Search results

The RAF method for regulation, assessment, follow‐up and continuous improvement of quality of care was developed in Israel in the late 1980s by the Quality of Care Unit at the JDC‐Brookdale Institute. The goal of the RAF method is to continuously increase the level of quality in organizations providing any kind of a service. This article presents the developmental processes for the method’s adaptation to a specific regulatory service – its structuring, implementation and assimilation – based on our experience in developing and implementing the RAF method in Israel. It describes how the RAF method encourages the development of reliable data bases, adaptation of the organizational structure, and introduction of a positive ideology that together promote changes leading to continuous improvement in quality of care.

Regulatory authority officials in Korea have been considerably strong enough to affect citizen’s intentions and alter their incentives to take new challenges. But, from the result of steady regulation reform, absurd bureaucratic interventions have been sharply reduced. Corruption in the process of rent seeking has decreased too. It is impossible to exercise regulatory authority that infringes on the essence of the freedom of the people because people who live in a democratic society would not accept these absurd practices.

This chapter introduces some key features of the regulatory management system in South Korea as well as the challenges that need to be overcome. In particular, the bureaucracy has worked hard to chip away at past regulations that produce rents for various private interest groups but provide little to society at large. Regulatory quality is tied closely to democracy as maintaining a fair and even playing field for entrepreneurs is a key freedom. Introducing checks and balances into the regulatory system can be an important way to facilitate this goal. The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) facilitated to strengthen the logic of regulatory necessity and the logic of improving regulation which increased the level of its institutionalization.

This paper aims to determine the most possible telecommunications regulatory system for the Palestinian Authority by investigating its institutional foundations. The paper highlights the problem of setting sophisticated institutions in fragile states that do not fully control their resources and investigates possible solution in terms of foreign investments.

The paper follows a qualitative research approach in two parts. The first part examines the institutional endowment framework set by Levy and Spiller and Levy and Spiller but considers critique of the framework. It also investigates institutional problems in fragile states in order to identify similar patters identified in Levy and Spiller framework. The second part focuses on the Palestinian Authority institutional foundations. Data are collected through interviews with key stakeholders of the Palestinian telecommunications sector.

The case of the Palestinian Authority shows a mix of political investment cycles and a genuine attempt of regulatory reforms. Endogenous fragility of the government magnified the effect of corruption and the maintenance of business‐politicians ties. Also, the Palestinian telecommunications sector suffers from exogenous fragility in terms of Israeli control of radio spectrum, international gateway, and importing of equipment. Inability of the Palestinian Authority to invoke GATS BTA conflict resolution mechanism and the crucial role foreign investors played to secure release of spectrum for the second mobile operator indicates the need for the Palestinian Authority to attempt attracting foreign investment. However, foreign investments require regulatory effectiveness that the Palestinian Authority lacks; thus eliminating endogenous fragility becomes a prerequisite to exogenous fragility.

This paper sheds light on problems regarding setting up an institution‐based regulatory system in unstable states. It contributes to the argument that “one size fit all” might not be the answer for some countries, especially fragile ones.

The purpose of this paper is to understand how institutional changes to the European Union regulatory landscape may affect corresponding institutionalized operational practices within financial organizations.

The study adopts an Investment Management System as its case and investigates different implementations of this system within eight financial organizations, predominantly focused on investment banking and asset management activities within capital markets. At the systems vendor site, senior systems consultants and client relationship managers were interviewed. Within the financial organizations, compliance, risk and systems experts were interviewed.

The study empirically tests modes of institutional change. Displacement and Layering were found to be the most prevalent modes. However, the study highlights how the outcomes of Displacement and Drift may be similar in effect as both modes may cause compliance gaps. The research highlights how changes in regulations may create gaps in systems and processes which, in the short term, need to be plugged by manual processes.

Vendors abilities to manage institutional change caused by Drift, Displacement, Layering and Conversion and their ability to efficiently and quickly translate institutional variables into structured systems has the power to ease the pain and cost of compliance as well as reducing the risk of breeches by reducing the need for interim manual systems.

The study makes a contribution by applying recent theoretical concepts of institutional change to the topic of regulatory change uses this analysis to provide insight into the effects of this new environment.

The aim of this study is to analyse the transformation of the Ecuadorian financial system using the regulatory dialectic approach (Kane, 1977). This research examines the initial conditions and motivating factors of the reform process, as well as the interplay between government and bankers during the period 2007-2012.

Kane’s regulatory dialectic suggests that regulation of financial institutions is a series of cyclical interactions between opposing political and economic forces. Three main stages are identified: thesis (measures and regulatory actions), antithesis (avoidance/lobby against those reforms) and synthesis (adaptive reregulation resulting from the interaction between interest groups).

Since 2007, the government focused on regulating interest rates, developing a liquidity fund for banking emergencies, increasing taxation and restricting international capital flows. These government initiatives took place against a background of conflicting interests. Private bankers opposed the majority regarding them as burdensome new rules, rather than enlightened reforms. Publicly, these reforms as intended by the government were seemingly supported. Finally through the political process, they were approved. To date, these reforms have strengthened the financial system, produced encouraging social policy results and placed the financial sector to serve the government’s development strategy.

Using Kane’s notion of regulatory dialectic, we explain the process of financial reform in Ecuador as part of a cyclical interaction between opposing forces. Drawing on this framework enabled insight into the nature of government intervention. Hence, we show how that intervention affected the growth, development and structure of the banking system.

This paper aims to contribute to research on corporate governance in regulated sectors, with emphasis in the field of activity of foreign investors through the ownership structure and legal system that regulates companies in Brazil.

In the first moment, the investigation had a quantitative approach of relational nature. Based on the data about the valuation of actions, statistical methods were applied to a secondary database containing measurable information provided by the organizations that operate the Brazilian stock-market and documentary evidence provided by the companies. In the second moment, a qualitative approach was adopted, resorting on the use of semi-structured interviews with investors and agents of the sector.

The results lead to two paths: presenting the perspective that foreign investors play a key role in improving governance practices because foreign ownership mitigates agency problems, provides adequate follow-up and optimizes the use of corporate resources; and evidencing the existence of a mitigation of operational risks in the face of the various obligations imposed by the concession contract with the regulatory agency, without direct interference under the ownership structure of regulated companies.

The literature portrays a distinct economic scenario in Brazil, where stock control is pulverized and mechanisms of corporate governance and scope of action of investors and regulated sectors are well-defined and implemented.

A great part of the studies from this field discusses the same object: the impact of the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms on selected efficiency indicators or on the value of the companies' actions. This investigation, on the other hand, targeted a differentiated approach so that its contribution would lie in the investigation under the influence of the regulation on the legal attributions and the performance of the investors how many conflicts between the other shareholder/regulatory body, as the control measures import by the regulatory agent the concessionaires of the Brazilian highways and transportation sector.

The identification of the presence of foreign investors as a determinant for: better performance of companies in Brazilian regulated sector in terms of market valuation; better mitigation of requirements with the regulatory framework for the agencies that regulate the concession sector, targeting a reduction in the asymmetry of information and transparency among all stakeholders.

The fact that Brazil is an emerging country that lacks a rigid legal system and corruption-control measures in corporate environments and public sectors, stresses the importance of the application of the “Best Codes of Corporate Governance Practices” in the main developed countries. This also stresses the need for effective supervisory bodies that contribute to a better financial performance of companies, guaranteeing investors the legal system.

In 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted a landmark resolution proclaiming the establishment of a New International Economic Order. One of the basic aims of this declaration was to enhance the voice and participation of developing countries in the international economic decision-making process based on norms of equitable governance. More than four decades have passed since its adoption. This paper aims to reflect on the past 43 years of the global financial regulatory system in light of the notion of equitable governance as envisioned by the “New International Economic Order”.

This paper surveys the global financial regulatory system from the vantage point of equitable economic governance. This discussion covers the period that comes after the 1974 UN landmark resolutions that declare the establishment of a “New International Economic Order”. The authors use qualitative and quantitative approach in this study. They use descriptive statistics and intuitive discussions of certain cases to carry the objective of the paper forward.

First, part of the development in global financial regulation manifests the establishment of informal networks that embark on global regulatory issues, while being very exclusive in their membership policies. Second, the lack of full and effective participation of developing countries in the decision-making and norm setting remains unsolved in the global financial regulatory system. Third, the shadow role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was of great significance in assisting the implementation of non-binding regulatory rules of international finance in developing countries despite the concerns of legitimacy and equity in the making of international standards. In sum, the global financial regulatory system that emerged in the past four decades is quite different from that aspired by the NIEO.

The declaration of NIEO coincides with the collapse of the Bretton Wood’s fixed exchange rate which in turn leads to the emergence of a new financial system and regulatory development. This period marked the proliferation of informal networks that make policy recommendations or non-binding rules with global implications. As far as the literature review goes far, this paper is the first to survey the post Bretton Wood’s period of the global financial regulatory architecture based on the tenets of the “New International Economic Order”.

As demand mounts for a review of the UK’s privatized utilities regulatory system, focuses on an increasing public phenomenon ‐ that of conflict between regulators and regulatees. Identifies the factors contributing to the difficulties which the regulators face in carrying out their roles. Utilizes the benefit of hindsight to reach conclusions as to why the current attacks on the roles of the regulators are natural outcomes, flowing from the ways in which regulatory systems have been designed.

This paper aims to trace the evolution of Indian financial market structure and regulation, in the broad dialectic sense and to suggest a consolidated, holistic regulatory model.

The paper sketches the evolution of Indian financial market structure and its regulation in terms of dialectic cycles. The first cycle extending practically over four decades, from the 1950s to the 1980s, was a period of foundation, expansion, and policy introspection. The decade of the 1990s marked the commencement of the second cycle – a period of liberalization and emergence of financial conglomerates. The Indian financial system has since completed one full circle in the dialectic process and is now passing through the last phase (synthesis) of the second cycle. Based on this dialectic approach, a consolidated and holistic regulatory model has been developed and suggested.

The paper concludes that, from a regulatory perspective, the recent developments in the financial sector have led to an appreciation of the limitations of the present segmental approach to financial regulation and favors adopting a consolidated supervisory approach to financial regulation and supervision, irrespective of its structural design.

This paper will be of value to financial regulators, financial intermediaries and investors across all the countries, developed as well as developing. It will facilitate and guide in the process of regulatory restructuring and strengthening the overall health of the financial markets.

This paper presents an institutional theory framework integrating normative, regulatory and cognitive-cultural pillars (Scott, 2008) to depict an interinstitutional system within which professions operate and develop. The pillars highlight the trade-offs between institutions leading to conflicts of interest that also impact the stability of the system and the ability of the profession to self-regulate. To illustrate the framework, the paper uses selected accounting-based professions and their alignment with the institutional pillars. Drawing from examples emerging from the Enron experience, the paper delves more deeply into the regulatory profession and professionals as agents to explore implications of their role in interpreting and in some instances developing institutions. Further, the paper highlights the potential fissures that emerge in a competitive environment between the public interest and market-based cognitive-cultural pillars that tends to erode public trust and weaken the institutional system, leading to the need for increased regulation to maintain the stability of the pillars. Overall, the framework presents a unique perspective on the role of public interest as a component of the normative pillar in aligning and thereby, stabilizing the functioning of the interinstitutional system. This perspective provides a basis to contextualize and articulate a public interest perspective for the accounting profession in an interinstitutional system.