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Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

The study of cause lawyers has focused heavily on the private sector, but both public and private attorneys bring voting rights litigation. This chapter first situates voting rights litigation within cause lawyering, as described by Scheingold and Sarat. It then suggests criteria for analyzing cause lawyering across public and private sectors and applies them to the attorneys who have done the majority of voting rights litigation for American Indians: The Voting Section of the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division and the Voting Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union. The chapter suggests that the public and private attorneys are more similar than one might expect in their motivation, relationship to clients, and range of political strategies used. Their organizational practice sites differ greatly, but the dynamics of the public practice site confirm that Voting Section attorneys are cause lawyers.

This chapter provides evidence that legislation affecting litigation risk has an influence on the financial reporting behavior of corporate management, we address the following research questions: (1) Do firms react to changes in litigation risk that result from the passage of new legislation at the federal level by adjusting their level of conservatism with regard to reporting earnings? (2) How do firms’ levels of conservatism react to changes in litigation risk over time? We analyze the level and trend in conditional conservatism to evaluate the efficacy of legislation in altering managerial reporting choice. Our examination takes place in the context of two distinct pieces of legislation intended to alter the legal environment faced by corporate managers: (1) the PSLRA (1995), and (2) Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Our findings indicate that the passage of legislation that increases litigation risk is associated with increased timeliness (conservatism) in financial reporting by managers. The increased timeliness, however, begins to subside shortly after the initial effect. While the initial effect of a reduction in litigation risk is negligible, subsequent periods exhibit declining timeliness (conservatism) in financial reporting. Our results indicate that legislative actions can be successful in altering management reporting choice through changes in legal regime. However, our results also demonstrate that the desired influence of these legislative policies may be transient.

There are few papers which deal with professional liability for buildings when architects and engineers (AEs) face disaster risks. The purpose of this paper is to find out the main legal risks for practitioners.

This paper uses t‐tests and ANOVA to investigate the impacts of earthquake on four areas: the number of architects or engineers who were sued; the time to appeal cases; the conviction rate in final judgments; and the number of public or private projects filed.

The results show that design professionals have a high burden of legal liability risks that were substantially increased by the Chichi earthquake. The following risks have significant impact: architects are burdened with higher civil liability than engineers; civil liability cases are more complicated; criminal cases have high conviction rates; and more liability cases are filed for private projects.

The following phenomena are worth further examination: the influenced of collectivism on AE defendants’ behaviour; and the legal tactics of plaintiffs in civil litigation, who may file parallel criminal liability cases to increase their compensation.

This paper contributes to the evidence of the kinds of liability which have high legal risks in practice, thus evaluating legal costs accurately in contractual negotiation.

It enriches AEs’ continuing education and engineering programs by strengthening the teaching materials on legal liability risks under earthquake attack.

In the USA, unlike Germany, Japan, and many other nations, victims ordinarily play a very limited role in the prosecution of crimes. Indeed, victims have so little prosecutorial authority that a growing ‘victims' rights‘ movement calls for constitutional amendments to give victims more control over criminal trials. Yet American law features some important exceptions to this general rule — for many environmental and white‐collar crimes, private citizens can bring actions to enforce the law. What makes these actions unique is the absence of ‘standing’ requirements that oblige the plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she was directly harmed by the criminal's actions.

This article is an up‐to‐date review of the trends that are developing in both the capital markets and private client litigation. This includes, of course, the trends in arbitration and clearing firm cases as well.

The purpose of this paper is to review research on litigation in corporate finance.

This paper surveys studies on the estimation of litigation risk, litigation costs, stock reaction to lawsuit announcement, and the effect of litigation on corporate financial policies and outcomes.

The first section presents a survey of studies that estimate litigation risk. The authors then discuss a set of studies that focus on the various costs associated with litigation. The third area of review is about studies which estimate the market reaction to a lawsuit announcement. The next section surveys studies that examine the relation between litigation and a variety of corporate policies, behaviors, and outcomes. The authors then discuss the emerging literature on how corporate political connections can influence the outcome of litigation. The survey concludes with a brief summary and a discussion of suggestions for future research involving corporate litigation.

By providing an extensive review of the literature on litigation in corporate finance, this survey can help researchers to identify recent trends in litigation research and select promising new avenues of investigation in the field.

The specific purpose of this study is to understand how firm size and public/private affiliation (employment status) affect voluntary disclosure decisions concerning quantitatively immaterial nonfinancial information. Although the prior disclosure literature is large and has considered a variety of factors including size and to a lesser degree employment status, this study offers a new perspective by considering both factors in the context of qualitative materiality.

This paper presents 136 manager participants with 24 cues representing nonfinancial, realistic business events and solicits their disclosure judgments. The cues are adapted from Pinsker et al. and contain information that does not meet widely-accepted quantitative thresholds for disclosure (e.g. 5 percent of net income), yet were identified by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as more likely to be material. This paper uses a median split of total assets and total revenues to determine “large” and “small” firms. Managers' judgments are measured in an own-firm setting (The context is their current employer, which can be public or private.).

This paper finds that disclosure is positively linked to firm size, but this paper do not find an employer status effect. Additional testing reveals that private firm managers are sensitive to SEC oversight and other external, competitive pressures, suggesting that they face mimetic pressures to behave like their public firm counterparts. In sum, their findings contribute significantly to the disclosure, strategic management, institutional theory and judgment-and-decision-making (JDM) literatures.

Although there is a vast literature on public firm managers' voluntary disclosure behavior (mostly involving large firms), there is little research regarding the voluntary disclosure behavior of small or large private firm managers involving nonfinancial information.

This study aims to examine the effect of state-level legal risk on audit fee pricing in the USA. This study hypothesizes that auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees to clients headquartered in states with higher legal risk in terms of probability of being sued, expected size of damages allocated to the auditors and breadth of third parties able to claim damages.

This study hypothesizes that higher state-level legal risk leads to higher audit fees. To test this, this study estimates ordinary least squares regressions of audit fees for 56,576 company years from 2001 to 2018 with the three measures of state legal risk and other factors known to affect audit fees.

This study finds that state-level legal risk is positively associated with audit fee pricing for two of three measures. Interestingly, the third measure, breadth of third parties able to claim damages, is negatively associated with audit fees.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper fulfills an identified need and is the first study to comprehensively test the association between state-level differentials in legal risk and audit fees.