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Financial analysts act as crucial conduits of information between firms and stakeholders. However, comparatively little is known about how these information intermediaries evaluate the believability and importance of corporate disclosures. We argue that a firm’s level of managerial discretion, or latitude of executive action, acts as a cue for financial analysts, which helps them interpret and respond to voluntary management earnings forecasts. Our study provides strong, robust evidence that financial analysts find management forecasts significantly less believable in low-discretion than in high-discretion environments, and therefore tend to be much less responsive to these forecasts. We also show that managerial discretion is especially impactful on analysts’ responses in those circumstances where analysts are typically most uncertain about how to interpret management forecasts.

It has been widely documented that investors and analysts underreact to information in past earnings changes, a fundamental performance indicator. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers’ voluntary disclosure efficiently incorporates information in past earnings changes, whether analysts recognize and fully anticipate the potential inefficiency in management forecasts and whether managers’ potential forecasting inefficiency entirely results from intentional disclosure strategies or at least partly reflects managers’ unintentional information processing biases.

Archival data were used to empirically test the relation between management earnings forecast errors and past earnings changes.

Results show that managers underreact to past earnings changes when projecting future earnings and analysts recognize, but fail to fully anticipate, the predictable bias associated with past earnings changes in management forecasts. Moreover, analysts appear to underreact more to past earnings changes when management forecasts exhibit greater underestimation of earnings change persistence. Further analyses suggest that the underestimation of earnings change persistence is at least partly attributable to managers’ unintentional information processing bias.

This study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by demonstrating the limitation in the informational value of management forecasts. The findings indicate that the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure in mitigating market mispricing is inherently limited by the inefficiency in management forecasts. This study can help market participants to better use management forecasts to form more accurate earnings expectations. Moreover, our evidence suggests a managerial information processing bias with respect to past earnings changes, which may affect managers' operational, investment or financing decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of management’s choice of forecast precision on the subsequent dispersion and accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.

Using a sample of 3,584 yearly management earnings per share (EPS) forecasts and 10,287 quarterly management EPS forecasts made during the period of 2002-2007 and collected from the First Call database, the authors controlled for factors previously found to impact analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion and investigate the link between management forecast precision and attributes of the analysts’ forecasts.

Results provide empirical evidence that managements’ disclosure precision has a statistically significant impact on both the dispersion and the accuracy of subsequent analysts’ forecasts. It was found that the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is negatively related to the management forecast precision. In other words, a precise management forecast is associated with a smaller dispersion in the subsequent analysts’ forecasts. Evidence consistent with accuracy in subsequent analysts’ forecasts being positively associated with the precision in the management forecast was also found. When the present analysis focuses on range forecasts provided by management, it was found that lower precision (a larger range) is associated with a larger dispersion among analysts and larger forecast errors.

Evidence suggests a consistency in inferences across both annual and quarterly earnings forecasts by management. Accordingly, recent calls to eliminate earnings guidance through short-term quarterly management forecasts may have failed to consider the linkage between the attributes (precision) of those forecasts and the dispersion and accuracy in subsequent analysts’ forecasts.

This study contributes to the literature on both management earnings forecasts and analysts’ earnings forecasts. The results assist in policy deliberations related to calls to eliminate short-term management earnings guidance.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of auditor type on management’s choice of forecast precision and management forecast errors, including the effects of corporate governance. The authors use a different sample and a larger period of years to determine whether prior inferences are robust across these dimensions as well as various corporate governance and other control variables.

This quasi-experimental study uses archival data in regression-based analyses.

The authors find firms with Big 5 auditors issue forecasts that have larger forecast errors are biased downward and are less precise. The inferences of this study are robust to the inclusion of corporate governance variables, along with an extensive number of control variables found important in prior studies.

While the sample and time period may be limited, the authors have no evidence this biases the results.

More stringent auditing may have an unintended consequence of reducing the informativeness of management forecasts, as managers act strategically in regards to forecast accuracy, bias and precision.

The inferences of this study indicate that while higher quality audits could constrain earnings management, higher quality audits may induce management to provide forecasts that have greater errors, may be biased and may be less informative.

The results and inferences of this study suggest that the inferences in prior studies hold across a different sample and a different time period. This is important given concerns in the academic community regarding the extent to which prior studies can be replicated.

The authors study whether CEO beauty influences management guidance.

The authors calculate an attractiveness score based on facial symmetry and perform regression analyses to examine the relation between CEO beauty and management guidance.

The authors find that attractive CEOs are more likely to issue voluntary management earnings guidance. After controlling for this appearance-based self-selection, the authors document that management forecasts provided by attractive CEOs are more optimistic yet less precise. Consistent with this result, the authors find that analysts' consensus forecast error following management forecasts made by attractive CEOs is larger than such error following management forecasts made by unattractive CEOs. The authors further find that the perceived credibility of management forecasts by attractive CEOs is not different from that by unattractive CEOs.

These findings suggest that attractive CEOs are more active but less skillful in issuing management forecasts. This adds to the emerging accounting literature on the relation between facial appearance and information delivery.

The purpose of our study is to examine the influence of three external corporate governance mechanisms (continuous disclosure regulatory reform, analyst following and ownership concentration) and one internal corporate governance mechanism (board structure) on the likelihood, frequency, horizon, precision and accuracy of management earnings forecasts in the low private litigation environment of New Zealand.

The authors use a sample of 1,082 management earnings forecasts issued by 125 firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange during the 1998-2007 financial reporting periods. The authors effectively control the self-selection bias problem inherent in management earnings forecasts.

The findings provide strong evidence that corporate governance significantly influences management earnings forecast behaviour. Firms with effective corporate governance tend to forecast earnings and provide these earnings forecasts more frequently and precisely. Earnings forecasts issued by firms with more non-executive directors on the board are less optimistically biased. A possible interpretation of the findings is that effective corporate governance mechanisms are able to substitute for a private enforcement alternative.

The findings have value in informing governance choices in the absence of external disciplinary mechanisms such as private litigation.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relevance of American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) to management voluntary forecasts of earnings. The authors further investigate whether the market reacts to such forecasts in respect of satisfaction.

The authors’ econometric models are constructed from previous work in accounting to specify the effect of ACSI on the issuance and optimism of management forecasts. Our model also specifies the impact of management optimism with respect to ACSI on stock returns. The data consisting of US firms in the 2001-2010 is collated from several databases and analyzed using multiple regression procedures.

Results indicate that ACSI is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing management forecasts and boosts management optimism. It is also found that investors react negatively to management optimism that is inherent in forecasts and results from satisfaction.

The authors’ research findings not only complement prior work on the linkage between customer satisfaction and firm value by incorporating a managerial perspective but also respond to the recent call for further work on how relevant marketing metrics drive organizational decisions and firms’ financial performance. It should be noted that findings are limited to firms that release both a voluntary issuance of management forecasts and ACSI.

The study results shed light on the justification of marketing expenditures and provide a response to the call for marketing accountability. The study results also enable managers to make better decisions about whether and when to issue a forecast. The authors’ research further calls stakeholders’ attention to the presence of management forecast optimism with respect to satisfaction.

Despite the importance of managers as primary information generators and disseminators in the capital markets, there appears to be little discussion on the satisfaction’s relevance to market participants, particularly in relation to the role of managers. Therefore, this investigation is the first to empirically show the relevance of ACSI to management earnings forecasts that have been ignored in the marketing literature.

The purpose of this paper is to assess management earnings forecasts in a continuous disclosure environment.

A large sample of hand checked Australian management earnings forecasts are examined. These data are analysed using a series of logistic regressions. Hypotheses are proposed and tested based on Skinner's litigation cost hypothesis. Increases in non‐routine management earnings forecasts post‐2000; and increases in the proportion of such forecasts that contain bad news are predicted. The relationship between forecast specificity and forecast news content is investigated.

It was found that, post‐2000, legislative changes and increased enforcement action by ASIC were followed by increased disclosure of non‐routine management earnings forecasts. For routine forecasts, no significant increase in forecast disclosure is observed. This result is consistent with Skinner as is the finding that the increased disclosure is only apparent for bad news non‐routine forecasts. For the second objective, evidence was found that the larger the gap between market expectations and actual performance the more specific the forecast, but only for bad news forecasts.

The study extends the small amount of research investigating the characteristics of management earnings forecasts. It also provides an assessment of the effectiveness of efforts by ASIC to ensure that management meet their continuous disclosure obligations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of career concerns on CEOs’ use of expectations management to meet or beat analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. The authors posit that early career-stage CEOs are less (more) likely to use expectations management than are late career-stage CEOs if the market views expectations management as an opportunistic strategy (efficient process) due to reputational capital concerns.

The authors obtain data for CEO career stages and CEO compensation from ExecuComp, analyst earnings forecasts from the detailed I/B/E/S database, financial statement data from quarterly Compustat and stock returns from the daily CRSP database over the period 1992–2013.

The results are consistent with the opportunistic hypothesis and early-stage CEOs seeking to build reputational capital by avoiding the perception of engaging in an inefficient managerial strategy. The authors find robust evidence that late career-stage CEOs are more likely to engage in expectations management than early career-stage CEOs. Furthermore, the authors show that late career-stage CEOs tend to employ expectations management to boost the value of their equity-based compensation.

The findings have important implications because the authors document a different implication of the “horizon problem” related to CEOs’ opportunistic forecasting behavior and the manipulation of analysts’ forecasts for CEOs who are approaching retirement.

The results have practical implications for analysts who provide earnings forecasts for firms whose CEOs are in early or late career stages and for investors who use such analysts’ forecasts in firm valuation models.

The authors contribute to the literature on expectations management by documenting how reputational incentives of CEOs affect the likelihood that managers engage in expectations management. The authors show that an important managerial incentive to engage in expectations management is CEO career concerns. Furthermore, the authors show that CEOs who are in early stages of their careers choose not to engage in expectations management due to the market’s perceived degree of opportunism pertaining to this strategy.

Barton and Simko argue that the balance sheet information would serve as a constraint on accrual‐based earnings management. This paper aims to extend their argument by examining whether the balance sheet constraint increases managers' propensity to use either downward forecast guidance or real earnings management as a substitute mechanism to avoid earnings surprises.

Following Barton and Simko, the paper uses the beginning balance of net operating assets relative to sales as a proxy for the balance sheet constraint. The argument is that because of the articulation between the income statement and the balance sheet, previous accounting choices that increase earnings will also increase net assets and therefore the level of net assets reflects the extent of previous accrual management. Models from Matsumoto and Bartov et al. are used to measure forecast guidance. Following Rochowdhury and Cohen et al., a firm's abnormal level of production costs and discretionary expenditures are used as proxies of real earnings management. The empirical analysis is conducted based on the 1996‐2006 annual data for a sample of nonfinancial, nonregulated firms.

The paper finds that firms with higher level of beginning net operating assets relative to sales are more likely to guide analysts' earnings forecasts downward, and more likely to engage in real earnings management in terms of abnormal increases in production costs and abnormal reductions in discretionary expenditures.

Overall, the paper's evidence suggests that managers turn to real earnings management or downward forecast guidance as a substitute mechanism to avoid negative earnings surprises when their ability to manipulate accruals upward is constrained by the extent to which net assets are already overstated in the balance sheet.

This study adds to prior literature that examines how managers trade off different mechanisms used to meet or beat analysts' earnings expectations. It also contributes to the extant literature by providing further insights on the role of balance sheet information in the process of managing earnings and/or earnings surprises.