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It has been widely documented that investors and analysts underreact to information in past earnings changes, a fundamental performance indicator. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers’ voluntary disclosure efficiently incorporates information in past earnings changes, whether analysts recognize and fully anticipate the potential inefficiency in management forecasts and whether managers’ potential forecasting inefficiency entirely results from intentional disclosure strategies or at least partly reflects managers’ unintentional information processing biases.

Archival data were used to empirically test the relation between management earnings forecast errors and past earnings changes.

Results show that managers underreact to past earnings changes when projecting future earnings and analysts recognize, but fail to fully anticipate, the predictable bias associated with past earnings changes in management forecasts. Moreover, analysts appear to underreact more to past earnings changes when management forecasts exhibit greater underestimation of earnings change persistence. Further analyses suggest that the underestimation of earnings change persistence is at least partly attributable to managers’ unintentional information processing bias.

This study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by demonstrating the limitation in the informational value of management forecasts. The findings indicate that the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure in mitigating market mispricing is inherently limited by the inefficiency in management forecasts. This study can help market participants to better use management forecasts to form more accurate earnings expectations. Moreover, our evidence suggests a managerial information processing bias with respect to past earnings changes, which may affect managers' operational, investment or financing decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to detect quantitatively the existence of anchoring bias among financial analysts on the Tunisian stock market. Both non-parametric and parametric methods are used.

Two studies have been conducted over the period 2010–2014. A first analysis is non-parametric, based on observations of the sign taking by the surprise of result announcement according to the evolution of earning per share (EPS). A second analysis uses simple and multiple linear regression methods to quantify the anchor bias.

Non-parametric results show that in the majority of cases, the earning per share variations are followed by unexpected earnings surprises of the same direction, which verify the hypothesis of an anchoring bias of financial analysts to the past benefits. Parametric results confirm these first findings by testing different psychological anchors’ variables. Financial analysts are found to remain anchored to the previous benefits and carry out insufficient adjustments following the announcement of the results by the companies. There is also a tendency for an over/under-reaction in changes in forecasts. Analysts’ behavior is asymmetrical depending on the sign of the forecast changes: an over-reaction for positive prediction changes and a negative reaction for negative prediction changes.

The evidence provided in this paper largely validates the assumptions derived from the behavioral theory particularly the lessons learned by Kaestner (2005) and Amir and Ganzach (1998). The authors conclude that financial analysts on the Tunisian stock market suffer from anchoring, optimism, over and under-reaction biases when announcing the earnings.

The purpose of this study is to examine if the cash flow and short-term accruals and long-term accruals together have a role to play in explaining the change in dividends.

The authors’ mainly used the same models developed by Atieh and Hussain (2008) and expanded on this model by including contextual factors: firm growth, firm size, gearing and quality of earnings. Using 344 observations from Jordanian firms, the association of variables with dividend changes was analyzed using the generalized least square regression.

The results reveal consistency with previous studies that disaggregated earnings outperforms the cash flow model in explaining the changes in dividends. Also, the explanatory power of the Lintner (1956) model is improved by replacing earnings with cash flow and short-term and long-term accruals, which is in line with previous studies. Regarding the effect of contextual factors, the superiority of the accrual model is affected by the contextual factors proposed, except for geared firms. The accrual model is superior for high growth, large firms and poor quality of earnings.

The paper contributes to the existing literature that the Lintner (1956) model’s explanatory power can be improved by replacing earnings with its components mainly cash flows and short-term and long-term accruals. These results support the evidence related to developed markets. The paper also provides evidence of the importance of firm characteristics on the information content of the components of earnings.

We investigate the empirical characteristics of firms resuming cash dividends to determine if dividend resumption is most like dividend initiation, a large dividend increase, or a completely unique event. Firms that resume dividends earn considerably larger returns than firms initiating or increasing dividends, both before and after the announcement. Dividend‐resuming firms exhibit changes in profits similar to firms increasing dividends, but the risk change following dividend resumption is more like that reported by studies of dividend initiation. These findings are unaffected by the length of time it takes firms to resume paying cash dividends, or whether the firm also declares a stock split and/or stock dividend during the period surrounding the resumption announcement. We conclude that dividend resumption is sufficiently unlike other dividend events to be regarded and studied as its own unique event.

The study's purpose is to examine market returns around dividend announcements that contrast with a pattern of prior dividend announcements.

The paper identifies firms that have a smooth dividend pattern of once-a-year dividend increases but at some point break that pattern and announce an unchanged dividend. The sample design allows the opportunity to investigate the market reaction to unchanged dividend announcements when an increase was likely to have been expected.

The results indicate that failing to increase the dividend is associated with significantly positive abnormal returns that are greater in magnitude for more entrenched dividend-increase records, supporting a contrast-effect hypothesis.

The results indicate that dividends are interpreted not only relative to the immediate dividend amount but also how the decision contrasts with dividends over a prolonged period. This finding suggests that the information content of the announcement of an unchanged dividend can vary according to the prior dividend pattern.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between the dividend signaling hypothesis and a firm's life cycle.

The authors use Dickinson's (2011) methodology to develop a proxy for the firm's stages in its life cycle and to examine the relationship between dividends and future earnings following a nonlinear setting.

Using a sample of US firms during the 2000–2014 period, the authors find that the signaling hypothesis can be dependent on firm-specific characteristics, such as life cycle stages. The authors report that the relationship between dividend changes and subsequent earnings changes is different for different life stages. They also find that changes in the amount of the dividend provide some information about future earnings, especially during the early (introductory and growth) stages. These results are consistent with the use of earnings or return on assets as the dependent variables in models of earnings expectations.

The authors believe that this is the first time that the dividend signaling hypothesis has been linked to the life cycle of the firm.

The nature and extent of our knowledge of stock market efficiency are examined. The development of “efficiency”, as a way of thinking about stock markets, is traced from Roberts (1959) and Fama (1965) onward. The early work successfully introduced competitive economic theory to the study of stock markets and paved the way for a flood of empirical research on the relation between information and stock prices. This literature irreversibly altered our views on stock market behavior. The theory and evidence of seemingly‐rational use of information lay in sharp contrast to prior beliefs. It was associated with a widespread increase in respect for stock markets, financial markets, and markets in general, at the time. Researchers began developing and using a variety of formal models of security prices. Nevertheless, “efficiency” has its limitations, both theoretically (as a way of characterizing markets) and empirically (by stretching the quality of the data, the estimation techniques used, and our knowledge of price behavior in competitive markets). Extensive evidence of anomalies suggests either that the market systematically misprices securities or that the theoretical or empirical limitations are binding, or both. The less interesting research question now is whether markets are efficient, and the more interesting question is how we can learn more about price and transactions behavior in competitive stock markets. The concept of an “efficient stock market” has stimulated both insight and controversy since Fama (1965) introduced it to the financial economics literature. As a construct, “efficiency” models the stock market in terms of the reaction of prices to the flow of information. Like all theory choices, modelling the market in this fashion involved tradeoffs. The benefits included opening the literature to an abundance of high‐quality researchable data, covering a variety of information, and the resulting insights obtained on the role of information in setting prices. The opportunity costs included temporarily closing the literature to alternative ways of viewing stock markets, for example by modelling public information as a homogenous good and thus ignoring factors such as differences in beliefs among investors, differences in information processing costs, and the “animal spirits” that might drive group behavior. The costs also included reliance on particular asset‐pricing models of how an “efficient” market would set prices. Not surprisingly, the ensuing deluge of research has produced some startling evidence, for and against the proposition that financial markets are “efficient”. Strongly‐conflicting views and puzzling anomalies remain. The early evidence seemed unexpectedly consistent with the theory. The theory, and its implications, also seemed clear at the time. After a period that seems short in retrospect, the growing body of evidence in favor of the efficient market hypothesis emerged as one of the most influential empirical areas of economics. Fama's (1970) review described a flourishing, coherent and confident literature. This research had an irreversible effect on our knowledge of and attitude toward stock markets, and financial markets generally. It coincided with an emergence of interest in, and respect for, all markets among economists and politicians, and influenced the worldwide trend toward “liberalizing” financial and other markets. The research consistently appeared to show an unbiased reaction of stock prices to public information. The property of “unbiased reaction” to public information, which formed the basis of the early definitions of “efficiency”, was seen to be an implication of rational, maximizing investor behavior in competitive securities markets (Fama 1965, p.4). Reduced to a basic level, the reasoning was that any systematicallybiased reaction to public information is costlessly publicly observable, and thus provides pure profit opportunities to be competed away. Characterizing the market in terms of its reaction to information is only one of many feasible ways of modelling stock price behavior, but it introduced economic theoryto the empirical studyof stock prices, which had received little serious attention from economists prior to that point. Despite the subsequent spate of anomalies, the early efficiency literature not only adapted standard economic theoryto provide the first formal economic insights into how stock prices behave, but it helped pave the way for an outporing of theoretical and empirical work on stock markets and capital markets in general. Subsequent empirical research was not as consistent with the theory. Evidence of “anomalous” return behavior now is widespread and well‐known. It generallytakes the form of variables (for example, size, day‐of‐the‐week, P/E ratio, market/book value ratio, rank of scaled earnings change, dividend yield) that are significantly but inexplicablyrelated to subsequent abnormal stock returns. Much of this evidence has defied rational economic explanation to date and appears to have caused many researchers to strongly qualify their views on market efficiency. Disagreement has not been not confined to the evidence. The literature has produced a variety of research designs, ranging from the “market model” of Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR, 1969) to Shiller's (1981a,b) variance‐bounds tests. The very term “efficiency” has engendered controversy: there is a modest literature on precisely what efficiency means, on the role of transaction costs, and on whether efficient markets are logically feasible. Making sense of this literature requires careful definition of “efficiency” in this context and careful analysis of the type of evidence that has been offered in relation to it. This involves an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of both the theory of efficient markets, as a way of characterizing stock markets, and of the data and research designs used in testing it. Not surprisingly, a mixed conclusion emerges. While the concept of efficient markets was an audacious departure from the comparative ignorance and suspicion among economists of stock markets that preceded it, and provides valuable insights into their behavior, the concept has its limitations, in terms of both its internal logical coherence and its fit with the data. Section 1 ofthis survey sketches the development of the efficient market theory, reviewing the principal contributions in terms of their usefulness in guiding and evaluating empirical research. Section 2 addresses the limitations inherent in what is knowable about stock market efficiency, given the present state of theory about how security prices might behave in an “efficient” market. It argues that there are binding limitations in the theoryof asset pricing, some of which are known and others of which are unknown or even unknowable. These limitations must be borne in mind when choosing whether to interpret the data as evidence of: (1) market efficiency, under the maintained hypothesis that a specific research design, including a specific model of asset pricing used to benchmark price behavior, correctly describes pricing in an efficient market; or (2) the ability of our models and research designs to encapsulate how prices behave in an efficient market, under the maintained hypothesis of efficiency. Against this background, section 3 then provides an assessment of the accomplishments of the theory of stock market efficiency, including an interpretation of the evidence. It focuses on the nature and influence of the evidence and does not attempt to provide a comprehensive literature taxonomy. The final section offers conclusions. The principal conclusion is that the theory of efficient markets has irreversibly enhanced our knowledge of and respect for stock markets (and perhaps for all financial market or even for markets in general) but that, like all theories, it is fundamentally flawed.

Existing studies show that firms may have an incentive to use share repurchases opportunistically, thereby taking advantage of market participants’ confirmation bias that share repurchase is a signal of undervaluation. This study aims to investigate whether signaling costs and accounting transparency can serve as tools to identify opportunistic share repurchases.

The authors measure signaling costs by using two share repurchase methods (direct and indirect share repurchase) with different share repurchase costs, and measure accounting transparency using the history of earnings timeliness. The authors further measure long-term performance following share repurchases using operating performance and stock returns. Lastly, the authors compare the long-term performances between the groups defined by share repurchase method and earnings timeliness level.

The authors find that indirect share repurchase firms with a history of poor earnings timeliness experience unfavorable long-term performance, while other share repurchase firms do not. This finding reinforces the view that some share repurchases may be driven by managerial opportunism. In particular, when firms with a history of poor earnings-reporting behavior choose a low-cost repurchase method, their share repurchases may be motivated by managerial opportunism.

The findings suggest that past earnings timeliness and the signaling costs of a repurchase together are useful predictors of false signaling. Moreover, they suggest that investors can – at least in part – predict opportunistic share repurchases by using signaling costs and accounting transparency.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a synthesis of the literature on the changing perspectives of corporate distribution policy.

This paper synthesizes and interprets the theoretical, empirical and survey‐based research on corporate payout policy.

Dividends once constituted a prominent part of an investor's total return, but this role has declined over time. Although many companies still pay cash dividends, share repurchases have risen dramatically and are now a significant component of payout.

New theories and perspectives on corporate distribution are likely to be introduced; while this paper represents an up‐to‐date view on the topic, it is not possible to anticipate new research developments that may affect some of the perspectives expressed herein.

No single explanation fully accounts for the changes in distribution policy, most notably, the declining incidence of dividend‐paying firms and the increasing level of repurchase activity. Factors that explain the popularity of share repurchases in the USA include the improved regulatory environment, economic conditions, and the flexibility of repurchases relative to dividends. Developing a comprehensive model that explains the choice between dividends and share repurchase remains a challenge facing researchers.

The paper adds to the body of knowledge by providing an integrated perspective on dividends and share repurchase, summarizing decades of theoretical, empirical, and survey‐based research.

This study aims to analyze the influence of firm characteristics in dividend payout in a concentrated ownership setting.

This study is probably the first to use the lasso technique for model selection and error prediction in the study of dividend payout in India. The lasso method comprises subsampling the available data set and performing reiterative regressions on those samples to generate the model with the best fit. This study incorporates four different ways of performing lasso treatment to get the best fit among them.

This study analyzes the influence of firm characteristics on dividend payout in the Indian context and asserts that firms with growth potential and earnings volatility do not hesitate to cut dividends. This study does not find evidence for signaling, agency cost and life cycle theories in a concentrated ownership setting. Earnings is the single most important factor to have a positive influence on dividend, while excessively leveraged firms are restrictive of dividend payout. Taxation has a prominent role in altering the way firms pay dividend.

The recent changes in buyback taxation offer another opportunity to test the reactive behavior of firms. Also, given the disregard for traditional motivations, further research needs to be done to determine if dividend adjustments (on the lower side) help enhance firm value or not.

This study may help investors view dividends in a proper perspective. Firms give importance to investments over dividends and thus investors need not dwell on dividend changes if firms fulfill their growth potential.

It lends perspective to investors about dividend changes and its importance.

The methodology used for analysis is absolutely original in the literature pertaining to dividend policy in the Indian context. The literature is abundant with theories advocating or opposing the eminence of dividend payout; however, this study takes a holistic view of all influential dividend determinants in literature to understand dividend payout.