Search results

This paper examines the profit distribution of engineering projects in the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode. IPD is a new delivery method that can ameliorate many of the disadvantages of traditional delivery methods and improve project results. In the implementation of IPD, the profit distribution is key for ensuring the success of IPD projects.

This paper described a new method for characterizing profit distribution in the IPD mode. The payment function and Shapley value of the cooperative fuzzy game of fuzzy alliance were defined by considering the Choquet integral of the fuzzy measure. The participation of each player was considered, and the influence of participation on the profit distribution was discussed. Lastly, changes in the profit distribution of core participants under different alliance combinations were studied.

A case from a report of The American Institute of Architects (AIA) was used to verify the fuzzy alliance model. There was a significant correlation between the degree of participation of the owner, architect and builder and the profit distribution among these three participants.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, this paper selects a case with only three key participants in order to simplify the research. When there are many core participants, how to establish the alliance in the IPD mode and how to establish the corresponding profit distribution model, further work is certainly required to disentangle these complexities in models. Second, in this case, BIM technology has little impact on the income of the whole project. Therefore, this paper does not consider the impact of BIM technology on the marginal effect of the IPD project. Third, the contract type in the case is a custom tri-party based on IFOA. There is no classified discussion of the impact of different contracts on the profit distribute in the paper.

Based on the in-depth study of cooperative game with alliance structure, this paper promotes the classic cooperative game with alliance structure. The authors define the payoff function of fuzzy cooperative games by Choquet integral of fuzzy measure, and introduce the idea into the field of IPD. It aims at extending the solution to a cooperative game without a core. It can be obtained through a simple calculation. In the IPD alliance, the fuzziness and uncertainty of the participation degree of each participant will affect the profit of the whole project. The authors find that the higher the participation rate of players, the more profit each participant has. The greater the influence weight of the designer on the alliance, the lower the influence weight of the contractor on the alliance, the lower the participation of the contractor and the designer, and the lower the income distribution value of the three core participants. It shows a monotonous decline status.

For any construction enterprise, it can make more profits if it joins the grand alliance. In the IPD alliance, each participant can maximize their own interests, which can also promote the enthusiasm of construction enterprises to participate in the alliance and increase the application of IPD mode in AEC industry. This research method provides a new fast, effective, and more realistic solution method for cooperative countermeasures. It can be further extended to other cooperative game fields and advance a new research perspective and solution for the distribution of cooperative interests.

The contribution of this paper is the development of a fuzzy alliance model that provides a tool for measuring the profit distribution in IPD. This is the first quantitative model to connect the degree of participation with the profit distribution in IPD using fuzzy alliance.

This study aims to examine how brands can leverage on advergames as an interactive marketing tool to foster prosumer culture and build a sacred brand. Drawing from game theory, this research scrutinizes how advergame format (cooperative vs noncooperative) influences consumers’ perceived brand sacredness by harnessing positive brand relationship quality (BRQ) and intention to prosume. It also examines how reward types moderate the relationship between advergame format and advergamers’ BRQ.

Three different studies were conducted. Study 1 develops a measure to capture advergamers’ intention to prosume. Study 2 uses survey to collect data from brand-controlled gaming community platform. Study 3 is an experiment that uses 2 (game format: cooperative vs noncooperative) × 2 (reward type: hedonic vs utilitarian) between-subject format.

Study 1 provides a reliable and valid measure to capture “intention to prosume.” The results of Study 2 elucidate that (non) cooperative advergame format generates strong cold (hot) BRQ, leading to intention to prosume, which, in turn, drives brand sacredness. The results of Study 3 elucidate that using (utilitarian) hedonic rewards strengthens the impact of (non) cooperative advergame format on (cold) hot BRQ.

This research has examined the roles of cooperative vs noncooperative game design formats and hedonic vs utilitarian reward formats. Future research may focus on other possible advergame design formats and reward types.

This research provides insights to advergame marketers toward designing appropriate hedonic or utilitarian game rewards to strengthen the impact of cooperative vs noncooperative advergame format on brand sacredness through enhancing BRQ and intention to prosume among the target advergamers.

This research applies game theory in the advergaming context to manoeuvre game format and rewards so that a sustainable prosumption culture is built, which has strong beliefs about the sacredness of the brand.

This paper aims to present various three-level service contracts among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter.

Three-echelon supply chains with marketing and warranty services are studied. Game-theoretic approaches (non-cooperative and cooperative) are presented. The non-cooperative approaches are static (NE) and dynamic (Stakelberg) models. The cooperative approach is related to bargaining models (Nash bargaining games). The authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effect.

Based on the mentioned drawbacks (i.e. lack of a model containing warranty, marketing and pricing), despite their importance, a developed model is proposed in this research to cover one of the research gaps. In addition, main contributions of this paper that differentiate it from the existing papers are regarding inventory, lost sale and lost goodwill, which are significant in the comparison environment. Another advantage of this study is related to the solution approach, the game theory. Twofold of the games theoretical, i.e. cooperative (in three forms) and non-cooperative are considered, because of their importance. Three types of non-cooperative games are presented as follows: Nash equilibrium – each echelon decides respectively and simultaneously; manufacturer-Stackelberg – the manufacturer has more power than the agent and the agent has more power than the customer; and customer-Stackelberg – customer is leader of the agent and the agent is the leader of manufacturer. The involved cooperative game in this paper is the bargaining problem that the participants can determine how to share the additional profits.

In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples are used to illustrate the models presented in this paper. Finally, the authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effects on the objective functions.

This paper aims to study the impact of existence and lack of discount on the relationships between one manufacturer and one retailer under the cooperative and the non-cooperative games and the members’ profits are compared.

In the first approach, the manufacturer’s price function is constant, and in the second approach, this price function is a decreasing function with respect to lot size. These approaches are modeled through three games structure, including two Stackelberg games and one cooperative game.

Some numerical instances comprising sensitivity analysis are provided, and then the members’ profits in different scenarios are compared. This paper reveals that in the presented models, whether the members are inclined to change their profits.

This paper presents a tool of decision-making for the type of relationships of members in two different circumstances, and an approach is also presented to maximize the members’ profit.

In this paper, the relationships between one manufacturer and one retailer are studied under six different circumstances, where pricing, cooperative advertising and inventory cost are considered simultaneously. Also, a different model is presented to make a balance in individual profits and gain more profit for each member compared to the cooperative and non-cooperative game.

In Canada, grain handling is an important agri-business that has traditionally been cooperative in nature (for example, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool). At the same time the industry is heavily regulated. There has been a dramatic change in the structure of the industry over the past 20 years and there are currently no major cooperatives present in the market. If the “yardstick effect” hypothesis of the role of cooperatives in an imperfectly competitive market is true, the disappearance of cooperatives could result in the ability of remaining firms to exercise market power over producers. To investigate the impact of changes in ownership structure in the market, we estimated two types of pricing games that might have been played between a cooperative, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP) and an investor-owned firm (IOF), Pioneer Grain (PG) in the Saskatchewan wheat-handling market over the period 1980–2004, with different assumptions about their pricing behavior imposed. We find that SWP and PG have likely been playing a Bertrand pricing game in the market over the period. We thus conclude that SWP, as the largest cooperative in the market, likely played a “yardstick effect” role in the market.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the results of Meca et al. (2004) depending on the grey information revealed by the individual firms.

The authors introduce cooperative grey games and focus on sharing ordering cost rule (SOC-rule) to distribute the joint cost.

In this study, the authors introduce a model, where inventory costs are assumed as grey numbers instead of crisp or stochastic ones studied in literature. At first, grey numbers and classical cooperative inventory games are recalled. Then, cooperative grey games are introduced and related results are given. Finally, an application is performed for three shotgun companies in Turkey.

It is an effective approach for theoretical analysis of systems with imprecise information and incomplete samples. Therefore, grey system theory, rather than the traditional probability theory and fuzzy set theory, is better suited to model the inventory problems by using cooperative game theory. To the best of the knowledge no study exists modeling inventory situations by using cooperative grey games. From this point of view this study is a pioneering work on a promising topic.

This paper deals with cooperative games whose characteristic functions are fuzzy intervals, i.e. the worth of a coalition is not a real number but a fuzzy interval. This means that one observes a lower and an upper bound of the considered coalitions. This is very important, for example, from a computational and algorithmic viewpoint. The authors notice that the approach is general, since the characteristic function fuzzy interval values may result from solving general optimization problems.

This paper deals with cooperative games whose characteristic functions are fuzzy intervals, i.e. the worth of a coalition is not a real number but a fuzzy interval. A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain fuzzy payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative fuzzy interval game.

In this paper, the authors extend a class of solutions for cooperative games that all have some egalitarian flavour in the sense that they assign to every player some initial payoff and distribute the remainder of the worth v(N) of the grand coalition N equally among all players under fuzzy uncertainty.

In this paper, the authors extend a class of solutions for cooperative games that all have some egalitarian flavour in the sense that they assign to every player some initial payoff and distribute the remainder of the worth v(N) of the grand coalition N equally among all players under fuzzy uncertainty. Examples of such solutions are the centre-of-gravity of the imputation-set value, shortly denoted by CIS value, egalitarian non-separable contribution value, shortly denoted by ENSC value and the equal division solution. Further, the authors discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS value, the ENSC value and the equal division solution. The authors provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

In the process of group decision-making, there may be multilayer subjects. In other words, members of the decision-making group may come from different layers and there is interest game among decision experts. Therefore, it is an extremely important topic to aggregate the information of decision experts who are involved in hierarchical relations and gaming relations so as to effectively address game conflicts and reach game cooperation.

First, a programming model is established to minimize the difference of expert opinions in hierarchical decision-making, and the method to solve the optimal solution is given. Second, the cooperative game model and its properties are discussed by using cooperative game and Shapley value, and the method to determine the weight vector between layers is also proposed.

This model can quickly aggregate information and achieve game equilibrium among decision-makers with hierarchical relationships. It can be widely used in decision evaluation with hierarchy structure and has certain practical value.

In order to solve the problem that experts at different levels may have conflicts of interest in multilayer grey situation group decision-making process, cooperative game and Shapley value theory are introduced into the study, and a multilayer grey situation group decision-making model based on cooperative game is constructed. The validity and practicability of the model are illustrated by an example.

This paper aims to solve the problem of public resource allocation among vulnerable groups by proposing a new method called uncertain α-coordination value based on uncertain cooperative game.

First, explicit forms of uncertain Shapley value with Chouqet integral form and uncertain centre-of-gravity of imputation-set (CIS) value are defined separately on the basis of uncertainty theory and cooperative game. Then, a convex combination of the two values above called the uncertain α-coordination value is used as the best solution. This study proves that the proposed methods meet the basic properties of cooperative game.

The uncertain α-coordination value is used to solve a public medical resource allocation problem in fuzzy coalitions and uncertain payoffs. Compared with other methods, the α-coordination value can solve such problem effectively because it balances the worries of vulnerable group’s further development and group fairness.

In this paper, an extension of classical cooperative game called uncertain cooperative game is proposed, in which players choose any level of participation in a game and relate uncertainty with the value of the game. A new function called uncertain α-Coordination value is proposed to allocate public resources amongst vulnerable groups in an uncertain environment, a topic that has not been explored yet. The definitions of uncertain Shapley value with Choquet integral form and uncertain CIS value are proposed separately to establish uncertain α-Coordination value.

An abundance of literature suggests that organisations adopting a cooperative approach achieve greater rewards than those that act in opposition or isolation. An emerging body of work also highlights the multiple actors involved in servitization. Despite this, in some contexts the benefits of servitization are not apparent. This paper examines business relationships in the oil industry and how they affect levels of servitization.

A mixed method study employing qualitative and quantitative methods was used to fully explore the context. In the quantitative phase, 48 oil industry specialists responded to a scenario based on game theory. This aimed to determine if the relationships between their respective organisations are cooperative or adversarial. Abduction drove a second qualitative phase. This consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews used to explore the servitization level and influence of servitization on relationships and vice versa.

The statistical results suggest that all parties used adversarial strategies despite the publicised intent to work cooperatively. The interviews suggested that increasing (decreasing) servitization could increase (decrease) cooperation and, in turn, value co-creation but revealed nuances to this effect. It also adds to our understanding of the darker side of servitization by illustrating the impact of mimetic isomorphism.

The findings add to understanding of the complex dynamics around servitization by showing that it is only at advanced levels of servitization that cooperative behaviour is observed, and base and intermediate levels result in non-cooperative behaviour and thus illustrate the importance of adopting a multi-actor lens to explore servitization.