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A game-theoretical model of bank foreign direct investment strategy in emerging market economies

Aidan O’Connor (Département de Management, Syste`mes et Stratégie, France Business School, Poitiers, France)
Francisco J. Santos-Arteaga (Departamento de Economía Aplicada II, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain)
Madjid Tavana (Business Systems and Analytics Department, La Salle University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA and Business Information Systems Department, University of Paderborn, Paderborn, Germany)

International Journal of Bank Marketing

ISSN: 0265-2323

Article publication date: 28 April 2014

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Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to propose a game-theoretical model for commercial bank foreign direct investment strategy, government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system. Government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the optimality of the limiting entry strategy followed by a given domestic institutional sector when considering the entry applications of foreign banks in the domestic financial system. The model analyzes the strategic options available to an emerging market country with a relatively underdeveloped banking system when deciding whether or not and to what extent allow for the entrance of better reputed and more technologically advanced foreign banks in its domestic financial system.

Findings

The paper shows that the progressive liberalization of entry restrictions would define the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the subsequent set of continuation games and the respective payoffs derived from this liberalization as the domestic economy integrates and competes within the global financial system.

Originality/value

Banks operating in the international financial market have incentives to invest directly in emerging market economies and governments have incentives in allowing foreign banks entry to their market. As banking systems in these economies are generally underdeveloped, opening the financial system to foreign competitors could lead to a decrease in the market share of local banks. Eventually foreign banks could control the banking system and could de facto control the money supply.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor for their insightful comments and suggestions.

Citation

O’Connor, A., J. Santos-Arteaga, F. and Tavana, M. (2014), "A game-theoretical model of bank foreign direct investment strategy in emerging market economies", International Journal of Bank Marketing, Vol. 32 No. 3, pp. 194-222. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJBM-08-2013-0077

Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2014, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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