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Studies on transfers to a more regulated section show an increase in information disclosure and stocks’ liquidity levels. Classical theories suggest that volatility should also be reduced. This study aims to analyse the long-term effects of a section transfer to a more regulated section (TSE 1/TSE 2) on stock return volatility.

This study uses an empirical framework relying on two-sample t-tests and panel regressions. These use robust standard errors and control for fixed effects, day effects and macroeconomic factors. The return variance of comparable stocks’ benchmark sample, instead of market variance, is used as a control variable. Comparable stocks operate within the same industry and do not transfer during the sample period. The authors test our results’ robustness using generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity estimates.

The study’s main findings show that pre-transferred stocks are more volatile than the stocks’ benchmark sample. The transfer to a more regulated section leads to a gradual decrease in the total daily stock return volatility, intraday return volatility and overnight return volatility.

To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to empirically address the volatility change caused by the stocks’ transfer to a more regulated section. This study highlights the benefits of choosing section transfers to reduce volatility.

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

The object of this research is the reconstruction of the existing legal response by European Union states to the phenomenon of immigration. It seeks to analyse the process of conferral of protection.

One main dimension is selected and discussed: the case law of the national courts. The study focuses on the legal status of immigrants resulting from the intervention of these national courts.

The research shows that although the courts have conferred an increasing protection on immigrants, this has not challenged the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the states to decide, according to their discretionary prerogatives, which immigrants are allowed to enter and stay in their territories. Notwithstanding the differences in the general constitutional and legal structures, the research also shows that the courts of the three countries considered – France, Germany and Spain – have progressively moved towards converging solutions in protecting immigrants.

The research contributes to a better understanding of the different legal orders analysed.

Regulators can adjust penalties to compensate for incomplete monitoring of regulated parties that are subject to legal rules, but compensating penalty adjustments often are unavailable when regulated parties are subject to legal standards. Incomplete monitoring consequently invites greater noncompliance under standards than under rules. This chapter develops a model that quantifies some of the specific tradeoffs that regulators face in designing standards regimes under incomplete monitoring. The model also considers the extent to which suboptimal compliance due to incomplete monitoring is likely to result in deadweight loss in different settings.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the Regulated Investment Company Modernization Act of 2010, P.L. 111‐325, signed into law on December 22, 2010.

The paper summarizes the Act and provides a detailed explanation and analysis of each of the provisions in the Act.

An investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 may elect to be taxed as a Regulated Investment Company (RIC) under the Internal Revenue Code. A RIC that satisfies certain additional minimum distribution requirements is generally allowed to deduct the amount of dividends paid to its shareholders in computing the RIC's taxable income and gains, with the result that the RIC's distributed net income and gains can be passed through to its shareholders free of tax at the RIC level. The Act makes a number of changes to the provisions in the Code related to RICs.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

This study aims to investigate whether country governance, regulated industry and firm-level characteristics, namely, ownership structure and firm size, are associated with the likelihood of firms having a politically connected board (PCB). This study also examines whether country governance and concentrated ownership moderates the association between institutional ownership and PCB.

This study uses cross-country analysis using 20 countries and hand-collected PCB data from 574 firms and 1,701 firm-year. This study performs logit regression analyses to examine hypotheses.

The results document that countries’ accountability, industry type and institutional ownership are associated with the likelihood of firms having a PCB. This study also finds that country governance, especially accountability, moderates the relationship between institutional ownership and PCBs. The results thus indicate the importance of country governance, especially accountability, in determining institutional investors’ political strategies.

This study provides several implications. First, firms tend to elect PCBs as a non-financial strategy because it arguably delivers additional resources and improves their performance, especially in countries with lower accountability and regulated industries. Meanwhile, investors and management must also hire PCBs cautiously because PCBs are closely related to agency issues. Agency issues reflect on the finding that institutional investors tend to avoid PCBs. However, the relationship between institutional investors and PCBs is closely related to the country-level context, especially accountability. This study also advises policymakers that country governance, especially accountability, is crucial in regulating the relationship between business and politics.

This study uses a relatively large number of new PCB and institutional ownership data collected manually from 20 countries. This study also examines several variables of country governance, such as accountability to PCB decisions that have not been tested before. This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and PCB ownership decisions that were not examined before and uses a cross-country sample. In addition, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first one that examines the role of state governance, especially accountability for the relationship between institutional ownership and PCBs.

This paper aims to analyze how the administrative structure of pension regulators affects regulatory capture or regulatory influence. It uses a historical institutionalist methodology to analyze regulatory capture.

The authors argue that the less complex allocation of regulatory authority in Ireland makes it more susceptible to regulatory capture or regulatory influence by the regulated industry than in the USA. Also, it is argued that stand-alone agencies are more susceptible to regulatory capture than are agencies that are embedded within larger departments of government. The authors present a five-step process in regulatory capture, with the later steps being used by the regulated industry if the earlier ones have failed.

The authors find that if the regulated industry has difficulty achieving regulatory capture through influencing the executive branch of government, it can also attempt to influence the legislative and judicial branches, as evidenced by a regulatory episode the USA has recently completed. Ireland has also recently completed reforms that may make regulatory capture more difficult. With a complex regulatory structure including overlapping authority as in the USA, when one agency has been strongly influenced by the regulated industry, another agency may take action to protect the public.

The paper presents international evidence as to the effect of the administrative structure of regulators on regulatory outcomes. It tests a hypothesis that the more complex, overlapping allocation of regulatory authority in the USA makes it less susceptible to regulatory capture.