-best level of peacekeeping is larger than the equilibrium level. When FDI is endogenous, starting from the initial war equilibrium, they also examine the effect of a multilateral agreement in which the size of the peacekeeping force is increased by the third country and the two warring countries agree to reduce their war efforts. The authors find that the reform makes all three countries better off and increases the level of FDI.

The paper uses a theoretical model with third-party interventions in a bilateral war. It intends to shed light on some of the missing economic implications of peacekeeping. The paper introduces explicitly peacekeeping forces into the analysis and introduces a factor that represents a disruption to return on investment in both warring countries. The third country has a dual role; it provides investments in the warring countries and deploys soldiers for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping reduces the disruption mentioned above and affects the employment of soldiers by the warring countries. The authors find that a multilateral agreement in which the two warring countries reduce their war efforts and the third party increases its peacekeeping force can increase welfare in all three countries.

In times of increasing shipping risks and uncertainty, the purpose of this paper is to analyze fiercely competitive shipping markets in the Asia-Pacific region and help the carriers develop the optimal pricing schemes, shipping networks (e.g. routes and shipping frequency), and future investment plans.

This paper develops viable maritime logistics strategies based on the non-cooperative game theory which determines the optimal vessel size/type, shipping route, and shipping frequency, while taking into account multiple cost components and unpredictable shipping market dynamics.

This study revealed that the container carrier’s optimal shipping strategy was insensitive to changes in freight rates, fuel prices, and loading/unloading fees at the destination ports. However, it tends to be more sensitive to an increase in the shipping volume than the aforementioned parameters. In other words, aggressive pricing schemes and drastic cost-cutting measures alone cannot enhance carrier competitiveness in today’s shipping markets characterized by overcapacity and weak demand.

This paper is one of a few attempts to identify a host of factors influencing the container carrier’s competitiveness using the game theory and develop an optimal shipping strategy in the presence of conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders (e.g. carriers, shippers, and port authorities). To validate the rigor and usefulness of the proposed game-theoretic model, the authors also experiment it with an actual case study of container carriers serving the Northeast Asian shipping market.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a game-theoretical model for commercial bank foreign direct investment strategy, government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system. Government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system.

The paper develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the optimality of the limiting entry strategy followed by a given domestic institutional sector when considering the entry applications of foreign banks in the domestic financial system. The model analyzes the strategic options available to an emerging market country with a relatively underdeveloped banking system when deciding whether or not and to what extent allow for the entrance of better reputed and more technologically advanced foreign banks in its domestic financial system.

The paper shows that the progressive liberalization of entry restrictions would define the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the subsequent set of continuation games and the respective payoffs derived from this liberalization as the domestic economy integrates and competes within the global financial system.

Banks operating in the international financial market have incentives to invest directly in emerging market economies and governments have incentives in allowing foreign banks entry to their market. As banking systems in these economies are generally underdeveloped, opening the financial system to foreign competitors could lead to a decrease in the market share of local banks. Eventually foreign banks could control the banking system and could de facto control the money supply.

Determining the optimal capital structure becomes more complicated by the presence of an agency problem. The issuance of debt as a corporate governance mechanism introduces the asset substitution problem – the agency cost of debt. Thus, there is a recognized need for models that can resolve the agency problem between the debtholder and the manager who acts on behalf of the shareholder, leading to optimal capital structure choice, and enhanced firm value. The purpose of this paper is to model the debtholder-manager agency problem as a dynamic game, resolve the conflicts of interests and determine the optimal capital structure.

As there is no satisfactory model for dealing with the above issues, this paper uses a differential game framework to analyze the incongruity of interests between the debtholder and the manager as a non-cooperative dynamic game and further resolves the conflicts of interests as a cooperative game via a Pareto-efficient outcome.

The optimal capital structure required to minimize the marginal cost of the agency problem is a higher use of debt, lower cost of equity and withheld capital distributions. The debtholder is also able to enforce cooperation from the manager by providing a lower and stable cost of debt and a greater debt facility in the overtime framework.

The study develops a new dynamic contract theory model based on the integrated issues of capital structure, corporate governance and agency problems and applies the differential game approach to minimize the agency problem between the debtholder and the manager.

On 22nd June, 2000, after a good deal of speculation, the much anticipated list of non‐cooperative countries was made public by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). They had assessed 31 countries before deciding on the final 15, deemed non‐cooperative as their laws and practices were construed as providing an impediment to the fight against money laundering. They were the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St Kitts & Nevis and St Vincent & Grenadines. Unfortunately for the Dominican Republic, a number of news sources from around the world substituted them for Dominica, assuming the two names referred to the same country.