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Abstract

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Freight Transport Modelling
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78190-286-8

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Article
Publication date: 30 October 2018

Marjan Raoufinia, Vahid Baradaran and Reza Shahrjerdi

The purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive behavior of market agents.

Design/methodology/approach

To consider dynamic competitive markets, the authors focus on a differential game theory in oligopolistic structures, using analytical models to illustrate how advertising effort, good differentiation and price stickiness interact simultaneously in the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibria. The comparative assessment of these equilibria obtains some significant results.

Findings

An optimization model that enriches the continuous time is presented. Under the open-loop and the closed-loop, Nash equilibrium showed an increase in the total output, advertising in price stickiness and promotional efficiency, while there was a decrease in product differentiation and advertising promotional efficiency. However, the open-loop equilibrium levels are larger than the closed-loop equilibrium. Under the closed-loop information, the long-run equilibrium was faster than the opened-loop in a dynamic oligopoly. The graphical illustration was used to present the behavior of the model parameters.

Practical implications

This study helps managers to choose an appropriate price and advertising adjustment to maximize profit. The obtained results may help firms to make the smart decision and may provide managers the valuable tool for making decisions in the competitive market environments.

Originality/value

This is a first attempt to analyze a dynamic oligopoly in the differentiated market environment. It considers a joint action of the output and advertising in shaping the closed-loop and the open-loop equilibria with N competitors in a dynamic competitive setting.

Details

Kybernetes, vol. 48 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

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Abstract

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Optimal Growth Economics: An Investigation of the Contemporary Issues and the Prospect for Sustainable Growth
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-44450-860-7

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Article
Publication date: 27 July 2021

Shuwen Guo, Junwu Wang and Han Wu

This paper examines the profit distribution of engineering projects in the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode. IPD is a new delivery method that can ameliorate many of…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper examines the profit distribution of engineering projects in the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode. IPD is a new delivery method that can ameliorate many of the disadvantages of traditional delivery methods and improve project results. In the implementation of IPD, the profit distribution is key for ensuring the success of IPD projects.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper described a new method for characterizing profit distribution in the IPD mode. The payment function and Shapley value of the cooperative fuzzy game of fuzzy alliance were defined by considering the Choquet integral of the fuzzy measure. The participation of each player was considered, and the influence of participation on the profit distribution was discussed. Lastly, changes in the profit distribution of core participants under different alliance combinations were studied.

Findings

A case from a report of The American Institute of Architects (AIA) was used to verify the fuzzy alliance model. There was a significant correlation between the degree of participation of the owner, architect and builder and the profit distribution among these three participants.

Research limitations/implications

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, this paper selects a case with only three key participants in order to simplify the research. When there are many core participants, how to establish the alliance in the IPD mode and how to establish the corresponding profit distribution model, further work is certainly required to disentangle these complexities in models. Second, in this case, BIM technology has little impact on the income of the whole project. Therefore, this paper does not consider the impact of BIM technology on the marginal effect of the IPD project. Third, the contract type in the case is a custom tri-party based on IFOA. There is no classified discussion of the impact of different contracts on the profit distribute in the paper.

Practical implications

Based on the in-depth study of cooperative game with alliance structure, this paper promotes the classic cooperative game with alliance structure. The authors define the payoff function of fuzzy cooperative games by Choquet integral of fuzzy measure, and introduce the idea into the field of IPD. It aims at extending the solution to a cooperative game without a core. It can be obtained through a simple calculation. In the IPD alliance, the fuzziness and uncertainty of the participation degree of each participant will affect the profit of the whole project. The authors find that the higher the participation rate of players, the more profit each participant has. The greater the influence weight of the designer on the alliance, the lower the influence weight of the contractor on the alliance, the lower the participation of the contractor and the designer, and the lower the income distribution value of the three core participants. It shows a monotonous decline status.

Social implications

For any construction enterprise, it can make more profits if it joins the grand alliance. In the IPD alliance, each participant can maximize their own interests, which can also promote the enthusiasm of construction enterprises to participate in the alliance and increase the application of IPD mode in AEC industry. This research method provides a new fast, effective, and more realistic solution method for cooperative countermeasures. It can be further extended to other cooperative game fields and advance a new research perspective and solution for the distribution of cooperative interests.

Originality/value

The contribution of this paper is the development of a fuzzy alliance model that provides a tool for measuring the profit distribution in IPD. This is the first quantitative model to connect the degree of participation with the profit distribution in IPD using fuzzy alliance.

Details

Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0969-9988

Keywords

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Article
Publication date: 1 April 2003

Seow Eng Ong, Fook Jam Cheng, Boaz Boon and Tien Foo Sing

Real estate developers often operate in oligopolistic environments. Pricing strategies must be made in an interactive framework that makes empirical evaluation difficult…

Abstract

Real estate developers often operate in oligopolistic environments. Pricing strategies must be made in an interactive framework that makes empirical evaluation difficult. This study appeals to economic experiments to examine how developers price their properties, especially when there is an option to market pre‐completed units. In addition, the interaction between bidding for land and pricing the end product is examined. The results indicate that competitor actions are important considerations in pricing decisions. In particular, the profit maximizing pricing strategy depends critically on being competitive, not necessarily being the most aggressive. Interestingly, pre‐completed units sell only at prices that incorporate future price expectations, and successful bids tend to precipitate more aggressive pricing. Finally, competitive bidding and pricing strategies appear to the best profit maximizing strategy.

Details

Journal of Property Investment & Finance, vol. 21 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1463-578X

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Article
Publication date: 10 August 2010

Shuping Wan

The purpose of this paper is to research stochastic dynamic investment games with stochastic interest rate model in continuous time between two investors. The market…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to research stochastic dynamic investment games with stochastic interest rate model in continuous time between two investors. The market interest rate has the dynamics of Duffie‐Kan interest rate.

Design/methodology/approach

Recently, there has been an increasing interest in financial market models whose key parameters, such as the bank interest rate, stocks appreciation rates, and volatility rates, are modulated by stochastic interest rate. This paper uses the Duffie‐Kan stochastic interest rate model to develop stochastic differential portfolio games. By the HJB optimality equation, a general result in optimal control for a stochastic differential game with a general utility payoff function is obtained.

Findings

Derive a general result in optimal control for a stochastic differential game with a general utility payoff function. The explicit optimal strategies and value of the games are obtained for the constant relative risk aversion utility games of fixed duration.

Research limitations/implications

Accessibility and availability of stochastic interest rate data are the main limitations, which apply.

Practical implications

The results obtained in this paper could be used as a guide to actual portfolio games.

Originality/value

This paper presents a new approach for the optimal portfolio model under compound jump processes. The paper is aimed at actual portfolio games.

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Article
Publication date: 7 December 2020

Olanike Akinwunmi Adeoye, Sardar MN Islam and Adeshina Israel Adekunle

Determining the optimal capital structure becomes more complicated by the presence of an agency problem. The issuance of debt as a corporate governance mechanism…

Abstract

Purpose

Determining the optimal capital structure becomes more complicated by the presence of an agency problem. The issuance of debt as a corporate governance mechanism introduces the asset substitution problem – the agency cost of debt. Thus, there is a recognized need for models that can resolve the agency problem between the debtholder and the manager who acts on behalf of the shareholder, leading to optimal capital structure choice, and enhanced firm value. The purpose of this paper is to model the debtholder-manager agency problem as a dynamic game, resolve the conflicts of interests and determine the optimal capital structure.

Design/methodology/approach

As there is no satisfactory model for dealing with the above issues, this paper uses a differential game framework to analyze the incongruity of interests between the debtholder and the manager as a non-cooperative dynamic game and further resolves the conflicts of interests as a cooperative game via a Pareto-efficient outcome.

Findings

The optimal capital structure required to minimize the marginal cost of the agency problem is a higher use of debt, lower cost of equity and withheld capital distributions. The debtholder is also able to enforce cooperation from the manager by providing a lower and stable cost of debt and a greater debt facility in the overtime framework.

Originality/value

The study develops a new dynamic contract theory model based on the integrated issues of capital structure, corporate governance and agency problems and applies the differential game approach to minimize the agency problem between the debtholder and the manager.

Details

Journal of Modelling in Management, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-5664

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Article
Publication date: 1 April 1992

David Chappell, Karen Dury and Christine Straker

Models Canada′s Pacific halibut fishery as a non‐zero‐sunnon‐co‐operative differential game. Optimal harvesting level are derivedunder the criterion of profit…

Abstract

Models Canada′s Pacific halibut fishery as a non‐zero‐sun non‐co‐operative differential game. Optimal harvesting level are derived under the criterion of profit maximization. Show that optimal aggregate steady‐state fishing effort and yield increase with the number of fishermen harvesting the stock. The model provides a better explanation of what has actual occurred in this fishery than an optimal control model, which may be considered as a game with one player.

Details

Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 19 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0144-3585

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Article
Publication date: 12 October 2012

Xiaojing Zheng, Xusong Xu and Cui Cui Luo

The purpose of this paper is to improve the behaviors coordination mechanism, to maintain the system's long time‐scale and stable competitive capability, when the agents…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to improve the behaviors coordination mechanism, to maintain the system's long time‐scale and stable competitive capability, when the agents in the system focus on cooperating with each other.

Design/methodology/approach

Effort level for every agent, whose dynamics can be described as a stochastic partial differential equation, and the incentive of effort as the control of the corresponding agent, are introduced to describe agents' behavior abstracted. The cooperative stochastic differential game model is constructed: first, the optimal resolve trajectory mapping with profit maximization of the system are obtained, then the transitory imputation coupled with effort initial state of the system by introducing dynamic Shapley value imputation method. Based on the results obtained, the profit distribution strategies and the equilibration incentive compensation mechanism are given, due to the evolution law of the payoff and the state variable.

Findings

It is concluded that: the transitory compensation to agent for efforts and incentive, which can be changed with the system state at current and in history and in future changed, would guarantee the realization of the Shapley value imputation throughout the game horizon.

Originality/value

In this paper, the interactivity between agents in the system is considered first. The dynamical Shapley imputation mechanism and the transitory compensatory mechanism are provided to make the imputation more stable and feasible.

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Article
Publication date: 14 October 2009

Pietro De Giovanni

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the state of the art in static and dynamic games (or inter‐firm relationships). This research area has changed significantly…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the state of the art in static and dynamic games (or inter‐firm relationships). This research area has changed significantly over the last 25 years through the development of phenomena such as the supply chain and the progressive overcoming of monopolistic and oligopolistic frameworks. By exploring the state of the art in inter‐firm relationships, this paper aims to identify the most suitable research methods to be used by future research in this domain and to highlight the major areas under investigation.

Design/methodology/approach

This research adopts both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The qualitative approach describes the technical differences between static and dynamic methods and gives evidence of their appropriateness when applied to a game. Quantitative analysis transforms some of the information extracted from the qualitative analysis into categorical variables in order to obtain an indication of the major issues still to be addressed.

Findings

The resulting findings identify the extent of the use of static and dynamic modelling in previous research and how their use has changed over time, what resolution methods need to be applied when investigating inter‐firm relationship, what features influence this decision and what research areas still remain unexplored.

Originality/value

The existing literature on the modelling of static and dynamic games lacks an exhaustive review. Several contributions investigate the literature on inter‐firms relationships and review numerous issues, but focus only on static or dynamic modelling. This paper fills this gap by reviewing a number of theoretical papers.

Details

European Business Review, vol. 21 no. 6
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0955-534X

Keywords

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