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The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of career concerns on CEOs’ use of expectations management to meet or beat analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. The authors posit that early career-stage CEOs are less (more) likely to use expectations management than are late career-stage CEOs if the market views expectations management as an opportunistic strategy (efficient process) due to reputational capital concerns.

The authors obtain data for CEO career stages and CEO compensation from ExecuComp, analyst earnings forecasts from the detailed I/B/E/S database, financial statement data from quarterly Compustat and stock returns from the daily CRSP database over the period 1992–2013.

The results are consistent with the opportunistic hypothesis and early-stage CEOs seeking to build reputational capital by avoiding the perception of engaging in an inefficient managerial strategy. The authors find robust evidence that late career-stage CEOs are more likely to engage in expectations management than early career-stage CEOs. Furthermore, the authors show that late career-stage CEOs tend to employ expectations management to boost the value of their equity-based compensation.

The findings have important implications because the authors document a different implication of the “horizon problem” related to CEOs’ opportunistic forecasting behavior and the manipulation of analysts’ forecasts for CEOs who are approaching retirement.

The results have practical implications for analysts who provide earnings forecasts for firms whose CEOs are in early or late career stages and for investors who use such analysts’ forecasts in firm valuation models.

The authors contribute to the literature on expectations management by documenting how reputational incentives of CEOs affect the likelihood that managers engage in expectations management. The authors show that an important managerial incentive to engage in expectations management is CEO career concerns. Furthermore, the authors show that CEOs who are in early stages of their careers choose not to engage in expectations management due to the market’s perceived degree of opportunism pertaining to this strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of long horizon institutional ownership on CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark.

Using a sample of 10,565 firm-year observations in the USA, the paper examines the extent to which long horizon institutional investors mitigate the positive relation between CEO turnover and missing the quarterly consensus analyst forecast.

After controlling for the general performance-turnover relation, this paper finds that long horizon institutional investors mitigate the positive relation between CEO turnover and missing the quarterly consensus analyst forecast. This finding is stronger when CEOs focus on long-term value creation and do not sacrifice long-term value to boost current earnings and is stronger when the monitoring intensity by long horizon institutional investors is greater.

The results suggest that long horizon institutional investors serve a monitoring role in alleviating CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark.

This paper contributes to the literature on the relation between long horizon institutional ownership and attenuated managerial short-termism. The literature is silent about why long horizon institutional investors alleviate managerial short-termism. This paper fills this void in the literature by documenting that long horizon institutional investors mitigate CEO career concerns for managerial short-termism. Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature on the monitoring role of institutional investors by documenting the incremental effect of institutional ownership on CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically capture the impact of a chief executive officer’s (CEO) personal and organizational characteristics on firm performance in the context of a developing country and to explore whether capital structure mediates the relationship between CEO characteristics and firm performance.

In order to test the hypothesized model, CEO duality, tenure and personal characteristics (age, gender and education) were taken as explanatory variables to study their impact on firm performance. Data were collected from 179 Pakistani companies from 2009–2015. The collected data were processed via panel data regression analysis under fixed effect assumptions.

Results show that CEO duality has a negative impact on firm performance and that a CEO with a dual role is more inclined toward debt financing. Moreover, a CEO with a longer tenure tends to be opportunistic and prioritize his/her personal interest while making strategic financial decisions, thus creating agency costs for the firm. Furthermore, CEO characteristics like age, gender and education have significant effects on firm financial decisions and firm performance. Finally, the debt and equity ratio partially mediates the link between CEO characteristics and firm performance.

The findings of this study have limited generalizability due to the specific nature of the sample characteristics.

To the best of the authors knowledge, this study is the first to explore the impact of CEO characteristics on capital structure and firm performance. This work is also the first to explore the mediating role of capital structure in the relationship between CEO characteristics and firm performance by using Pakistani data.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the individual and interaction effects of chief executive officers (CEO)-chairman leadership structure (CEO duality) and CEO-serviced early years (the first three years in office) on real earnings management (REM) through sales activities of listed firms in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).

The longitudinal data on CEO and chairman names of 3,825 firm-year observations were manually gleaned from the SET market analysis and reporting tool and the annual reports from 2001 to 2015. Multiple regressions were utilized to analyze the effects.

The findings show a positive relationship between CEO duality and sales-driven REM. However, the CEO-serviced early years have no association with sales-driven REM. The CEO duality/serviced early year interaction effect is positively correlated to sales manipulation. In addition, firms with the CEO duality engage in upward or downward sales-driven REM, while firms with newly appointed CEO adopt only the upward sales-driven REM. In firms which their newly appointed CEO concurrently serves as chairman, either upward or downward sales-driven REM strategy is introduced.

The findings provide some grounds for capital market and regulators to exercise caution when it comes to firms with the newly appointed CEO and/or the CEO duality, given a high tendency to manipulate sales revenues.

This study is the first to investigate the relationship between the CEO duality/serviced early years on sales-driven REM. The findings are expected to complement existing publications on REM.

US corporations are now sitting on an enormous stockpile of cash. Instead of investing their resources and creating jobs, the firms are holding on to excess cash. Academicians and practitioners alike have tried to fathom the reasons why companies are holding on to so much cash. Numerous studies have talked about the various motives for holding cash. Many researchers have tried to correlate excess cash holding with particular firm characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to study the correlations that exist between excess cash holding and some measurable managerial characteristics.

Four different measures of managerial horizon (MH) were constructed. The first two constructs (MH1 and MH2) are based on the CEO’s age and how long he has been the CEO of the company. The next two constructs (MH3 and MH4) are based on compensation, proportion of current compensation and proportion of future compensation. This paper tries to examine if MH has any impact on excess cash holding.

The results clearly show that the CEO age and the proportion of CEO’s compensation (current and future) do determine level of cash holding in the company. Younger CEOs hold more cash compared to older CEOs. Older CEOs hold less cash suggesting that as CEOs grow older they might be motivated by the idea of leaving a long lasting legacy. CEOs who receive more of their compensation in future payments also hold on to more cash, whereas CEOs who receive more of their compensation in current payments hold less cash.

There is no previous literature dealing with MH and cash holding by corporations.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework to answer the following question: What are the consequences of sunflower behavior as well as spread behavior for how asset-liability management is administrated in a life insurance company?

This paper takes into account the following: the chief executive officer (CEO) of a life insurance company confirms the board of directors’ belief – the preference of the like of higher return relative to the dislike of higher risk; the authors call such behavior sunflower management; the life insurance policyholder is entitled to a guaranteed interest rate and a participation percentage of the company’s investment surplus; and the authors examine the optimal insurer interest margin, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the guaranteed rate.

Sunflower management translates into lower utility for the CEO and makes the CEO more prudent to risk-taking at an increased insurer interest margin for the provision of life insurance contracts. The effect of the guaranteed rate on the margin is ambiguous and depends on the level of guarantee itself. An increase in the participation level decreases the CEO’s loan risk-taking at an increased margin. It is shown that a trend toward higher return like of the board’s belief produces a corresponding trend toward the CEO’s decreasing risk-taking when the return like is revealed strongly. The results indicate that sunflower management as such is an important determinant in ensuring a safe insurance system.

This is the first paper to construct a contingent claim model to evaluate the expected value of the CEO’s utility function defined in terms of the equity returns and the equity risks of a life insurance company. The model explicitly considers CEO sunflower behavior, CEO spread behavior and the limited liability of shareholders.

This paper aims to examine the effect of chief executive officers (CEOs’) global experience (GE) on the Chinese firms’ outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and provides new insights on how CEOs’ foreign study and education experiences may affect firms’ OFDI. Further, this paper examines whether CEO power and state ownership have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between CEOs’ GE and firms’ OFDI.

This study used panel data of Chinese manufacturing companies in 2007-2016 to examine different hypotheses. The authors tested them using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model to shed light on the effect of CEOs’ GE on the firms’ OFDI.

This study found that CEOs’ GE generally promotes Chinese firms’ OFDI. CEOs’ foreign study experience has a stronger effect than foreign education experience. Further, CEO power and state ownership have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between CEOs’ GE and firms’ OFDI.

The findings have two important implications for managers and policy-makers. First, globally experienced CEOs are vital for firms to succeed in today’s highly competitive global environment. Second, CEO power is important in firms’ OFDI decision-making.

The authors use path dependency and upper echelons theories to show that GE, particularly foreign study experience, enables CEOs to take advantage of available resources in the market and institutional environment to create a path for the firm to expand globally.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the moderating effect of mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) experience/education and earnings management in European companies.

Data from a sample of 302 European firms listed on Stoxx Europe 600 index and 596 CEOs from 2000 to 2014 are used to test the moderation model using moderation regression analysis.

Evidence reveals that CEO’s accounting-based attributes are negatively associated with accruals-based earnings management and positively associated with real earnings management (REM). Further, mandatory IFRS adoption significantly moderates the impact of CEO’s accounting-based traits on earnings-management activities.

A small number of European firms were studied and, given the long study period, many firms with missing data were eliminated. To avoid a small sample size, countries with few observations were included, which leads to an uneven distribution between observations per country.

Findings from this paper can help: European firms to consider demographic traits when recruiting or promoting executives; the IASB to improve enforcement mechanisms and make IFRS implementation mandatory; and audit committees to effectively monitor REM.

This study is unique in providing European evidence for the moderating effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the relationship between CEOs’ accounting experience/education and earnings management activities. This paper is also relevant as it addresses the effectiveness and efficiency of accounting literates.

Based on 1,798 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013, using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms, this study aims to examine whether statutory internal auditors influence firm-level stock price crash risk.

Based on the bad news hoarding theory of crash risk, the authors investigate the association between the quality of statutory internal auditors and one-year-ahead stock price crash risk. The quality of statutory internal auditors is measured as the compensation of statutory internal auditors and the financial expertise of statutory internal auditors. Stock price crash risk is measured as an indicator variable whether a firm experiences one or more crash weeks during the fiscal year period.

The authors find that higher quality of statutory internal auditors – measured through greater compensation and greater financial expertise – is associated with lower possibilities of future stock price crash risk. These results indicate that high-quality statutory internal auditors mitigate bad news hoarding of managers because of their greater capability and stronger incentive to lower litigation risk and preserve their reputation. The results are mostly robust to different measures for stock price crash risk and the quality of statutory internal auditors.

The findings of this study regarding stock price crash risk are important for investors because such risk can significantly affect investor welfare. The results indicate that statutory internal auditors play an important role in controlling future stock price crash risk and maintaining stability in the equity market.

This study adds to the extant literature on the determinants of stock price crash risk and is the first to examine the impact of internal auditors on stock price crash risk. Moreover, this study also contributes to the existing literature on internal auditor quality by showing that high-quality statutory internal auditors reduce risks in financial markets.

The aim of the paper is to investigate the effect of labor strength on stock price crash risk and related moderating mechanisms.

To examine the relationship between labor unions and stock price crash risk and, more importantly, whether corporate governance moderates this relationship. Ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares, cross-sectional analyses, industry-level regressions and firm-level regressions are conducted.

The results suggest a negative impact of labor union strength on stock price crash risk. Further analysis suggests strong corporate governance mechanisms may mitigate the increased stock price crash risk in less-unionized firms.

Labor unions have a long-term horizon in the firm and have strong incentives to monitor managerial opportunism. However, labor unions may also increase financial reporting opacity and collude with managers to gain bargaining power in labor negotiations. The authors’ finding suggests that labor union strength is negatively associated with stock price crash risk. This finding is consistent with the notion that labor unions curb managerial opportunism in information disclosure, resulting in reduced crash risk. More importantly, the authors find corporate governance mitigates the negative impact of reduced unionization on crash risk, providing empirical support for recent regulatory efforts to strengthen corporate governance to prevent stock market crash.